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THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF ITALY AND FRANCE

A Study in Comparative Communism

By THOMAS H. GREENE*

I

THROUGHOUT the 1950's, students of communism almost invariably emphasized the "totalitarian" characteristics of Communist states, a conceptual orientation that coincided with and reinforced the foreign policy of the cold war. The doctrines of containment and massive retaliation could be justified most easily if the targeted enemy was considered the embodiment of the unremitting evil suggested by the totalitarian label.

Taken as micropolitical examples of the totalitarianism of Communist states, the nonruling Communist parties also were considered alien elements in the body politic of their particular societies. Thus they were seen as foredoomed to atrophy because of their attachment to Soviet foreign policy, their totalitarianism in the midst of essentially democratic political systems, and their reliance on the deprived socioeconomic strata of marginally productive economies. But, of course, it is not a very difficult task today to show that the long-standing and principal examples of nonruling communism, the Communist parties of Italy and France, have not withered away with economic growth and advancing political modernization. Plainly, our initial approaches to the study of communism included prejudices that resulted in a low level of valid prediction.[1]

The marked decline in the intensity of the cold war in the late 1950's and the 1960's coincided with increasing efforts in the social sciences to compare political systems systematically on a cross-cultural basis, par-

* Part of the research for this article was conducted during a year's residence in Europe in 1963 and 1964. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Social Science Research Council and its Research Training Fellowship program which made this research possible. I am indebted also for the encouragement and guidance initially provided by Professors Mario Einaudi and Steven Muller of Cornell University and Professor Theodore Lowi of the University of Chicago.

[1] H. Gordon Skilling has reviewed some of the concepts and criticisms of the totalitarian model as used in the study of Communism. See his "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 435-51.

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ticularly those systems characterized as traditional or premodern.[2] Both these developments, in the social sciences and in international politics, helped to stimulate a sweeping reevaluation of conceptual approaches to the study of communism. Conceptual retooling in the area of Communist studies has been largely in two directions, cross-cultural comparisons of two or more Communist political systems[3] and integration of Communist studies within the conceptual frameworks of general systems theory or political development. In the case of the development model, the integrative approach views Communist systems as particular variants of a more general phenomenon, the modernizing state in which the principal motor of change is economic growth.[4]

While the comparative and integrative approaches to the study of communism do not logically preclude adoption of the totalitarian conceptual model, it is significant that the totalitarian label has almost disappeared as studies of communism have become more comparative

[2] Among the earlier attempts at systematic cross-cultural analysis of modernizing societies were George McT. Kahin, Guy J. Pauker, and Lucian W. Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX (December 1955), 1022-41; Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (August 1956), 391-409; Dankwart A. Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph Series (Princeton 1956); Lucian W. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," *Journal of Politics*, XX (August 1958), 468-86; and the now classic introduction to Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960).

[3] See Robert C. Tucker, "On the Comparative Study of Communism," *World Politics*, XIX (January 1967), 242-57. Tucker suggests several categories within the comparative framework. Other comparative approaches to the study of communism are suggested in the symposium of views reprinted in the *Slavic Review*, XXVI (March 1967), 1-28. See especially Alfred G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," 3-12. Among the most notable attempts to study communism on a comparative basis are Franz Borkenau, *European Communism* (New York 1953); Richard V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton 1961); François Fejtö, "Les Progrès du schisme chinois," *Esprit*, XXXI (November 1963), 694-717, a Paris journal of the democratic Left; Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *The Communist Revolution in Asia* (Englewood Cliffs 1965); J. F. Brown, *The New Eastern Europe* (New York 1966); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., *Communist Political Systems* (Englewood Cliffs 1966); and H. Gordon Skilling, *The Governments of Communist East Europe* (New York 1966).

[4] The integrative approach to the study of communism is especially well exemplified by Frederick C. Barghoorn's contribution to the Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics. See Barghoorn's *Politics in the USSR* (Boston 1966). Like the other contributors to this series, Barghoorn integrates his topic area within a framework for functional analysis which derives particular sophistication from studies of developing societies. For some of the pitfalls in employing functionalist categories in the study of communism, see Robert S. Sharlet, "Systematic Political Science and Communist Systems," *Slavic Review*, XXVI (March 1967), 22-26. Alfred G. Meyer's perceptive analogies between the Soviet Union and modern corporate bureaucracy might also be included in the integrative category of Communist studies. See Meyer's *The Soviet Political System* (New York 1965).

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and integrative. Just as scholarship has recognized the many differences among states formerly characterized as the "Communist bloc," so has scholarship recognized that nonruling Communist parties frequently differ in their responses to the policy demands of the Soviet Union. And just as we have identified widely varying levels of decision-making conflict among Communist states, so we have recognized that the patterns of behavior of nonruling Communist parties frequently vary significantly according to the party.[5]

In the case of the French and Italian Communist parties, there no longer should be any novelty to the argument that documents the relative liberalism of the PCI, and the vestiges of Stalinism that still characterize the PCF. Students of contemporary communism should easily recognize these and other essential differences between the two parties, only noting in passing the more superficial characteristics that once justified lumping the two parties together: common organizational structures and ideological heritage, general Moscow orientation, a heritage of long-standing proletarian traditions in the city and anticlericalism in the countryside, predominance on the extreme Left of multiparty political systems, identification with the popular élan of the Resistance and Liberation periods, and exclusion from national political power from 1947 to the present.[6]

Despite these similarities, there have been substantial differences in the reactions of the PCF and the PCI to the central issues confronting them in the postwar period. The focus of the present article is on the possible causes of these differences, but the policy and behavioral contrasts between the PCF and the PCI should be briefly summarized.

II

In comparison with the PCF, the Italian Communist party was much more reluctant to implement the wholesale wrecking plans proposed in 1947 by the Cominform "progressives," Zhdanov and Tito. The

[5] Among the studies of decision-making conflict in the Soviet Union are Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), and Sidney Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953-1963* (Princeton 1965).

[6] Studies that view the French and Italian Communist parties as basically identical can be found in Mario Einaudi, Jean-Marie Domenach, and Aldo Garosci, *Communism in Western Europe* (Ithaca 1951); Ignazio Silone, in the French weekly *L'Express* (December 7, 1956); David S. McLellan, "The French and Italian Communist Parties and the Decisions of the 20th Congress, CPSU," *Western Political Quarterly*, X (June 1957), 446ff.; and, more implicitly than explicitly, Giorgio Galli's contributions to *Problems of Communism*, VIII (May-June 1959), 27-34, and to Volume I of *Communism in Europe*, edited by William E. Griffith (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).

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PCI's leader, Palmiro Togliatti, at first delayed staging the riots and general strikes ordered by the Cominform, public manifestations that were abortively carried out in France by the PCF. Togliatti then integrated the PCI's actions with his own strategy for an anti-De Gasperi electoral front with the Socialists for the 1948 elections. Unlike the PCF's, the PCI's behavior was not at all consistent with the Cominform's policy, which had been advanced specifically to offset the apparent failures of collaboration between Communists and non-Communists during the early postwar period.[7]

There also were marked differences in the ways the French and Italian Communist parties reacted to the Cominform's expulsion of Tito in 1948 and the subsequent campaign of anti-Yugoslav vilification that, in the case of the PCF, even carried beyond Stalin's death in 1953. The PCF was the first to begin and the last to end a campaign against the "traitor Tito and his clique of adventurers, who have gone over to the service of the imperialist abettors of war and become the worst enemies of their people, of the international labor movement, and of the Soviet Union."[8] Togliatti, on the other hand, was distinctly a moderate in the anti-Yugoslav campaign and never took seriously the violent charges of socialist betrayal and fascism hurled at Tito by Stalin and the PCF's leader, Maurice Thorez.[9] The liberalizing Eighth Congress of the PCI in 1956 in fact suggested that the PCI had been a close student of Yugoslavia's experiments in socialist construction. The Yugoslav party's attempts to control for bureaucratic domination, as well as its experimentation with administrative decentralization and workers' factory management, have been important stimuli to the PCI's own efforts to project the socialist future in a much more probing manner than ever has been attempted by the PCF. With so much ink spilled in its assault on Yugoslavia, it has been impossible for the PCF to suggest even the heuristic utility of the Yugoslav model for building a socialist society.

The PCI's relatively negative reactions to both Zhdanovism and anti-Titoism in the late 1940's had already suggested that one of the major characteristics of Italian communism was its anti-Stalinism, and the

[7] This period is covered in detail by Borkenau, chap. 20. Borkenau's insights into Cominform politics still are too frequently overlooked by students of comparative communism.

[8] Maurice Thorez, as quoted in the non-Communist journal *La Nouvelle Socialiste* (May 1956).

[9] François Fejtö, "Le Parti communiste et le 'polycentrisme,'" *Arguments* (No. 1-2, 1962). *Arguments*, now defunct, was a quasi-sociological journal edited in Paris by Edgar Morin for the intellectual Left.

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salient events of the 1950's and 1960's supported this conclusion. After the destalinizing Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, the PCF persisted in idolizing Stalin and in maintaining the Soviet Union in its apparent role as autocratic guide of a world Communist movement. The PCI instead pushed the criticism of Stalin's personality cult to the point of criticizing the nature of the Soviet political system itself, and it argued that each Communist party should exercise independent authority within its own region of what was termed a "polycentric" system of Communist and non-Communist states.[10]

While the PCF attempted to explain away the substantial economic improvement in France after 1953, arguing the continued validity of Marx's pauperization theses,[11] the PCI revised its ideological interpretation of the potential of capitalism. The PCI's economists and sociologists focused on the Italian industrial triangle, examined Antonio Gramsci's studies of highly developed and automated capitalist production, and admitted the capacity of "neocapitalism" to plan its way out of devastating economic cycles.[12] Within the framework of neocapitalism, the PCF interpreted the Common Market primarily as a new military alliance poised for advance to the east, while the PCI accepted the Common Market as "a new economic reality" and sought in its program to democratize the Common Market's political structures.

And while the PCF used the Sino-Soviet conflict to reargue its case for a centralized system of Communist parties, calling for the conformity or expulsion of the Chinese Communists, the PCI urged a conciliatory policy, correctly perceiving Chinese autonomy as essential to Communist polycentrism. Togliatti's famous "last testament," written just prior to his death in Yalta in August 1964, used the Sino-Soviet conflict as a basis not only for resurrecting the thesis of polycentrism but also for criticizing the Soviet Union's failure to analyze thoroughly the causes of Stalin's personality cult. Togliatti also accused the Soviet leadership of unwarranted hesitation in carrying out the liberalization policies proclaimed at the 1956 and 1961 CPSU congresses and, as before

[10] Palmiro Togliatti, interview in *Nuovi Argomenti* (June 18, 1956), a non-Communist journal of the Italian intellectual Left.

[11] See the collection of Thorez' articles in *La Paupérisation des travailleurs français: Une tragique réalité* (Paris 1961).

[12] In 1961, the well-known non-Communist French writer on trade unions and industrial technology, Serge Mallet, admitted his debt to the Italian Communist sociologist Leonardi, who in the mid-1950's had developed the concept of integration, applying it to the new relationships between workers and their enterprise. Leonardi's concept of integration was "considered by the PCF as the expression of the most atrocious collaboration of classes" (Mallet, "La Querelle Thorez-Togliatti," *France Observateur*, November 30, 1961).

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in the PCI's postwar history, criticized the limitations the Soviet Union (and the PCF) had imposed on artists and intellectuals.[13]

Especially in regard to cultural freedom, the PCI and the PCF have frequently demonstrated their respective liberal and authoritarian orientations. The relative flexibility of the Italian party in this category also has been reflected in the PCI's willingness to revise the orthodoxy of communism, while the French Communists have attempted to maintain it as a set of eternal verities—for example, in regard to the nature of capitalism and the traditional Leninist thesis that views trade unions only as a "transmission belt" between the party and the masses.

Attentive students of communism, however, have been increasingly aware of the policy and behavioral differences distinguishing the Italian Communist party from the French. And in a few notable cases, attempts have been made to explain the reasons for these differences.[14] These attempts should be included within the developing tradition of comparative Communist studies, a category of inquiry this article hopes to contribute to and, perhaps, enlarge.

The comparative study of communism has been largely confined to Communist parties that have been in control of their respective social, economic, and political systems. This concentration on ruling communism is for understandable reasons. The data required for systematic comparisons of Communist states (as distinct from nonruling Communist parties) are usually more accessible to researchers and more amenable to the manipulation required for cross-cultural analysis. It is a relatively simple task to compare levels of industrialization, urbanization, literacy, the extent and form of agricultural collectivization, characteristics of political elites (including patterns of political recruitment), the degrees of managerial autonomy at the factory level and commodity pricing according to market demand, the extent of administrative decentralization, trade and tourist exchange with non-Communist

[13] An English translation of the widely publicized Togliatti memorandum, with an introductory note by Luigi Longo, Togliatti's successor, was published in the *New York Times*, September 5, 1964. The PCI's subsequent willingness to go further in favoring an international CP resolution of the Chinese conflict was primarily in exchange for the CPSU's publication of Togliatti's memorandum, a successful maneuver by the post-Togliatti leadership. *Pravda* published Togliatti's memorandum in full on September 10, 1964, thus immeasurably strengthening the PCI's position on all counts. The PCF's *L'Humanité* had reported the event of Togliatti's memorandum on September 4, 1964, without quoting from it and, predictably, with only critical comment. The occasion also prompted another PCF demand for imposing discipline on the Chinese, whose "factionalist activities have made the calling [of a conference] all the more urgent."

[14] For example, François Fejtö, "Le Parti communiste et le 'polycentrisme,'" and Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," in the special issue of *Daedalus*, "A New Europe?" (Winter 1964).

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III

states, political socialization of the mass society, patterns of communication between elite and mass, or even the number of newspapers admitted from non-Communist states as an index of domestic liberalization. Such indices are derived from data more readily available from and pertinent to political systems in which the Communist party wields power rather than competes for it.

Nonruling Communist parties, however, have no simple sets of indicators ready to suggest, for example, the extent of their organizational Stalinism, doctrinal revisionism, adaptability to socioeconomic change, or influence in the economies and political systems of their respective societies. Comparison of nonruling Communist parties tends to be more difficult because of the more subtle character of the variables that must be accounted for in even a very general differentiation of two or more parties.

COMMUNIST ELECTORAL SUPPORT IN ITALY AND FRANCE

One of the more obvious starting points in a systematic comparison of nonruling Communist parties is an evaluation of their respective electoral support, assuming the existence of competitive elections in the given political systems. And in this regard, a comparison of French and Italian Communist influence in national elections since World War II is a useful beginning in attempting to understand the reasons for the doctrinal and political differences between the PCF and the PCI.

Figure 1 is a graphic representation of some of the data reproduced in Table I of the Appendix on pages 34-38. It should be noted that the



FIGURE 1. PERCENTAGE OF ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR THE ITALIAN AND FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTIES IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 1945 TO 1967

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PCF's electoral support in June 1946 (26.0 percent of valid votes cast) is plotted on the graph instead of the party's electoral support received in the November 1946 election (28.2 percent). The June election was far more representative of the PCF's electoral influence, which was distorted in November by a marked increase in abstentions. Between June and November the registered electorate increased by 390,000 and the PCF's vote by 280,000, but the number of abstentions increased by more than one million (22 percent of the registered voters). It was the highest abstention rate of the French Fourth Republic (1946-1958) and resulted in a misleading indication of PCF electoral strength. Commentators on the politics of the Fourth Republic frequently have compared the PCF's vote in 1951 (26.0 percent) and 1956 (25.7 percent) with the November 1946 vote and optimistically but erroneously concluded that French communism was on the wane.

Instead, the four national elections between 1945 and 1958 plotted in Figure 1 showed remarkably stable support for the PCF, in spite of substantial economic improvement after 1948 (see Figure 2) and the



FIGURE 2. PCF ELECTORAL SUPPORT IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 1945 TO 1962, AND INDEX OF GENERAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1948 TO 1963 (1958=100). (SOURCE: *United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1965*, Table 52)

impact of De Gaulle's RPF in 1951 and Poujadism in 1956. Nevertheless, it was precisely a *political* event that substantially weakened the PCF's electoral support in 1958, when the party confronted a charismatic leader in power and a new electoral system that temporarily institutionalized the PCF's isolation from the French non-Communist Left. But since 1958, the PCF has shown some electoral resiliency under

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the Fifth Republic's institutions. And the party's general electoral stability in local elections, where the Gaullist impact has been minimal, suggests that French communism can usually expect to be supported by 20 to 25 percent of the French electorate.

Figure 1 also shows the Italian Communist party receiving from 20 to 25 percent of the popular vote since the war.[15] But however similar the amount of electoral support for the PCF and the PCI, the secular trends are dissimilar, and this finding may be helpful in explaining some of the less quantifiable differences between French and Italian communism briefly summarized in Section II above. While the PCF's long-run electoral support is best characterized as stable (especially during the Fourth Republic) or declining, the PCI's long-run electoral support has been clearly on the rise.

Figures 2 and 3 also make it very clear that general economic improvement does not have a negative impact on Communist electoral support, contrary to the quasi-Marxist hypotheses of many non-Communist scholars. Similar correlations over time of Communist voting strength with workers' hourly wages, general retail trade, and consumers' price level (not reproduced) support the conclusion that the electoral influence of nonruling communism is more a function of politics than of immediate economic change. (Marx probably would reply that the broad economic setting determines the general political style of any particular society.) However, in the case of the PCI (Figure 3), there may be some tangible support for the argument that a limited amount of economic improvement actually stimulates a higher incidence of extremist voting. This phenomenon, suggestive of Marx's correlation of increasing class consciousness with industrial development, presumably is due to more effective politicization and rising (and unfulfilled) socioeconomic expectations.[16]

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMMUNIST ELECTORATES IN ITALY AND FRANCE

A second category for comparing nonruling Communist parties relates to the socio-professional characteristics of their electoral clien-

[15] The 1948 parliamentary election in Italy is not included in Figure 1 or Table I because of the Communist-Socialist electoral alliance. The alliance precluded any precise differentiation of the two parties' combined vote (31 percent).

[16] See especially Lipset, 279-80, 290-93. An ecological study of the ninety-two Italian provinces in the 1953 national elections also finds a positive correlation between PCI voting support and increases in per capita income. This is especially true of the provinces in central and southern Italy, where the respective correlation coefficients are .58 and .59 (Steighton Arthur Watts, Jr., *The Influence of Socio-Economic Factors on Party Vote in the Italian General Election of June 7, 1953*, unpubl. diss., Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, 1960, Table 40, 254, 314).

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teles. Fortunately, in the case of Italy and France, sufficient data are available for some instructive findings that again may help to explain the relative moribundity of the PCF, especially during the 1950's, and the relative vitality of the PCI.

According to the data reproduced in Table II of the Appendix, the



FIGURE 3. PCI ELECTORAL SUPPORT IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 1946 TO 1963, AND INDEX OF GENERAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1948 TO 1963 (1958=100). (SOURCE: *United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1965*, Table 52)

PCI's electorate is more masculine in composition than the PCF's electorate (PCI, 61 percent males; PCF, 51 percent males).[17] The relative conservatism of the feminine voter was thus less controlling on the PCI (in the 1950's), an especially important consideration given the greater influence of the Catholic church in Italy in comparison to France. Strictly in terms of the composition by sex of a leftist party's electorate, we also can hypothesize that the higher the proportion of feminine supporters, the less the party can concentrate on problems of the work environment. And insofar as a party's feminine supporters also are workers, they can provoke problems that complicate a party's relations with its masculine electoral and trade-union supporters: e.g., the issue of equal pay for equal work performed by women workers,

[17] It should be noted that the near equivalence of male and female percentages in the PCF's electorate appears to have been a characteristic only during the mid-1950's, the period of PCF immobility and Stalinism with which this article is mainly concerned. Opinion samples by the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (IFOP) in both 1951 and 1965 showed the PCF's electorate including 61 percent male and 39 percent female supporters, the same ratio of male and female that appears consistently to have characterized the PCI's electorate. See the IFOP's quarterly review, *Sondages*, No. 3 (1952), and *Le Monde*, November 20, 1965.

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the difficulty the parties have in determining when and where to place women on the party's electoral lists of proposed candidates, and the problem of discrimination against women in party and trade union positions of responsibility.[18]

If the vitality of a party is closely related to the youthfulness of its supporters, the Italian Communist party has another significant advantage over its French counterpart. According to the data in Table II, 81 percent of the PCI's electorate is below fifty years of age, while only 55 percent of the PCF's electorate is below fifty.

The same suggestion of relative conservatism or stagnation in regard to French communism also derives from the finding that almost half of the PCF's electorate (48 percent) reside in towns of under *five* thousand population. Only 35 percent of the PCI's electorate reside in towns of under *ten* thousand population. The PCF's electorate, then, is not only less masculine and older in general composition, it is significantly more rural than the PCI's electorate. Thus the fate of the small agricultural proprietor and the shop merchant of the village commune is of greater concern to the PCF. And it is precisely this type of marginal economic interest that has induced some of the conservatism and immobility characteristic of the PCF in France's modernizing economy.[19]

On the other hand, the PCI's extension of electoral influence into the underdeveloped South of Italy has proceeded apace with the postwar programs of land reform and large-scale economic investment.[20] Communist implantation in the Italian South, while rising consistently since the war, reached a substantial level only in the early 1950's, especially with the 1953 Italian national election.[21] As the PCF's implantation in the rural central region of France dates from the Popular Front successes of the 1936 election, the PCF in the 1950's found itself fighting

[18] A PCF *militante*, Denise Millérioux, writes that "if in a large factory . . . a woman is elected cell secretary after debate and a fair election, her authority as secretary is still frequently placed in question. It is necessary to struggle constantly in order to maintain her in her position, even if she is doing a good job" ("Sur le travail parmi les femmes: Quelques expériences probantes," *Cahiers du communisme* [January 1962], 67). An Italian party leader also has written that "conceptions that assign to women a subaltern and a marginal role in society are not yet overcome by the PCI" (Pietro Valenza, "Alcuni problemi del Rinovamento del PCI nel Mezzogiorno," *Cronache Meridionali* VII [January-February 1960], 7, quoted in Sidney G. Tarrow, "Political Dualism and Italian Communism," *American Political Science Review* LXI [March 1967], 46.)

[19] See Roy C. Macridis, "The Immobility of the French Communist Party," *Journal of Politics*, XX (November 1958), 613-34.

[20] Murray Edelman, "Causes of Fluctuations in Popular Support for the Italian Communist Party Since 1946," *Journal of Politics*, XX (August 1958), 535-52.

[21] Watts, 122.

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a rearguard action to maintain influence rather than seeking to extend its influence as in the case of the PCI. The PCI's rural support thus appears to be of a more dynamic type than the PCF's, and these findings again are likely to have important implications for the two parties' respective behavioral patterns.

The categories of social class, educational level, and occupation (Table II) all suggest that the PCF's electoral clientele is more heterogeneous than the PCI's. The French Communist electorate is slightly more representative of a middle class (PCF, 12 percent; PCI, 8 percent); it is significantly better educated (20 percent of the PCF's electorate has had schooling beyond the lower primary level, while this is true for only 10 percent of the PCI's electorate); and the PCF appears to have more employers, managers, doctors, lawyers, property owners, office workers, shopkeepers, students, pensioners, and housewives than the PCI.

From these findings it is easy to argue that the PCF's immobility in the 1950's derived in large part from the diversity of its electoral support. Primarily concerned with maintaining its electoral influence, the PCF frequently was pulled in conflicting directions, running the risk of alienating one part of its clientele in order to satisfy another. The classic response of most political organizations confronted with such a dilemma is to do essentially nothing, even though part of the manufactured image of communism requires making a great show of wanting to do everything. Immobility, however, was the major political and ideological characteristic of French communism in the 1950's—much more than in the case of Italian communism. The findings presented here suggest that there were some sound sociological reasons for this particular difference between the two parties.[22]

PARTY MEMBERSHIP

It is not possible to be on such firm ground in evaluating the membership characteristics of nonruling Communist parties, in part because the occasionally relevant data come from the parties themselves. It can be only a very tentative hypothesis that the general *pattern* of differences between the PCI's and the PCF's electorates is reflected in the characteristics of their respective memberships (i.e., that the PCF's

[22] Immobility as a function of a diversity of support is also Samuel Lubell's thesis explaining the stagnation of the American Democratic party during Harry Truman's Administration. See *The Future of American Politics* (Garden City 1956), 232-33. Roy Macridis makes the same argument in regard to the PCF in "The Immobility of the French Communist Party."

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membership is older, less masculine in composition, more rurally based and socially diverse). This may be a logically convincing argument, especially given the close relationship between areas of electoral influence and organizational strength, although this particular relationship tends to break down in the Italian South.[23] But there are no substantial data on the characteristics of the total membership on both parties that empirically verify this hypothesis.

The distinctive regionalism of Italian communism also makes cross-national comparisons of party membership characteristics highly tentative. For example, 45 percent of the PCI's membership in the North can be classified as nonagricultural workers, while only 31 percent of the party membership in the South belong in the same category.[24] While there are regional differences in France, they are not as pronounced as in Italy. One of the major weaknesses of French trade unionism, for example, derives specifically from the extensive geographical distribution of French industry. Even traditional PCF strongholds in the less industrialized regions of France, as near the Massif Central, often have as their leftist base in small communities a number of factories employing fewer than fifty or one hundred workers. Not only are substantial numbers of the workers sympathetic to the Left, but many citizens in the attendant economic strata of the community are dependent on the fate of the industry and its employees and frequently share, as a consequence, a leftist orientation.[25]

Nevertheless, Table III is an attempt to assemble the data available on PCI and PCF membership characteristics. The PCI data describe only the party cadres at the federation level and slightly overrepresent the southern membership: 25.8 percent of the PCI's members live in the South, while the Federal Committee personnel from the South constitute 30.5 percent of the sample in the table. The PCF data derive from (1) a sample conducted by the party itself, which included 100,000 members from selected federations, and (2) the characteristics of delegates to the Fourteenth PCF Congress held in 1956.

One of the clearest generalizations that can be made from Table III,

[23] Tarrow, 45.

[24] *Ibid.*, Table I. (My calculations correct for the summing of the "Italy" column in this table, where *N* is equal to 4,246 and not 4,264, as stated.)

[25] For observations of PCF "rural" support that is actually based on small industry, see François Goguel, ed., *Le Référendum du 8 Janvier 1961*, Cahiers No. 119 of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (FNSP) (Paris 1962), 143, 222; Antoine Olivesi and Marcel Roncayolo, *Géographie Electorale des Bouches-du-Rhone sous la IV^e^ République*, FNSP Cahiers No. 113 (Paris 1961), 221-23; Jacques Fauvet and Henri Mendras, eds., *Les Paysans et la Politique dans la France contemporaine*, FNSP Cahiers No. 94 (Paris 1958), 448-49.

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although not directly related to the problem at hand, is that the PCF's congress delegates do not appear to be a representative sample of the party membership, as industrial and urban members are overrepresented and agricultural and rural members are underrepresented. Because the party congresses have no decision-making autonomy, the leadership's manipulation of delegates according to socio-professional characteristics probably amounts to an effort to give the PCF a more proletarian image than is in fact the case. Otherwise, there are no significant differences between the PCF and the PCI that are apparent from the categories summarized in the table, unless the comparatively high PCF membership that is unaccounted for ("Others," 26.2 percent) again suggests a relatively greater heterogeneity than in the case of the PCI. This is unlikely, however, as two relevant categories in the PCF sample are not complete ("Professionals" and "White-collar"), and these are both categories in which the PCI's figures are higher than the PCF's.

The gross totals of party membership also have to be interpreted with caution (see Table IV). But in this category the apparent trends are again predictive of differences in PCF and PCI behavior. Figure 4 is based on the *declared* membership of the PCF and the PCI since World War II. It is virtually certain, however, that the PCF's member-



FIGURE 4. FRENCH AND ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL PARTY SOURCES, 1945 TO 1964

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ship never reached one million, a claim made in 1945 by Maurice Thorez and designed more to impress other Communist parties than to intimidate Frenchmen or reflect reality. Almost all authorities, including former Communists, agree that the PCF's total membership at this time was about 800,000 and that the PCF's official declarations of membership totals have been based on the number of blank membership cards distributed by the Central Committee's Secretariat to the party federations. According to nonparty estimates, the difference between membership cards distributed and received by the Central Committee (the latter indicating actual membership) varies from 150,000 to 200,000. The Italian party's membership declarations are also based on cards distributed rather than received. But the substantially greater membership of the PCI means that the difference between claims and reality is numerically greater than in the case of the PCF, probably between 400,000 and 500,000.[26]

While the PCF, then, probably lost about 70 percent of its total membership between 1945 and 1964, the PCI lost only about 8 percent for the same period and 37 percent between 1949 (the PCI's peak year) and 1964. Even accepting the parties' claims at face value, the PCF's admitted losses far exceeded those of the PCI: 59 percent for the PCF between 1945 and 1964; 4 percent for the PCI for the same period and 29 percent between 1949 and 1964. Officially or unofficially, in comparison with their peak years of membership strength and in proportion to their total membership, the French Communists have lost twice as many members as their Italian comrades.

It is appropriate to note here that the different behavior of the PCF and the PCI during the Zhdanov period of the Cominform, briefly described above, may be due in part to the different recruitment patterns of the two parties at that time (1947-1948). As Figure 4 shows, the PCF was rapidly losing members, while the PCI was rapidly gaining them. Had Togliatti reacted to the Cominform's call for national disruption with as much alacrity as Thorez, the PCI's rapid recruitment unquestionably would have slackened and perhaps come to a halt. Strictly in terms of recruitment patterns, Thorez had nothing to lose by trying to implement the wholesale wrecking plan dictated by Zhdanov and Tito. But Thorez's acceptance of the Cominform's advice without demur, unlike Togliatti's response, only reinforced the

[26] These differences in PCF and PCI total membership, actual and declared, conform to the credible estimates made by the U.S. State Department for 1959 (source cited for Table IV).

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membership decline already characteristic of the French Communist party.

From another point of view, the data summarized in Figure 4 might suggest an anomaly in the working hypothesis of the present study: that Italian communism has shown more vitality than French communism, in large part because of sociopolitical phenomena beyond the immediate control of the parties themselves. From only the data in Figure 4 it could be argued that, sometime in the 1950's, the PCF might have demonstrated more doctrinal and political flexibility than the PCI, if only to curtail its continuing loss of party members. More secure in its organizational support, why should the PCI not have been the more intractable of the two parties?

One possible answer, and the more obvious, derives from simply reversing the cause-effect assumption of the question. The PCI was less intractable than the PCF, thus more secure in its organizational support. And the reasons for the PCI's greater flexibility are to be found in the categories for comparative analysis explored elsewhere in this article.

A second answer relates to the *turnover* in party membership, a category of inquiry that belies the relative stability suggested by total membership figures. That membership turnover in fact can become a sizeable problem for militant organizations is made clear by figures presented to the Fifteenth PCF Congress in 1959 by Marcel Servin. Servin reported that 68,000 new members had been recruited since the party's Fourteenth Congress in 1956.[27] The probable membership of the PCF in 1956 was approximately 300,000, and in 1959, 250,000. Had the PCF retained all its members of 1956, the 1959 figure would have been 368,000. Instead, while gaining 68,000 new members, the PCF had lost 118,000 old members, thus reducing the overall membership total from 300,000 to 250,000. Put another way, the PCF lost 39 percent of its old membership between 1956 and 1959, and this old membership was replaced by a newly recruited element that constituted 27 percent of the total party membership in 1959.

From the available data, it appears that turnover among the PCI's membership is probably of similar proportions. Sidney G. Tarrow reports that the PCI had a membership turnover of 6 percent in the North and 14 percent in the South, but these percentages are for only

[27] Reprinted in *Cahiers du communisme* (July-August 1959), 233.

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one year (1961).[28] In absolute numbers, the turnover for the North exceeded the South's, as 74 percent of the PCI's membership is concentrated in the more industrialized region of the North.

Thus the PCI's greater stability in total membership probably is due not to a lower rate of defection but to the PCI's ability to recruit a higher percentage of replacements for those members who do defect. This hypothesis can in turn be supported by the following observations: the newly recruited membership is likely to be younger than the defecting membership, and the PCI, at least as suggested by its electoral sociology, is substantially younger than the PCF.[29] And, second, the major areas for new PCI recruitment have been in the Italian North, a more rapidly growing reservoir of new industrial labor (especially immigrants from the South) than any comparable area in France. In 1963, Italian southerners were still moving to the North in large numbers, the special trains for internal migration carrying southerners to the North at the rate of ten thousand a month.[30] The PCI's gains in the North in the 1963 elections were largely attributed to the distress of these southern immigrants, whose transitory status had been aggravated by social and subcultural conflicts with Italian northerners.[31]

It would be misleading, then, to argue that greater stability of total membership, as in the case of the PCI, is a factor inducing less flexibility in doctrine and politics. The higher proportion of replacements for defectors that the PCI appears to have been able to recruit (which accounts for the PCI's greater stability of total membership) in fact suggests the superior vitality that distinguishes the PCI from the PCF. It also is likely that the French party's membership turnover has only reinforced the PCF's stagnation, by enhancing the role-security of the

[28] P. 44. The 1956-1959 membership turnover for the PCF also derives from a more unstable period in Communist history, although most authorities agree that the events of the Twentieth CPSU Congress and in Poland and Hungary (in 1956) affected only the Communist intelligentsia of the nonruling parties. This point is especially well documented by Hadley Cantril, *The Politics of Despair* (New York 1958), 195-96.

[29] As noted above, 81 percent of the PCI's electorate in the mid-1950's was below fifty years of age, while only 55 percent of the PCF's electorate was below fifty. In terms of party membership, Sylvia Sprigge reports that "some older [Italian] Communists are said to be passing over to Nenni's Socialist Party, but new young members are however still joining [PCI]" ("Destalinization in the Italian Communist Party," *World Today*, XVIII [January 1962], 29).

[30] Ninetta Jucker, "Italy in Transition," *Political Quarterly*, XXXIV (April-June 1963), 185-93.

[31] David S. McLellan and Robert McLellan, "The 1963 Italian Elections," *Western Political Quarterly*, XVII (December 1964), 671-90 (esp. 683-84). An ecological study of the Italian industrial triangle appears in *Tempi Moderni*, V (April-June 1963), 87-94; an increase of southern immigrants in northern districts is shown to correlate with increases in the PCI's 1963 electoral support.

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party's firmly implanted cadres. Particularly in the French Communist party, the Stalinist old guard has derived its monopoly of power from its control over the middle hierarchy positions as well as the top of the party structure. Unschooled in intraparty politics and always at inferior levels in the organization, the PCF's newly recruited members thus have tended to reinforce the dominant position of the established leadership.

SOURCES OF AUXILIARY SUPPORT

The principal source of auxiliary support for nonruling Communist parties almost always is found in the trade-union movement. And in this category, as in the case of their electoral and organizational support, the Italian Communists appear to have distinct advantages over their French comrades. There is also, however, the same problem of differentiating claims from reality in assessing the relative strengths and dynamism of trade unions through analysis of trends in their total membership. Table V attempts this differentiation, with the following results.[32]

Both the French and Italian Communist trade unions had about six million members in the first years after the war. By 1960, the French CGT had dropped to about one million, while the Italian CGIL had a total membership of about 3.5 million. In 1960 the CGIL had approximately 61 percent of its peak-year strength (in 1947), while the CGT had only 17 percent of its peak-year strength (in 1945). We are likely to be on safe ground in assuming that, as in the case of total party membership, the CGIL's greater numerical stability is reflective of a more successful recruitment program making up for a part of the inevitable defections. Relative success in recruitment can again be attributed partially to the more rapid rate of Italian industrialization after the war (see Figures 2 and 3 above) and its greater regional concentration in comparison to that of France. A measure of this particular relationship is the drop from 6.7 million to less than two million workers in the major French trade unions (Communist and non-Communist) between 1945 and 1960. Between 1950 and 1960 the major Italian

[32] The French General Confederation of Labor (CGT) is dominated by the PCF, although the CGT occasionally has shown some independence, as in its reaction to the Soviet repression in Hungary and the extent of its support for the Algerian rebels. The PCI is by far the dominant partner in the Communist-Socialist CGIL, the General Confederation of Italian Labor, with the Communists receiving the support of at least 70 percent of the CGIL's membership (E. A. Bayne, *Four Ways of Politics* [New York 1965], 64). Giorgio Galli estimates the Communist majority in the CGIL at 75 percent ("Italian Communism," in *Communism in Europe*, Vol. I, 325).

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unions show an approximate decline in total membership of only one million workers, from seven million to six million (see Table V). The superiority of the CGIL to the CGT thus is reflective of a trade-union movement that is more vital in Italy than in France.

In industrial-administrative elections the CGIL also has been more strongly supported than the CGT (see Table VI). In 1947 the CGT received 59 percent of the vote electing administrators for social security funds in the nationalized industries; it received 43 percent in 1955, a loss of 27 percent in electoral support. In the election of grievance-committee members, Italian workers gave the CGIL 71 percent of their votes in 1947 and 57 percent in 1956, a loss of 20 percent in electoral support over a similar time-span. The comparability of these data is questionable, however, not only because of the different functions of the elected personnel, but because the particular electorates in both countries are not necessarily representative of unionized or general working-class sentiment.

There are as many subcategories for comparing the mass movements of two or more Communist parties as there are organizational attempts at controlling the various forms of public opinion. And of course Communist parties excel in the proliferation of mass-oriented groups, both on paper and in actuality. There is ample opportunity, then, for extending a comparison between the PCI and the PCF in the category of auxiliary support structures. Communist youth and student groups, rural and urban cooperatives, trade-oriented unions—including the professions (school teachers are of special importance)—and Communist-controlled municipal and regional governments are all subcategories for useful comparison.

And on the basis of data related to these subcategories and available at the time this article was written, it appears that the PCI continues to enjoy significant structural advantages over the PCF. For example, the Italian cooperative movement, including both agricultural and industrial workers, is far more developed than its French counterpart, and the PCI controls almost 50 percent of the more than 20,000 cooperative units in Italy.[33] In regard to municipal government, the PCF has occasionally controlled a major urban center such as Le Havre, but it never has enjoyed the extent of municipal power that the PCI has exercised in Bologna since World War II, with only minor Socialist support. In smaller municipalities, the Italian Communists and Socialists control

[33] Bayne, 65.

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about 2,200 communes.[34] The PCF, since the mid-1950's, has controlled between 1,300 and 1,700 communes, probably constituting substantially less of the total population than in the case of the Communist-Socialist local alliances in Italy.[35]

Data research and comparative analysis at this level of political activity, however, are likely only to fill in the details of an outline that, in the case of French and Italian communism, is already fairly clear. And in the category of sources of auxiliary support, there is little doubt that Italian communism has a more extensive popular base than French communism and, at least structurally, enjoys closer contact with the social mass it claims to understand and lead.

POLITICAL COMPETITION

The extent of competition between Communists and non-Communists in the political system probably is the most important variable differentiating French and Italian communism. That this should be true is, perhaps more than any other finding, convincing proof that Western European communism finally has renounced "the Revolution" for integration into the bargaining game of politics. A doctrinally extreme party that is isolated from political competition has no particular motive for adapting its ideology and politics to changing circumstances. And dogmatism and political immobility are certain to characterize a Communist party that feels itself unchallenged by the Socialist forces to its Right. This was precisely the situation of French communism from 1947 to the first years of the 1960's, when the French political environment reinforced the Stalinist characteristics of the PCF.

The first observation that should be made about postwar communism in Italy and France is not that both parties were excluded from ruling coalitions in 1947, but that the Italian Socialists were also excluded from governmental power while the French Socialists were not. The Nenni Socialists (PSI), the principal Socialist party in Italy, did not again support an Italian government until 1962 and did not regain official cabinet status until December 1963 and the maturation of the "opening to the Left." But the French Socialist party (SFIO) was a major participant in the coalition bargaining of French governments from 1945 to the first part of 1952 and from 1955 to May 1957. In 1953 and 1954 the SFIO provided important support for the governments

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] *Est et Ouest*, Supplement (February 16-28, 1959); *Bulletin S.E.D.E.I.S.* (March 15, 1957); *B.E.I.P.I.*, Supplement (July 1-15, 1955).

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of Pierre Mendès-France, and between 1945 and 1957 the SFIO controlled the premiership five times. In June 1958 the French Socialist party committed the unpardonable sin, from the Left's point of view, of letting almost half of its parliamentary deputies vote for De Gaulle's investiture, and three Socialists were among De Gaulle's twenty-three cabinet ministers until January 1959.

As a consequence, the French Communist party was unchallenged in its claim to be the focus of protest and the sole embodiment of leftist resistance to the regime. But the leftist elements in the Italian political system, from 1947 to 1962, could choose either communism or socialism as focal points for their antiregime sentiments. The resulting competition between the PCI and the PSI in Italy very probably was a major factor in differentiating the behavior of Italian communism from French.

Table II in the Appendix to this article also shows that the sociological bases of Italian socialism are more competitive with communism than are those of French socialism. Both the Nenni Socialists (PSI) and the Saragat Social Democrats (PSDI) have a substantially higher proportion of males and youth among their electoral supporters than the French Socialists. The PSI also is more solidly based on lower-middle and lower social classes than the SFIO and is more homogeneous than the SFIO in its support by social class and, according to the data available, by occupation. Particularly in terms of social class, the PSI is closer in electoral composition to the PCI than the SFIO is to the PCF.

It also is probable that the PCI has perceived both the PSI and the Social Democrats, and occasionally even the Italian Republican party, as close electoral competitors. All three of these non-Communist parties of the Italian Left have maintained at least as strong a lay orientation as the PCI and have been recipients of Communist party defectors.[36] However, by summing only the PSI and PSDI vote (see Table I), it is still very clear that the Italian Left has offered communism more electoral competition than has the French Left. Especially after the June

[36] On the basis of his field research and interviews, E. A. Bayne reports that the Soviet repression of the Hungarian rebellion in 1956 prompted more defections from the PCI to the Social Democrats and Republicans than to the Nenni Socialists (p. 56). The Republicans have been particularly strong in the Central regions (where the PCI also enjoys its strongest support) and have substantial appeal for anticlericals in general and sharecroppers and agricultural laborers in particular (also a significant part of the PCI's clientele). See Joseph LaPalombara, "Political Party Systems and Crisis Governments: French and Italian Contrasts," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, II (May 1958), 117-142.

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1946 elections in Italy and France, Italian socialism has been in the ascendant (the PSI and PSDI vote sums to 17.2 percent in 1953, 18.8 percent in 1958, and 19.9 percent in 1963), while French socialism, until 1967, has been stable or on the decline (the SFIO received 17.7 percent in November 1946, 14.7 percent in 1951, 15.0 percent in 1956, 15.4 percent in 1958, and 12.5 percent in 1962).

The French Radical party's essential centrism after 1947 and the French Christian Democratic (MRP) party's centrism as well as colonialism have disqualified both of these parties as significant competitors for the French Communist electorate. The PCF's marginal supporters have been affected more by movements on the French Right, Poujadism in 1956 (which increased PCF abstentions) and Gaullism, the latter especially after 1958. After the SFIO, the only other French leftist competitor of note has been the Unified Socialist party (PSU), but the PSU was not organized until 1960, and in parliamentary elections in both 1962 and 1967 it received only a little more than 2 percent of the total popular vote.

The Left of the Italian electorate thus has had more variety to choose from than the Left of the French electorate. This has helped to impart to the Italian Left a vitality not at all characteristic of the French Left, especially in the 1950's when the dogmatism and immobility of French communism were complemented by the anachronisms of French socialism. The SFIO, also rigid and authoritarian in its structure and outdated in its ideology, also dominated by a narrow leadership clique, and after 1956 soiled by a reputation for repressive colonialism (in Algeria), promised the French Left as dismal a future as the PCF. Thus the tendencies of French communism toward a self-satisfied immobility were reinforced by an almost equally moribund organization to the immediate Right. On the other hand, a misstep by Togliatti (for example, his predictable postwar preference for Yugoslav sovereignty over Trieste) could have immediate and important ramifications to the detriment of the PCI.

The French Fourth Republic also had no counterpart to Italian Christian Democracy. With the support of a more influential Church than in France, and with such auxiliary support groups as the Catholic Action Society, the political Center has been more cohesive and powerful in Italy than in France, certainly before De Gaulle. And after the Communists, the Italian Christian Democratic party's electoral support included a higher percentage of industrial workers than that of any

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other party in Italy.[37] The leftist elements in Italian Christian Democracy also have had competitors for working-class support such as Giorgio La Pira, mayor of Florence throughout most of the postwar period. La Pira dramatized his sympathies in 1956 when he requisitioned a bankrupt ceramics factory and turned it over to a workers' council to be operated as a cooperative. La Pira and other leftist Christian Democrats also have lobbied persistently within their party for a dialogue with the PCI, an effort that has met with some success, notably during the papacy of John XXIII.[38]

The Italian Communists, then, have been neither as secure in their leftist position as the French Communists nor as isolated from the other parties in the political system. While the PCF's isolation from the bargaining of the French political system was being institutionalized (after 1947, and especially with the electoral reforms of 1951 and 1958), the Italian Communists and Socialists were allied at the national level in a unity-of-action pact until 1952, more informally until early 1957, and at the local level and in the trade-union movement throughout the postwar period. In local government, the PCF never has approached the degree of Communist-Socialist collaboration that is practiced in the governments of almost a third of all Italian communes and almost a fifth of all Italian provinces. Nor has the PCF enjoyed the kind of continuing support the PCI has received from an estimated one-third of the Nenni Socialist membership, which has urged close collaboration between Italian Communists and Socialists in domestic politics.[39] By contrast, between 1947 and the early 1960's, one of the major preoccupations of almost all French Socialists was to avoid the PCF's apparent "embrace of death."

Table V also shows the greater competitiveness of the Italian labor movement in comparison to the French. As noted before, the major

[37] In the first half of the 1950's, 42 percent of the PCI's electorate were nonagricultural workers (26 percent were agricultural workers), and 39 percent of the Christian Democratic electorate were nonagricultural workers (21 percent were agricultural workers). The PSI's working-class support was only 23 percent nonagricultural and 15 percent agricultural (data reproduced in LaPalombara, 141).

[38] Norman Kogan, "Italian Communism, the Working Class and Organized Catholicism," *Journal of Politics*, XXVIII (August 1966), 531-555. On Giorgio La Pira, "a shrewd politician, a scholar and a fluent public orator," see G. M. G. Orsini, "The Red Lily of Florence," *Italian Quarterly*, VII (Fall-Winter 1963), 93-105.

[39] Norman Kogan, *The Government of Italy* (New York 1962), 49. At the October 1963 PSI Congress, convened to sanction the PSI's direct participation in Italy's Center-Left government, a substantial minority of 40 percent of the PSI delegates voted for continued opposition to the government, and thus for continued cooperation with the PCI.

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French trade unions have suffered a loss of almost six million members since the postwar peak years, while the major Italian unions have lost only about one million members. In terms of competition between Communists and non-Communists, a more significant finding is that defections from the French Communist CGT have been lost entirely to the French trade-union movement; but defections from the Italian Communist-dominated CGIL have tended to move to competing union organizations, either the Christian Democratic CISL or the Social Democratic and Republican-oriented UIL. And while total membership of the non-Communist unions has declined consistently in France, it appears to have risen consistently in Italy. The same impression of a trade-union environment that is more competitive in Italy than in France is also derived from Table VI, where the CISL and UIL are shown to have increased their electoral support in industrial-administrative elections by substantial margins after 1950. The French non-Communist FO and CFTC, on the other hand, either lost ground or maintained their positions between 1947 and 1962.

Unlike the PCF, then, the PCI has had the advantage of participating in a political system that offered communism both a greater competitive challenge and more opportunities for involvement. The vitalizing effects deriving from these particular dynamics are demonstrated not only by the differences between Italian and French communism, but by the significant changes in French communism itself after the full impact of Gaullism. It was only after the electoral losses of November 1958 (when the PCF's seats in the French National Assembly were reduced from 150 to ten!) and the increasing willingness of the SFIO and CFTC to work with the Communists against the Gaullist regime that the PCF began to revise its Stalinist dogma and politics of the 1950's, to cooperate with non-Communists on a nonsubversive basis in elections and trade-union activities, and even to take some bold steps in the direction of independence from Moscow. The degree of general system competitiveness, then, clearly is a major independent variable in the study and differentiation of nonruling Communist parties.[40]

[40] The PCF's destalinization efforts in the early 1960's were also stimulated by a power struggle within the party (the "Servin-Casanova affair"), based on the PCF's long accumulated weaknesses and the Sino-Soviet conflict. Increasing PCF autonomy from Moscow was demonstrated in February 1964 when Roger Garaudy disputed Leonid Ilyitchev's thesis that religion would have to be eradicated before communism could be constructed; in March 1964 when *L'Humanité* reprinted an editorial from a French Yiddish journal that criticized Russian anti-Semitism; in October 1964 when the PCF (like the PCI) sent a special delegation to Moscow to inquire into the circumstances of Khrushchev's fall from power; and especially in February 1966 when Louis

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LEADERSHIP AND SOME HISTORICAL ACCIDENTS

While some quantification would be appropriate to this category for comparing French and Italian communism (particularly a comparative study of the formation of party elites), a quantitative basis already is laid for suggesting some of the reasons for the relative flexibility and liberalism of the PCI. A few descriptive comments need to be added, however, as they relate to some additionally important reasons for the PCI's distinctiveness from the PCF.

One easily observed but important factor distinguishing the two parties until 1964 was the intellectual and political superiority of Palmiro Togliatti to Maurice Thorez. It is symptomatic of some of the problems of contemporary communism that so much should turn on the merits of individual leadership. It hardly testifies to the institutionalization of the "democratic" part of "democratic centralism," but then the general history of most political organizations is linked closely to the qualities of the organization's leadership. And in almost all the categories of Communist party leadership, Togliatti demonstrated his superior skills: in the manipulation of political alliances and electoral coalitions; in reshaping old ideology or explicitly rejecting parts of it as new economic and political conditions required; in maintaining the disparate factions of the PCI within the party organization and yet allowing a not insignificant expression of divergent opinion; in squeezing the maximum independence for PCI tactics from the brute directives of Moscow. These qualities were minimal in Maurice Thorez, who led his party not with a rapier but with a bludgeon.[41]

There admittedly was less to choose from after the deaths of both Thorez and Togliatti in 1964, followed by the succession of Waldeck Rochet in the PCF and Luigi Longo in the PCI. Both leaders complemented the capture of power in the Soviet Union by the bureaucratic technicians. But the PCI retained its qualitative advantage over the PCF in the second-rank leadership with Giorgio Amendola and Mario Alicata. The PCF could offer only a neo-Stalinist type in the person of Roland Leroy, together with old Stalinists like Jacques Duclos and

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Aragon condemned a Soviet court's conviction of writers Andrei Sinyavski and Yuli Daniel. Aragon wrote on the front page of *L'Humanité* (February 16) that "even a mediocre writer has the right to live freely," and he noted that the conviction "creates a precedent more detrimental to the interests of socialism than could ever have been the case with the writings of Sinyavski and Daniel."

[41] Comparisons of the leadership qualities of Togliatti and Thorez, with marked advantage to the former, have been made by several writers; see, for example, Borkenau, 79, 459, 529, 546.

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Jeannette Vermeersch (Thorez' wife), while the more intellectually oriented, such as Roger Garaudy and Louis Aragon, were as far as ever from the centers of crucial decision-making.

A second important factor in this category which further distinguishes French from Italian communism, and a factor that deserves at least passing reference, relates to the respective histories of France and Italy during the interwar period. Forced underground after 1926 by the Italian Fascist repression, the PCI escaped much of the bolshevization and pervasive control that hammered the PCF into a malleable instrument of Soviet diplomacy and Stalinist dogma.[42] Italian communism, after World War II, thus was not built on such an extensive network of tested Stalinist cadres who had proved themselves faithful to all the Comintern's about-faces in the 1930's and the early war period.

It is also likely that the PCI's long illegality and émigré status played an important role in shaping Togliatti's personal attitudes toward Stalinism. Thorez' occasional visits to the Soviet Union never deprived him of his faith in the Soviet system as the realization of the proletarian dream, and his relationship to Stalin was always that of an obedient and adoring disciple.[43] Thorez, however, was never in the position of having to seek asylum in the Soviet Union during the purges and maneuvers of the 1920's and 1930's. During this same period, Moscow was Togliatti's enforced residence or base of operations for Comintern activities. Togliatti thus saw at first hand Stalin's liquidation of thousands of foreign Communists who were living in the Soviet Union and represented pre-Stalin traditions. It is very likely that Togliatti, as a former supporter of Bukharin, lived most of his years in the Soviet Union in an atmosphere of frequent anxiety and occasional terror. It is not surprising, then, that Togliatti should have been much more responsive to destalinization and more skeptical of the Soviet Union's authority than Maurice Thorez.

THE PCI AND ANTONIO GRAMSCI

An even more unquantifiable distinction between the PCF and the PCI is represented by the influence of Antonio Gramsci on Italian communism. Gramsci directed the PCI between 1924 and 1926 and died in 1937 shortly after eleven years of Fascist imprisonment. In its initial stages, Gramsci's complex thought was uncongenial to the pre-

[42] This point is made by Lipset in his contribution to *Daedalus*, 277.

[43] This still is evident in the latest edition of Thorez' autobiography, *Fils du peuple* (Paris 1960), in which there is an astonishing display of Thorez' maudlin attachment to the memory of Stalin. See pp. 281ff.

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eminence of the party organization in the direction of the working class. The importance of Benedetto Croce in Gramsci's thought also added a liberalizing element, as well as appealing to the carriers of an important Italian philosophical tradition.[44]

After World War II, the PCI published Gramsci's works, and they appear to have exercised a considerable intellectual and political influence on contemporary Italian communism.[45] At the same time, the PCF acquired the French publication rights to Gramsci's works through its publishing house in Paris, Editions Sociales. But it was not until 1959, after the vigorous intercession of the PCI, that the French Communists finally published selections from Gramsci's writings.[46] With a preface by an unremarkable PCF reliable, Georges Cogniot, the volume was reviewed in the March 1962 issue of the *Revue Française de Science Politique* by Jean-Marie Vincent. Vincent made the significant point that the PCF's selections from Gramsci's writings during the "*Ordine nuovo*" period, when Gramsci emphasized the role of factory councils in the proletarian movement and projected socialist state, "give only a very approximate idea of the very great richness of Gramsci's thought." Even in publication, then, the PCF exercised censorship over materials considered subversive of the party's interests.

In Togliatti's historical and theoretical *Il Partito comunista italiano*, the general effect of Gramsci's thought appears to have been in the defense of Marxist theory against the rigidities of ideological dogma, and more particularly in urging the party organization to maintain a constant and close relationship with the masses of Italian society. The point is sufficiently important, both for differentiating the PCI from the PCF and for Communist ideological history, to merit some documentation. In one passage, Togliatti wrote, "With Gramsci, Marxism is liberated from the parasitic deformations of positivist Marxism and vulgar materialism, and regains its full value as a conception of the world and an integral vision of history." And in another passage suggesting Gramsci's influence, Togliatti revised the central Leninist notion

[44] Studies of Gramsci in English are of fairly recent origin. In 1957 the PCI's Gramsci Institute in Rome approved an anthology of Gramsci's writings, selected and translated by Louis Marks, who also provides a biographical introduction (*The Modern Prince and Other Writings*, by Antonio Gramsci [London 1957]). A substantial contribution to the study of Gramsci as a major Marxist theoretician was recently published by John M. Cammett, *Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism* (Stanford 1967).

[45] See Giorgio Galli, "Italy: The Choice for the Left," in Leopold Labedz, ed., *Revisionism: Essays on the History of Marxist Ideas* (London 1962), 326-27.

[46] Reported by Mallet in *France Observateur*, November 30, 1961.

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of the continuing necessity of the party organization as director of the working-class movement:

> The great mass of the population feels in a direct manner the constraints and sufferings in which it is forced to live and the disasters which strike it. It searches for favorable solutions which could ameliorate and render more just its conditions of existence. The maturity of the socialist transformation of society is expressed in the fact that this search leads the citizenry, sometimes immediately, sometimes through an experience which also can last for a long time, *to orient itself* in the same direction as the demands of the parties which are struggling for socialism. It is thus that not only the membership of these parties constantly increases, but *pure coincidences of profound movements are created, superior to the very organization of political parties*, which sometimes do not result in overt self-manifestation, except with extreme difficulty, but which exist nevertheless. In the masses of citizens somewhat separated from one another and *foreign to the direct propaganda of Communists and Socialists*, it is thus that there occurs little by little the development of a new consciousness which, in the end, cannot but impose the necessary social transformations.[47]

This particular ideological orientation of Italian communism could only reinforce the relative proximity the PCI appears to have with a substantial part of Italian society, as noted earlier in comparison with the PCF's grass-roots contacts. French communism has had no theoretical counterpart discouraging the PCF's self-embodiment of working class interests in its own detached action and thought. And if Marx, Lenin, and Gramsci traditionally have served as the PCI's "Sovereign Holy Trinity" (in the words of Ignazio Silone), Marx, Lenin, and Gramsci still are immeasurably superior to the PCF's traditional trinity of Lenin, Stalin, and Thorez.

[47] Palmiro Togliatti, *Il Partito comunista italiano* (Milan 1961). The excerpts are taken from pp. 169 and 136 of the French edition, *Le Parti communiste italien* (Paris 1961), translated from the Italian by Robert Paris (italics added). In his book, Togliatti demonstrated in several other ways the extent to which Italian communism had shaken off some of the behavioral patterns of Stalinism. There was not a single quotation from Marx, Engels, or Lenin (or, of course, Stalin) in the book's 170 pages, but instead there were innumerable references to Gramsci. It is significant that the PCF has no counterpart to Togliatti's study, and instead offers *Fils du peuple*, Thorez' presumptuously entitled autobiography, cited above. And what should be a major theoretical statement by the PCF (*Qu'est-ce que la philosophie marxiste?* [Paris 1962]) is instead a routine restatement of old dogma written by the PCF's two top bureaucrats (rather than intellectuals), Waldeck Rochet and Jacques Duclos.

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THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS

A final distinguishing factor to be noted, one related to both ruling and nonruling Communist parties, is the role of intellectuals in the French and Italian party organizations. Despite the PCF's pretensions to being the heir to all that is grand in French cultural traditions, and despite the party's enthusiastic display of its collection of scientists, writers, and artists,[48] the PCF in fact has used the party's creative talents only for the justification of PCF policy and the enhancement of its prestige. "The Communist party adores intellectuals. But in one form and one only: as oriental porcelain vases."[49] French Communist intellectuals, always far removed from the posts of continuing responsibility, consequently have played an insignificant role in the development of the PCF.

While no informed observer could claim that the history of Italian communism has been dominated by the influence of party intellectuals, there again are important differences in this respect between the PCF and the PCI. As noted before, Antonio Gramsci was both an intellectual of significance and a leader of the PCI in its early stages. And Palmiro Togliatti was certainly closer to being an intellectual than Maurice Thorez, frequently showing himself more sensitive to the ideas and interests of intellectuals than his French counterpart.

For example, when Khrushchev attacked abstract art in early 1963, Togliatti stated explicitly that "we do not share the attitude adopted by the Soviet Union on the subject of artistic problems. We are of the opinion that tolerance is necessary when one speaks of artistic expression." There followed a heretical break with the dogma of "socialist realism": "An artist belonging to an ideological current judged erroneous by some can frequently produce an authentic masterpiece."[50] Thorez said nothing about the whole affair, and he certainly never considered using it as a means for broadening liberalization and revisionist trends.

Before the 1963 Italian elections, Togliatti successfully sought to win back some of the intellectuals formerly alienated from the PCI, and he offered candidacies on the party ticket to such well-known personalities as authors Elio Vittorini and Carlo Levi, Giulio Einaudi (publisher and son of Italy's first postwar president), and Carocci, the director of the important leftist review *Nuovi Argomenti*. For comparison, French

[48] There is a note of ecstatic self-satisfaction whenever the PCF leadership quotes Picasso's declaration, "I came to communism as one goes to the fountain."

[49] Christian Guerche, a PSU militant, in *Le Monde*, May 3, 1962.

[50] Quoted in *Le Monde*, April 19, 1963.

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intellectuals have Thorez' declaration at the Fourteenth PCF Congress in 1956, aimed specifically at the "renegade" Pierre Hervé but also summarizing the PCF's continuing conception of the relation of the intellectual to the party organization. Thorez referred to "those inside the party who sometimes talk like our enemies under the pretext of 'liberty' of discussion. We do not grant to these individuals, whose interventions within the party coincide with the attacks launched from without by our enemies, the 'liberty' to propagate within our ranks their destructive and anti-Communist conceptions. (*Applause.*) Even better, we take the liberty to put them outside of the party. (*Prolonged applause.*)"[51]

The importance of the Italian party's economists and sociologists in analyzing the new conditions of European capitalism in the 1950's was briefly noted above. It should be emphasized here, however, that at this important juncture of Communist ideological history Thorez relied on his own interpretations of the new economic phenomena, thus continuing with the negative policies and dogma traditional to postwar French communism. And if Benoît Frachon, Communist general-secretary of the CGT, showed himself more capable in many respects than Thorez, Frachon still lacked the political competence and intellectual vigor of Giuseppe Di Vittorio, the PCI's late trade-union leader in the CGIL. It was Di Vittorio at the PCI's Eighth Congress in 1956 who questioned the contemporary validity of Lenin's thesis of the trade union serving only as a "transmission belt" between the party and the masses. In 1957 Di Vittorio also showed some willingness to accept the forthcoming European Common Market as a structure with potential benefit for working-class interests. But Frachon and the CGT have never directly challenged the Leninist thesis on the role of trade unions and have followed the PCF's line that interprets the Common Market strictly as a device for capitalist exploitation and German revenge against the East. Of course, it is probable that the relative competitiveness of the Italian trade-union environment, noted earlier, has served as an important stimulus reinforcing the greater doctrinal flexibility of Di Vittorio and the CGIL in contrast to Frachon and the CGT.

While the presence of an intellectual element in the party organization does not guarantee relative flexibility or liberalism, there can be little doubt that the absence of intellectual influence reinforces the party's bureaucratic and dogmatic characteristics. It is interesting to note that, in the 1950's, excessive bureaucratic control and dogmatism characterized both the French and Czechoslovak Communist parties.

[51] Reprinted in *Cahiers du communisme* (July-August 1956), 63.

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Both parties also were notably slow in accepting destalinization, showed an evident mistrust of Khrushchev, considered "revisionism" a much greater evil than "dogmatism," and consistently displayed, in François Fejtö's words, "an exemplary fidelity to Moscow."[52] At this point, Fejtö's analysis is worth quoting in full:

> How can one explain this affinity of reactions between two parties otherwise so dissimilar in national milieu and the traditions of the labor movement? Undoubtedly one of the principal reasons resides in the similar worker-bureaucratic character of the two parties. Contrary to the characteristics of the Italian and Polish parties, the intellectuals have played only a secondary role in the history of the French and Czechoslovak parties. . . . The cadres of the French CP as well as of the Czechoslovak are made up of bureaucrats who have climbed up through the ranks and who generally have a repugnance for all theoretical discussion and prefer implicit faith to ideas.[53] For them, the USSR, whatever it may do, remains the country of socialism incarnate; of Leninism, they have retained above all the necessity of making the party an army which obeys without murmur. They remain unshakable in their convictions once acquired—the German-Russian Pact, the crushing of the Hungarian insurrection hardly make them flinch. These are the guardians of the revolutionary ideal, for whom faith justifies the most bureaucratic, routine, and opportunistic attitudes. . . .

As Fejtö suggests, the Stalinist parallels between the French and Czechoslovak parties derive particular relief from the relatively liberal parallels between the Italian and Polish parties. The cross-national similarities and differences suggest, in part, the importance of intellectuals for a vital party organization, regardless of the nature of the external political environment. Thus the more intellectually oriented Polish and Italian Communist parties both responded positively to destalinization and gave full support to Khrushchev's foreign policy of détente. Gomulka and Togliatti also rejected the initial demands of

[52] "Le Parti communiste et le 'polycentrisme.' "

[53] This point in regard to the PCF is illustrated by Auguste Lecoeur, a former coal miner who climbed through the PCF's ranks to become secretary for organization before being purged in 1954. Lecoeur showed his disdain for the party intellectuals at several points in his book, *Le Partisan* (Paris 1963). The party, Lecoeur declared, is "a hobby for the intellectuals, for whom something thought is something done. As their 'present' is sufficiently comfortable and satisfying, they have nothing to lose by making themselves the propagandists of the 'happiness for future generations,' that old Stalinist dodge" (p. 295).

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the "Stalinist bloc" of parties, including the parties of Czechoslovakia and France, for an international conference to force conformity or ostracism on Peking. Gomulka's subsequent surrender in 1964 on this particular issue primarily reflected Poland's increasing economic difficulties and its consequent reliance on the good will of the Soviet Union.

For nonruling Communist parties, however, "objective" economic conditions seldom have such a controlling effect on policy choices. The extent of the intellectuals' influence in nonruling communism thus becomes a more significant variable in differentiating the behavior of various parties, as in the case of the PCI and the PCF. Nevertheless, in ruling Communist parties as well (for which the data on personnel are more readily available), there does appear to be a clear and positive correlation between relative liberalism and intellectual influence, if "intellectual" is defined by formal educational achievement (see Table VII).

Of the forty-four politburo members in the relatively liberal Yugoslav and Polish Communist parties, twenty-five (57 percent) had graduate or university training. But in the relatively Stalinist Communist parties of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, only five politburo members (14 percent) of a combined total of thirty-six had graduate or university training. If intellectual influence is likely to be even more decisive in the case of nonruling Communist behavior, then the relatively greater influence of intellectuals in Italian communism is another factor explaining the PCI's greater political and doctrinal flexibility in comparison to the PCF.

SUMMARY

The foregoing analysis of variables differentiating Italian and French communism, offered both as an explanation for the relative liberalism and vitality of the PCI in relation to the PCF and as an analytical framework for comparing nonruling Communist parties, can be summarized as follows:

1. The PCF's national electoral support has been stable or declining since World War II, while the PCI's national electoral support has generally risen.

2. The PCI's electorate has a greater proportion of male to female supporters, is younger, more urban-based, occupationally more homogeneous, and is drawn from more dynamic economic regions.

3. The PCI has enjoyed greater stability in total party membership,

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which implies a more successful recruitment program, largely from among the younger population of the urban-industrial centers.

4. The PCI has controlled a stronger trade-union movement, as measured by the relative stability of total union membership and suggested by successes in industrial-administrative elections.

5. The PCI has received stronger support from auxiliary structures, including trade unions, cooperatives in industrial and agricultural areas, and local and regional governments, which implies a closer relationship to the mass of the society.

6. A substantial part of the PCI's relative vitality appears to have derived from a more competitive political environment, including both the trade-union movement and political party system.

7. The PCI has been less isolated than the PCF from non-Communist groups in the political system, particularly at the level of local government and in the trade-union movement.

8. The PCI has enjoyed a distinct advantage in the category of leadership qualities, and the personal experiences of Palmiro Togliatti predisposed him more favorably to destalinization than did the personal experiences of Maurice Thorez.

9. The PCI's illegality during the interwar period mitigated the effects of Stalinist conformity and bureaucratic control which have been more pervasive in the organization of the PCF.

10. The PCF has had no intellectual or theoretical counterpart to the PCI's Antonio Gramsci, whose thought tended to resist a dogmatic interpretation of Marxism and to reduce the otherwise omnipotent role of the party in the context of mass movements.

11. The doctrinal and political influence of intellectuals has been more pronounced in the PCI than in the PCF.

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APPENDIX

TABLE I. Percentage of Valid Votes in National Elections After World War II, Communist and Socialist Parties in Italy and France

	PCF	PCI	SFIO	PSI	PSDI
1945	26.1	—	23.8	—	—
1946 (June)	26.0	19.0	21.0	20.7	—
1946 (Nov.)	28.2	—	17.7	—	—
1951	26.0	—	14.7	—	—
1953	—	22.7	—	12.7	4.5
1956	25.7	—	15.0	—	—
1958	18.9	22.7	15.4	14.2	4.6
1962	21.8	—	12.5	—	—
1963	—	25.3	—	13.8	6.1
1967	22.5	—	*	—	—

Abbreviations: PCF, French Communist party; PCI, Italian Communist party; SFIO, French Socialist party; PSI, Italian Socialist party (Pietro Nenni); PSDI, Italian Social Democratic party (Giuseppe Saragat), formed in 1947 after a split in the PSI.

Note: The 1945 election in France and the 1946 election in Italy were for constituent assemblies. All other elections were for the lower house, with the electoral percentages for France, beginning in 1958, taken from the first-round balloting. The data for the 1948 parliamentary elections in Italy are not included; the PCI and PSI were allied and together received 31.0 percent of the popular vote. In 1948 the PSDI was called the Socialist Unity party and received 7.1 percent of the popular vote.

*In the March 1967 parliamentary elections in France, the SFIO was allied with Center-Left elements led by François Mitterrand and called Fédération de la Gauche Démocratique et Socialiste. This grouping received 18.8 percent of the valid votes.

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TABLE II. Percentage Distribution of Voters for the French and Italian Communist and Socialist Parties, According to Sex, Age, Size of Town, Social Class, Education, and Occupation

	PCF	PCI	SFIO	PSI	PSDI
Sex					
male	51	61	54	68	67
female	49	39	46	32	33
Age					
below 35	25	—	13	—	—
below 40	—	61	—	65	52
below 50	55	81	58	79	77
above 50	44	19	38	21	20
Size of town					
under 5,000	48	—	50	—	—
under 10,000	—	35	—	—	—
under 20,000	58	—	66	—	—
Social class					
upper	1	1	9	2	7
middle	12	8	21	15	36
lower-middle	77	38	62	51	32
lower	10	53	4	32	25
Education					
none or lower primary	80	90	—	68	47
upper primary	10	8	—	23	25
secondary and technical	6	—	—	8	19
university	4	2	—	1	9
Occupation					
employers, managers, liberal professions, property owners	15	12	21	12	19
agricultural (all categories)	15	36	18	—	—
employees, office workers	10	1	17	6	18
workers (nonagricultural)	44	42	21	23	21
other (includes shopkeepers, students, pensioners, housewives)	16	9	23	—	—

Sources: To maximize comparability I have attempted to synthesize data from the following: Joseph LaPalombara, "Political Party Systems and Crisis Governments: French and Italian Contrasts," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 11 (May 1958); Philip Williams, *Politics in Post-War France* (New York 1958); Mattei Dogan, "La Stratificazione sociale dei suffragi," in Alberto Spreafico and Joseph LaPalombara, eds., *Elezioni e comportamento politico in Italia* (Milan 1963); *Les Elections du 2 Janvier 1956*, Cahiers No. 82 de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (Paris 1957). The LaPalombara article is itself a synthesis of data from various sources. The Dogan articles uses census data for an ecological study of the electoral supporters of Italian parties, but all the other data in the table are based on opinion samples conducted by Doxa, for Italy, and IFOP (Institut Français d'Opinion Publique), for France. While more recent samples are available (e.g., see *Le Monde*, November 20, 1965), for the purposes of this article I have selected data based on studies made between 1951 and 1956.

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TABLE III. Percentage Distribution of PCI and PCF Membership, by Profession; PCI Federal Committees, According to Region, 1954; PCF Sample of Selected Federations, 1954; Congress Delegates to the Fourteenth PCF Congress, 1956

	PCI			PCF	
	North	*South*	*Total*	*Sample*	*Congress Delegates*
N	2,943	1,303	4,246	100,000	787
Workers	44.9	30.8	40.6	40.1	52.0
Agricultural workers	4.1	7.1	5.0	4.8	3.2
Peasants	8.3	8.7	8.5	9.4	5.2
Professionals, students, and technicians	17.2	30.1	21.1	14.5*	22.3
Artisans	4.5	6.0	5.0	5.0	0.3
White-collar	15.4	11.0	14.0	—	11.9
Others	5.6	6.3	5.8	26.2	5.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Data reported are insufficient to make this category complete.
Sources: For PCI Federal Committees, Sidney G. Tarrow, "Political Dualism and Italian Communism," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (March 1967), Table I, 45; for PCF Sample of Selected Federations, *Cahiers du communisme* (July-August 1959), 234; for PCF Congress Delegates, *ibid.* (July-August 1956), 407.

TABLE IV. Membership of the French and Italian Communist Parties, Selected Years From 1945 to 1964, Official and Unofficial Sources
(in thousands)

	1945	*1946*	*1947*	*1948*	*1949*	*1951*	*1953*
PCF	1,032 804*	—	907	798	786	—	375*
PCI	1,700	2,150	2,215	—	2,300	2,112	—

	1954	*1957*	*1959*	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*
PCF	500	300*	425 250*	407 220*	—	240*	420
PCI	—	2,035	1,789 1,350*	1,788	1,750	—	1,632

*Estimates of party membership by non-Communist authorities. In 1965, the Italian Communist party's membership was estimated at 1.6 million, a reversal of PCI membership trends since 1949. (See the article by Luigi Barzini in the *New York Times Magazine*, February 13, 1966.) In 1963, the French Communist party's membership increased for the first time since 1945.
Sources: Dogan (see Table II); Bureau of Intelligence Research, U.S. Department of State, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations*, Intelligence Report No. 4489, R-12 (Washington, January 1960); Sylvia Sprigge, "Destalinization in the Italian Communist Party," *World Today*, XVIII (January 1962); Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York 1959); *La Voie communiste* (November 1963); Aldo Garosci, "The Italian Communist Party," in Mario Einaudi and others, *Communism in Western Europe* (Ithaca 1951); Leopold Labedz, ed., *International Communism After Khrushchev* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); François Fejtö, "Les Progrès du schisme chinois," *Esprit*, XXXV (November 1963); Georges Marchais, "Report to the Seventeenth Congress of the French Communist Party," *Cahiers du communisme* (June-July 1964); Michel Collinet, "The French CP: Signs of Crisis?" *Problems of Communism*, VIII (May-June 1959), 22-27.

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TABLE V. Membership of French and Italian Trade Unions, Communist and Non-Communist, Selected Years From 1945 to 1960, Official and Unofficial Sources

(in thousands)

	CGT	CGIL	CFTC	CISL	FO	UIL
1945	6,000*	—	750	—	—	—
1947	6,500	5,735	—	—	—	—
1948	4,000*	4,500*	—	—	—	—
1950	—	5,006*	—	1,489*	425*	401*
1953	1,125*	—	—	2,000*	—	—
1955	—	4,561	—	2,045	—	632
1957	1,000*	3,500*	—	2,000*	—	500
1958	1,500*	3,600*	700*	—	500*	—
1960	1,000*	3,745	450*	2,357	380*	1,495

Abbreviations: CGT, General Confederation of Labor (French, Communist-controlled); CGIL, Italian General Confederation of Labor (Communist-dominated with an organized Socialist minority); CFTC, French Confederation of Christian Workers (after November 1964, Democratic French Confederation of Labor, CFDT); CISL, Italian Confederation of Free Syndicates (formed in 1948 under Christian Democratic control); FO (CGT-FO), CGT-Force Ouvrière (French, Socialist-dominated minority that separated from the CGT in 1947, reorganized into CGT-FO in 1948); UIL, Italian Labor Unions (formed after a schism within the CISL, oriented toward the Italian Social Democratic and Republican parties).

*Estimates of trade-union membership by authorities other than trade-union sources.

Sources: J.-D. Reynaud, *Les Syndicats en France* (Paris 1963); Dogan (see Table II); Norman Kogan, *The Government of Italy* (New York 1962), *B.E.I.P.I.*, Supplement (October 1-15, 1953); Collinet (see Table IV); "Les grandes centrales syndicales ouvrières en France," *Les Cahiers français* (June-July 1963); *L'Express*, June 21, 1957; *France Observateur*, May 8, 1958, and May 25, 1961; Joseph LaPalombara, *The Italian Labor Movement: Problems and Prospects* (Ithaca 1957).

TABLE VI. Percentage of Electoral Support for French and Italian Trade Unions, Communist and Non-Communist, Industrial-Administrative Elections, Selected Years From 1947 to 1962

	CGT	CGIL	CFTC	CISL	FO	UIL
1947	59.2	71.3	26.4	22.5	—	—
1950	43.5	—	21.3	—	15.1	—
1953	—	—	—	—	—	3.3
1954	—	68.3	—	23.9	—	3.5
1955	42.9	61.4	20.9	29.5	16.2	5.5
1956*	—	57.2	—	32.9	—	7.2
1962	44.3	—	20.9	—	14.7	—

*The data for 1956 are based on the first six months, reducing by roughly half the number of valid votes cast (one million) and Italian factories affected (3,500 to 4,000) in the course of an entire year.

The French trade unions (CGT, CFTC, FO) are here competing in elections for the administration of social security funds. The Italian trade unions (CGIL, CISL, UIL) are competing in grievance committee elections. For an explanation of the abbreviations, see Table V.

Sources: Reynaud (see Table V); Murray Edelman, "Causes of Fluctuations in Popular Support for the Italian Communist Party Since 1946," *Journal of Politics*, xx (August 1958), 535-52.

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TABLE VII. Educational Achievement of Politburo and Secretariat Members of the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian Communist Parties, 1959, and of Politburo Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, 1945 to 1966

(in percent)

	LIBERAL PARTIES		STALINIST PARTIES	
	Yugoslavia	*Poland*	*Czechoslovakia*	*Bulgaria*
N	29	15	20	16
Graduate or university training	48	73	15	13
Secondary training	—	7	10	56
Secondary and primary training	38	—	—	—
Primary training or less	—	20	75	31
Unknown	14	—	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100

Sources: For the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian parties, Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 374; for the Yugoslav party, John R. Guenard, Jr., "The Politburo of the Yugoslav Communist Party, 1945-1966," unpubl. paper, Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, 1967.

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CASTRO'S REVOLUTION, CUBAN COMMUNIST APPEALS, AND THE SOVIET RESPONSE

By EDWARD GONZALEZ*

DEVELOPMENTS in the Cuban revolution between mid-1959 and early 1960 demonstrate both the interaction between the international and domestic systems and the bargaining process involved in Cuban efforts to secure Soviet support. Until the dispatch of First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan to Havana in early February 1960, the Soviet Union had been hesitant about revolutionary Cuba. The radicalization of the revolution which preceded Mikoyan's visit, therefore, stemmed not only from Fidel Castro's perception of opposition to his regime and from his need to ensure revolutionary momentum, but also from his efforts to increase Cuba's bargaining leverage with Moscow. In turn, the Cuban Communists served as a key linkage with Moscow and, most important, as an aggressive negotiating agent for Castro. In formulating their response to revolutionary Cuba, the Soviets were thus forced to contend with covert and overt pressures from Castro and his Communist allies.

A comparative analysis of the Castroite, Cuban Communist, and Soviet press, supplemented by information obtained in recent interviews in Havana, is used in this study to develop inferential evidence concerning the respective interests, objectives, demands, and responses of these three actors. What follows is a reconstruction of (1) the initial positions of the three actors; (2) the transformation of the revolution by Castro, the role of the Communists, and the Soviet view of Cuban developments; and (3) the bargaining that preceded the dispatch of the Mikoyan mission.

I. The Position of the Three Actors

THE CASTRO REGIME

Three sets of interrelated problems were left unresolved by Fidel

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Castro as he moved to consolidate the revolution during the first part of 1959. The first was the revolution's survivability over the long run: Could a nationalist and social revolution rely upon "the colossus of the North" coming to terms with the new revolutionary regime? Or would the regime in the end need to turn to the Soviet bloc in the face of Washington's intolerance? The second was the nature of the revolution and its implementation: Could a total restructuring of the Cuban socio-economic systems be accomplished through a popular nationalistic government utilizing a reformist and voluntaristic approach? Or would a revolutionary dictatorship be required to impose deep transformations and to maintain revolutionary dynamism? The third set of problems concerned the choice of revolutionary allies in the formation of a viable mobilization regime: Could revolutionary momentum be sustained solely with non-Communist elements drawn principally from Castro's Twenty-sixth of July Movement? Or would the revolutionary camp have to include Communist allies in order to recruit international as well as newly organized domestic sources of support?

Castro was well aware of Washington's role in the overthrow of the revolutionary, pro-Communist regime in Guatemala in 1954, but he nonetheless was determined to liberate Cuba from her quasi-colonial status.[1] For its part, the United States was ambiguous in specifying the limits within which it would tolerate the developing revolution.[2] On the one hand there were attacks in Congress and the press on the revolutionary trials and executions, the new government's permissiveness toward Communists, and the Agrarian Reform Law that expropriated foreign-owned properties. Occasional demands were also voiced from these quarters for a cut in the Cuban sugar quota, while anti-Castro exile activities were seemingly condoned by United States authorities. On the other hand, during Castro's unofficial visit to the United States in mid-April 1959, State Department officials expressed readiness to enter into immediate loan negotiations with his economic advisers.[3] In

[1] Castro's first public reference to the Guatemalan affair came on April 2, 1959. For the relevance of the Guatemalan experience to Castro's calculations, see Luigi Roberto Einaudi, "Marxism in Latin America: From Aprismo to Fidelismo," unpubl. diss., Harvard University, 1966, 160-250.

[2] For opposing interpretations of United States–Cuban relations, see Maurice Zeitlin and Robert Scheer, *Cuba: Tragedy In Our Hemisphere* (New York 1963), 62-106; and Philip W. Bonsal, "Cuba, Castro, and the United States," *Foreign Affairs*, XLV (January 1967), 260-76.

[3] Felipe Pazos, the former president of the National Bank of Cuba, who accompanied Castro to the United States, writes, "In the conversations with the State Department and the [International Monetary] Fund I had the feeling that they were almost forcing me to accept loans . . ." (letter, March 22, 1963).

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its note of June 11, the State Department also adopted a conciliatory position toward the agrarian reform and pressed solely for the "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" of expropriated properties.

From Castro's anti-imperialist and anticapitalist viewpoint, however, the negative reactions from "vested interests" outweighed the conciliatory gestures from official Washington. Moreover, even the more accommodative responses offered Castro little assurance that the United States would continue to tolerate his profoundly revolutionary objectives. The loan overtures, for example, did not signal a fundamental change in policy toward Cuba, as would have been the case had Washington proposed a revision of the Guantanamo Bay treaty. On the contrary, loans had been traditionally used by the United States to stabilize and control Cuba's internal situation.

Equally crucial, a *modus vivendi* between revolutionary Havana and conservative Washington was not necessarily in Castro's interest. Castro had liberationist goals not only for Cuba but also for the hemisphere; indeed, the "Cuban example" of armed struggle was to serve as the method by which "oligarchical" regimes could be overthrown throughout Latin America. At a minimum, therefore, a *quid pro quo* with Washington would have entailed Castro's giving up his liberationist ambitions for the hemisphere in exchange for economic assistance. In turn, this would have strengthened United States influence over the revolution, while simultaneously compromising Castro's anti-imperialist reputation among ultranationalists in Cuba and Latin America. Consequently, on arriving in Washington Castro announced that he had not come "as a beggar," and privately he instructed his economic advisers not to enter into loan negotiations.[4]

Within the revolution, Castro was faced with three different and contradictory tendencies. On the Right were the more conservative, middle-aged civilian moderates who held nominal governmental office, but who had virtually no revolutionary authority or effective power. Of greater influence were the more youthful but essentially anti-Communist Center-Left revolutionaries who were committed to structural socioeconomic reforms within a democratic system and who

[4] *Revolución* (the organ of the Twenty-sixth of July Movement and the Castro government), April 18, 1959, 9; and an interview with Felipe Pazos, July 2, 1964. Pazos also writes in his letter cited earlier that he overheard Castro express the fear that if he were invited to the White House and photographed with the President he would be considered "as one more Latin American leader 'sold out' to imperialism." On returning to Cuba, Castro time and again defended his performance in the United States on grounds that he had fulfilled his "duty" as a revolutionary. See *Revolución*, May 9, 1959, 2.

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occupied positions in the Rebel Army, the Twenty-sixth of July Movement, the government, and the trade unions. Finally, there were the youthful radical Left revolutionaries in the Rebel Army and government who favored a socialist revolution and dictatorship. Their leaders, Raúl Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, belonged to Castro's inner circle, and, although highly critical of the Communist party's passive role in the struggle against Batista, they openly advocated an alliance with the Communists.

During the first half of 1959, Castro had zigzagged between the radical Left and Center-Left on the Communist issue.[5] On the one hand, the Communists' Popular Socialist party (PSP) had been legalized; Communist infiltration of the Rebel Army had been promoted by radical Left elements; and anticommunism had been denounced time and again by Castro's brother, by Guevara, and by Castro himself. On the other hand, Castro's espousal of a "humanist" revolution and his public condemnation of communism during his trip to the United States in April triggered the Twenty-sixth of July Movement's offensive against the PSP. Furthermore, after his return to Cuba on May 8, Castro seemingly supported the Center-Left in its attacks against the Communists. Indeed, on May 21, he publicly accused the Communists of "anti-revolutionary" activities and further undermined the PSP's position by announcing Guevara's departure for a tour of the underdeveloped states. Consequently, by the end of May, the Communists felt themselves confronted with possible excommunication from the revolution.[6]

Castro's new inclination toward the Center-Left, however, was abruptly abandoned in early summer. Although the reasoning behind his turnabout remains clouded, three consecutive developments may have led him to move toward a rapprochement with the Communists. First, the implementation in early June of the Agrarian Reform Law of May 17 provoked the first manifestations of serious domestic opposition to his regime.[7] Second, the Cuban-based expedition to liberate the Dominican Republic foundered in mid-June, leaving revolutionary

[5] For an account of Castro's erratic course, see Edward Gonzalez, "The Cuban Revolution and the Soviet Union: 1959-1960," unpubl. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1966, 361-403.

[6] Blas Roca, the secretary-general of the PSP, warned the party in its May Plenum, "We are now in a critical moment for the revolution," and added that the attacks on the Communists created "a grave threat of regression and derailment for the revolution" (*Hoy* [the newspaper of the PSP], May 26, 1959, 7).

[7] Drawn up by Castro and his radical Left confidants, the Agrarian Reform Law was soon greeted in the nonrevolutionary press with public demands for its modification and for the prompt holding of elections. It was also a major factor in the resignations of five moderates from the cabinet on June 12.

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Cuba isolated and Washington disturbed over Castro's threat to Caribbean security.[8] Third, shortly thereafter Major Díaz Lanz, commander of the Rebel Air Force, defected to the United States and testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in the first week of July concerning Communist infiltration of the Cuban armed forces.

Castro may have thus concluded from these developments that (1) his revolution was fundamentally incompatible with Washington's prerogatives and with vested domestic and foreign economic interests, and (2) he would consequently require new sources of internal and external support. Given the Guatemalan precedent, he may therefore have calculated that if his regime was inevitably to be labelled as "Communist," he had everything to gain by moving closer to the Cuban Communists who could serve as brokers in obtaining indispensable Soviet assistance.

Accordingly, Castro turned decisively toward the radical Left and began to rehabilitate the Communists. On July 2, he refused to criticize PSP Executive-Secretary Aníbal Escalante for having belittled his "humanist" ideology.[9] Then, on July 17, in the midst of acrimonious exchanges between moderate President Manuel Urrutia and the PSP, Castro forced Urrutia's resignation and sharply condemned anti-communism. Urrutia was immediately replaced as President by Osvaldo Dorticós, the obscure Minister of Revolutionary Laws and a former Communist party member.

The Urrutia affair marked a crucial turning point for the revolution and the Communists. By crushing Urrutia, appointing Dorticós, and galvanizing a mass following, particularly among the peasantry, Castro had virtually consolidated his personal power and authority.[10] As a consequence, the Center-Left was now not only isolated and out of step with Castro, but also jeopardized by his strengthened position. Castro had thus successfully set the stage for actively pursuing a pro-Communist line and for recasting the Cuban revolution.

[8] The Dominican venture led to the Trujillo government's appeal for OAS action and to Castro's refusal to allow an OAS investigating team to enter Cuba. On the effect of the Dominican affair upon Castro's subsequent policy, see Andrés Suárez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 65-69.

[9] Castro dismissed Escalante's criticism and announced that his government had the "duty" to defend those who favored the revolution, adding that it would be "hardly honorable" to attack the Communists in order to avoid being accused as Communist (*Revolución*, July 3, 1959, 22, 23; and July 4, 1959, 20).

[10] To oust Urrutia, Castro had resigned the premiership on July 17. The mass meeting of July 26, augmented by peasants transported to Havana, restored Castro to office, at which time he singled out the peasantry for its loyalty and revolutionary commitment. See *Revolución*, July 28, 1959, 5.

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THE CUBAN COMMUNISTS

The Popular Socialist party had remained on the fringes of the revolutionary camp during the first half of 1959.[11] Given its marginal role, the organizational survival and political influence of the PSP hinged upon two mutually dependent contingencies. The party required Castro's endorsement and the deepening of the revolution in order to improve not only its domestic position but also its leverage with Moscow. Conversely, it needed to obtain assurances of tangible Soviet solidarity with Cuba in order to strengthen its bargaining position with Castro. Communist efforts were therefore directed toward securing both of these conditions.

In late January and early February, the PSP had publicly demanded concessions in the government and trade unions. However, Castro had rejected these overtures on assuming the premiership in mid-February, thereby forcing the PSP to recognize his revolutionary leadership and to mute its power demands.[12] Thereafter the Communists employed pressure-group tactics to improve their position and influence the course of the revolution. They condemned anticommunism as antirevolutionary, pledged their full support to Castro and the revolution, and derided moderate leaders as antinational elements. They also demanded the enactment of revolutionary measures and an independent, nationalistic foreign policy.[13] In this latter respect, the party worked to preclude the possibility of a rapprochement between Castro and Washington by echoing ultranationalist demands from the radical Left that Castro not "sell out" during his trip to the United States in mid-April.[14]

Simultaneously, the PSP sought to obtain Soviet support for Cuba through its direct contacts with Moscow and through its reportage and editorials in the party newspaper, *Hoy*. In both cases, the Cuban Communists worked to obtain Soviet solidarity by defining the nationalist,

[11] Although individual Communists had fought in the Rebel Army, the PSP had not actively joined the anti-Batista struggle until the last months of 1958. The party therefore was generally discredited within the revolutionary camp, and its members were excluded from positions of power.

[12] Although critical of Castro's failure to promote trade-union "democracy," the PSP's Executive Bureau nevertheless stressed that the party would assist him "to the full extent of its strength" ("Acuerdos del Buró Ejecutivo del Comité Nacional del Partido Socialista Popular," *Hoy*, February 21, 1959, 1, 3).

[13] The PSP, however, was less radical than were the Castroites on the issue of agrarian reform: until early 1960, it opposed the premature collectivization of agriculture on doctrinal, tactical, and economic grounds.

[14] Castro's trip to the United States produced considerable anxiety in the party, which was reflected in *Hoy* between April 4 and April 28.

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liberationist, and radical character of the revolution.[15] The party's public and private revolutionary assessments were therefore employed to influence Soviet policy-making and international Communist opinion.

This policy intent can be seen in the key declarations made by the PSP Secretary-General, Blas Roca, on April 11 and again during the party Plenum in late May.[16] Blas Roca proclaimed that Cuba had a "patriotic and democratic, national-liberationist and agrarian" revolution, thereby signifying that it was free of compromising ties with Washington, tolerant of the Communists, and anti-imperialist and antifeudal in character. Furthermore, the revolution was "popular and advanced," which meant that it included the working class (i.e., the PSP) and was moving beyond the typical bourgeois-democratic stage under capitalism. Finally, the revolution's continued national-liberationist and "advanced" character was assured because the "most radical sector of the petty bourgeoisie" had assumed leadership.

In essence, Blas Roca was indicating to the Communist camp that the revolution should be distinguished from other revolutions in the underdeveloped areas. This was conveyed in the assertion that revolutionary leadership was in the hands of the radical petty bourgeoisie rather than the national bourgeoisie. Unlike the national bourgeoisie whose revolutionary and nationalist commitment most likely would be compromised by profit considerations and by relations with agents of foreign capital, the radical petty bourgeoisie were considered to be economically independent and potentially more favorable to the proletariat. In turn, precisely because the revolution was more "advanced," Blas Roca was alerting the international socialist camp that it should be ready to extend full support to Cuba.[17]

The Urrutia affair was immediately portrayed by the PSP as a highly favorable development. The party hailed Urrutia's ouster as a "triumph and advance" for the revolution; it proclaimed Dorticós' appointment as making the government "more revolutionary"; and it praised the

[15] Interview with Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, member of the Secretariat of the Communist party of Cuba and former editor of *Hoy*, August 14, 1967. The Soviet press frequently cited the Cuban media in reporting developments, and permanent Soviet "correspondents" do not appear to have arrived in Havana until the end of 1959.

[16] "Qué clase de revolución es esta?" *Hoy*, April 11, 1959, 1, 3; and "Conclusiones del Pleno del Comité Nacional del Partido Socialista Popular, realizado en los días 25 al 28 de Mayo 1959," *ibid.*, June 7, 1959, 7-10. Blas Roca's assessment was also directed against the advocates of the "Chinese road" led by Aníbal Escalante. On the intraparty dispute over strategy, see Gonzalez, 343-61 and 404-16.

[17] This interpretation was confirmed by Rodríguez in his interview of August 14, 1967.

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"unity, coordination, and cooperation" among revolutionary organizations in supporting Castro.[18] Evidently confident of securing a firm foothold in the revolution, the Communists also asserted their equality, legitimacy, and superior ideological credentials within the revolutionary camp.[19] Blas Roca, however, went further in assessing the new revolutionary situation. Although acknowledging that Cuba would first have to pass through the "stage of national liberation," he also envisaged "the process toward socialism" by means of a "worker-peasant alliance" under a Castro-led government pursuing socialist policies, with the Communists sharing only formal power.[20]

Despite these optimistic appraisals, the PSP nevertheless still required external leverage in consolidating its position with Castro. Hence, Blas Roca's assessment in particular may have sought to activate Soviet interest in the revolution by alerting Moscow to the possible socialist role of the Cuban radical petty bourgeoisie led by Fidel Castro.

THE SOVIET UNION

In 1959, Moscow viewed the Cuban revolution as peripheral to the security and revolutionary interests of the Soviet Union. As during the anti-Batista struggle, the Soviet press continued to exploit Cuban developments for cold-war advantage, depicting United States "imperialism" and acclaiming Castro's foreign policy as a "national-liberationist" model for Latin America.[21] On the other hand, the Soviet press tended to underplay the revolutionary potential of the Cuban situation.[22]

Three developments in 1959, however, impressed Soviet commentators as strengthening the national-liberation character of the revolution. First, the Soviets acclaimed Castro for not having requested United

[18] "Declarationes del PSP: Sobre la solución de la crisis creada por la traición de Urrutia" (*Hoy*, July 19, 1959, 1, 5).

[19] See Aníbal Escalante, "Doctrina y acción—Concentración campesina y algo sobre la 'infiltración' comunista" (*ibid.*, July 29, 1959, 1, 5); and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, "Reflexiones ante un aniversario" (*ibid.*, July 29, 1959, 7).

[20] "Los Comunistas no ocultan nada" (*Hoy Domingo*, July 26, 1959, 1, 9).

[21] For example, see V. Levin, "Cuba: Victory Over the Tyranny," *International Affairs*, No. 4 (April 1959), 96-98; V. Levin, "Na mezhdunarodnyye temy: Manevry pokroviteley tiranii" [On international themes: Maneuvers by patrons of tyranny], *Pravda*, April 1, 1959, 6; and L. Kamynin, "Na mezhdunarodnyye temy: O tex, kto mechtayet povtorit' gvatemalii" [On international themes: On those who dream of a repetition of Guatemala], *Izvestia*, April 10, 1959, 1.

[22] Thus, while noting that the Castro regime had broad class support, a *Pravda* writer went only so far as to assert that the regime realized "that the best defense of the revolution lies in the indefatigable advance forward, toward the radical solution of pressing social and economic problems" (A. Kalinin, "Kuba na novom etape" [Cuba in a new phase], *Pravda*, May 12, 1959, 6).

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States economic assistance during his stay in Washington.[23] Second, the Agrarian Reform Law was viewed as a measure that would break Cuba's "semicolonial economic system" by striking at the "reactionary big landlords" who were the allies of imperialism.[24] Finally, the elimination of Urrutia was said to "forcefully demonstrate anew" that the Cuban revolution was determined to go forward along "the path of freedom and independence."[25]

Nevertheless, in covering the Urrutia affair the Soviet press reported neither on PSP advances nor on Blas Roca's prediction concerning the prospects of a "worker-peasant alliance" and the potential socialist orientation of the Castro regime. This qualified appraisal of Cuban developments suggests that Moscow still had serious reservations concerning the prospects for Soviet engagement and Communist advances in Cuba. First, Cuba was geographically remote, militarily vulnerable, and beyond the immediate sphere of Soviet interests.[26] Second, the fate of the Arbenz government in Guatemala weighed heavily in Moscow's calculations; this was evidenced by frequent references in the Soviet press to the "Guatemalan tragedy."[27] Third, the survivability and reliability of the Castro regime remained to be demonstrated. Fourth, the PSP's revolutionary assessments may have been considered as the exaggerated claims of one more foreign Communist party bidding for Moscow's favor and support.

Finally, Khrushchev's immediate foreign policy concern in mid-1959 was a summit conference that could resolve the deadlocked Berlin crisis. Indeed, at the very time of the Urrutia affair in mid-July, Eisenhower and Khrushchev had agreed to reciprocal visits, with the Camp David meeting scheduled for September.[28] Consequently, Soviet engage-

[23] L. Kamynin, "Mezhdunarodnyi obzor: Vokrug poyezdki Fidelya Kastro v SShA" [International review: Concerning Fidel Castro's visit to the USA], *Izvestia*, April 26, 1959, 5.

[24] V. Yakovlev, "Cuba: The Land Reform," *International Affairs*, No. 8 (August 1959), 88.

[25] L. Kamynin, "Kuba dayet otpor" [Cuba gives rebuff], *Izvestia*, July 21, 1959, 3.

[26] The low priority of Latin America in Soviet policy may be seen by (1) the 1958 May Day slogans, which did not mention the region; (2) the 1959 slogans, which listed Latin America after the other underdeveloped regions, but did not mention Cuba; and (3) the August issue of *World Marxist Review*, which carried an abridged version of Blas Roca's report to the May Plenum, but omitted several of his key "lessons" for Latin America derived from the Cuban guerrilla-war experience.

[27] Rodríguez, in his interview of August 14, 1967, confirmed this evidence. According to Rodríguez, the Soviets feared a repetition of the Guatemalan case in Cuba through an army revolt, external aggression, or internal disintegration of the Castro regime.

[28] On July 13, following overtures by Khrushchev and Kozlov, President Eisenhower invited the Soviet premier to meet at Camp David; he received Khrushchev's acceptance on July 22 (Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961* [Garden City 1965], 405-7).

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ment and Communist advances in Cuba surely were seen by Khrushchev as conflicting with his summit diplomacy.

In sum, Moscow valued the Cuban revolution insofar as the Castro regime disturbed inter-American solidarity, weakened United States hegemony in Latin America, and diverted Washington's attention to the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, the Soviets evidently hoped to realize these limited cold-war objectives with a minimum of direct involvement in Cuba and with the revolution retaining its liberationist but non-Communist character.

Thus a radical alteration in the ideological and political character of the revolution would appear to have been against Soviet interests at the time. The emergence of an openly pro-Communist regime and a "socialist revolution" would diminish the autochthonous appeal of the "Cuban example" for Latin America. Most important, it could obligate Moscow to extend economic, political, and military support to Cuba, thereby jeopardizing Khrushchev's summit diplomacy and creating a possible economic and strategic liability for the Soviet Union. It was therefore to Moscow's advantage to restrain the tempo and to moderate the course of the revolution in order to minimize Soviet internationalist obligations.

THE BARGAINING CALCULUS

On the one hand, the Soviet Union endorsed the independent nationalist course of the revolution. From the perspective of Castro and the PSP, on the other hand, the continued moderation of the revolution appeared incompatible with their respective interests, first, because it would mean the loss of revolutionary momentum by the postponement and scaling-down of goals and, second, because it would lessen the chances of obtaining firm Soviet support and aid.

Consequently, Castro had to contend not only with the "colossus of the North," but also with Moscow's equivocal position regarding Cuba. As a result, he was left without the possibility of finding a "third alternative" that had been made available to other nationalist leaders in exploiting "positive neutralism." Hence, rather than compromise his revolutionary goals to gain Washington's uncertain sufferance, he chose to confront the Soviets with a *fait accompli*: beginning in late summer, he moved to align himself with the Communists and to embark upon a socialist path as the only sure means of securing firm Soviet-bloc commitments. Once Castro opted for this course, the Cuban Communists in turn found it necessary to support the "Maximum

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Leader" because only he could bestow immediate power concessions and because Moscow's ultimate engagement in Cuba was vital to the consolidation of the party's position. By the end of 1959, the Soviet Union was therefore confronted with a transformed revolution and with implicit and explicit appeals from Castro and the PSP to extend aid to Cuba.

II. System Transformation

Castro's new radicalism

In the last months of 1959, Castro's abrupt radicalization and reorientation of the revolution profoundly altered its initial character. Reversing earlier democratic, reformist, and non-Communist tendencies, the Castro regime began to develop into a popular, revolutionary dictatorship that moved along a socialist and pro-Communist course and increasingly directed its appeals almost exclusively to the peasantry, workers, and students. Externally, the former nonaligned position of the Castro regime was replaced by a militantly anti–United States posture and by overtures to the Soviets.

This internal transformation and external reorientation stemmed from steps designed by Castro not only to ensure his domestic position and to maintain revolutionary momentum, but also to obtain eventual Soviet support. In turn, the regime's new socialist and pro-Communist tendencies, which emerged prior to the arrest of Major Huber Matos and the deterioration in Cuban–United States relations, progressively restricted Castro's options and further deepened the revolution. The revolutionary process was thus characterized by Castro's premeditated efforts to consolidate his domestic and international position in the face of both manifest and anticipated opposition to his new line, as well as by his improvisations in responding to immediate internal-external crises and opportunities.

Politically, Castro's first step was to facilitate the alliance with the Communists by neutralizing the Center-Left. In early August, anti-Communist leaders were removed from the National Directorate of the Twenty-sixth of July Movement.[29] At the end of the month anti-Communist officers were also transferred from command positions in the Rebel Army to less sensitive civilian posts.[30] Then, in mid-

[29] For example, Marcelo Fernández, National Coordinator of the Twenty-sixth of July Movement and a leader of the anti-Communist offensive in May, was transferred to the Foreign Ministry (*Revolución*, August 4, 1959, 1).

[30] Three majors and a captain were displaced for their anti-Communist sentiments (interview with José A. Duarte, former Rebel Army major, June 6, and June 27, 1967).

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September, *Revolución*'s polemical exchanges with the Communists were abruptly terminated.[31]

Guevara had in the meantime returned to Cuba following a worldwide junket that had included a visit to Yugoslavia. A few days after his return, the new economic course was launched by Castro on September 17.[32] Although publicly softened at the time, Castro's new policy signified in effect the phasing-out of the mixed economy and the agrarian and redistributive stage of the revolution. In their stead, Castro indicated that a socialist order was to be promoted which would stress statism-collectivism and industrialization and which would require rapid capital accumulation and working-class sacrifices.[33]

The domestic ramifications of the new economic course were political as well as economic. By the end of September or early October, the Castro-Communist alliance appears to have been concluded or tacitly agreed upon, as the PSP pledged labor's full support for the new economic course. On October 16, a new Minister of Labor was appointed to promote trade-union "unity" with the Communists, a policy that was fully implemented a month later. In late November, the respected economist Felipe Pazos was replaced by Guevara as president of the National Bank with authority to recast the Cuban economy.[34] Finally, toward the end of the year, the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) expanded its industrial activities and accelerated the collectivization of agriculture.

In the interim, Castro had been faced with the problem of disposing of the Center-Left and of exposing the still ambiguous threat posed by the United States. That he viewed the Center-Left as an obstacle to the radicalization of the revolution was made clear on October 19, when he warned, ". . . It would be better if those who prefer to remain on

[31] The conflict had erupted in late August with the PSP's campaign to obtain trade-union concessions by discrediting the Twenty-sixth of July labor leaders. *Revolución*'s counterattacks ended with an article that alluded to the incompatibility of Soviet-style communism with the objectives of the revolution. See Euclides Vázquez Candela, "Saldo de una polemica," *Revolución*, September 14, 1959, 10.

[32] During his three-month tour of the Near and Middle East, Asia, and Europe, Guevara had met Soviet representatives in Cairo, and two small Soviet sugar purchases were subsequently concluded between the USSR and Cuba. However, it does not appear that the Castro government was following Soviet instructions in radically restructuring the Cuban economy, given Moscow's apparently cool public response to the new economic course.

[33] See Fidel Castro, *Informe Económico Sobre Cuba* (Havana 1959), 38ff.

[34] Pazos believes that Guevara did not want the post for tactical reasons, but that Castro made the appointment precisely to exaggerate the leap to the extreme Left in order to terrify the business community (interview, July 17, 1964).

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the borderline in these hours . . . become enemies; that is, they would do more damage as companions than as enemies."[35]

Regarding the United States, Castro had to deal with the conciliatory position adopted by Ambassador Bonsal. Following his meeting with the Ambassador in early September, Castro had minimized Bonsal's personal efforts to restore harmonious relations on grounds that these depended primarily upon "the forces of interests at play" in the United States.[36] Nevertheless, negotiations between Bonsal and other Cuban officials proceeded satisfactorily through the second week of October.[37] The prospect of immediate accommodation, however, was dimmed by the report in mid-October that Washington had blocked the sale of British jet fighters to Cuba.[38]

Two developments on October 21 provided Castro with the opportunity to turn the revolution full force against his domestic opponents and the United States. First, Major Huber Matos, the popular leader of the Center-Left within the Rebel Army, was arrested on charges of treason when he resigned his commission over the Communist issue. Second, the Castro government charged that a Florida-based plane piloted by Díaz Lanz had bombed Havana shortly after Matos' arrest and that it had done so with the complicity of United States authorities.[39]

Before a mass rally on October 26, Castro violently denounced Washington for its responsibility in this new act of "aggression" and for its former role in supporting Batista and in maintaining Cuba's semi-colonial status. In turn, he equated all forms of opposition and anti-communism, as exemplified by the Matos affair, with the "aggression" and "treason" being promoted by "powerful interests" at home and abroad.[40]

The Matos affair and the October 26 speech marked the beginning of the annihilation of the Center-Left and the creation of new power alignments that provided for the Communists' ascendancy.[41] The end

[35] *Hoy*, October 21, 1959, 3.

[36] Castro, 36.

[37] This was the evaluation given by Marcelo Fernández, Under-Secretary of State. See *Revolución*, October 16, 1959, 1, 13.

[38] *New York Times*, October 17, 1959, 1; and *Revolución*, October 19, 1959, 1.

[39] United States authorities were culpable in not preventing such exile operations; but a close reading of Castro's speeches prior to October 22 suggests that he seized upon the incident in order to justify the turn against the Center-Left and the United States.

[40] *Revolución*, October 27, 1959, 5, 8.

[41] Pazos recalls that the arrest and denunciation of Matos had been "terrible news" because it signified that Castro had "swept away" the "popular front" within the Rebel Army in which Communists and anti-Communists had been kept in "equilibrium" (interview, July 17, 1964).

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of Center-Left influence within the government came with the resignations on November 25 of three prestigious revolutionary leaders—Felipe Pazos, Faustino Pérez, and Manolo Ray. In the meantime, Castro had begun to jettison the middle class and to cultivate support among the peasantry, workers, and students through the use of nationalistic and class appeals.[42] As a result, he gave up any further pretense of restoring constitutional democracy and relied instead upon the enactment of "direct democracy" between himself and "the people."[43] In order to ensure a personally loyal military apparatus, he also launched the full-scale organization of the "popular militias" to be recruited principally from among the peasantry and the urban lower class.[44] Finally, the labor movement was opened to Communist penetration by Castro's personal intervention in the National Congress of the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) on November 18 and 21.[45]

Externally, Castro's break with the United States was reconfirmed by two successive developments. In his strongly worded diplomatic note of November 13, Foreign Minister Raúl Roa stated that the Cuban government "definitely" rejected as "false" Ambassador Bonsal's allegations that Cuba sought to worsen relations. He went on to accuse Washington of supporting the counterrevolutionaries and to announce that Cuba would purchase weapons from whoever "may be willing to supply them." In addition, he demanded "some clear explanation" as to whether Washington endorsed the "insults, falsehoods, and other insidious propaganda" of the American wire services, asserting that the Communist issue was the "same old record" used to promote foreign intervention.[46] Then, the following week, the CTC Congress dis-

[42] In condemning Matos and his officers on October 26, Castro had noted that they were not of the peasant "class," which provided "the elite and the flower and the cream of the most battle-tested, the most valiant, and the most firm [element] of the Rebel Army" (*Revolución*, October 27, 1959, 8).

[43] Henceforth he would "consult with the people," Castro declared in his October 26 speech. The next day, the Revolutionary Tribunals and the death penalty for terrorist crimes were restored in order to "defend the revolution." *Revolución* later warned, "Here there are only two positions; either with Cuba or against Cuba. Or with the revolution or against it" ("La tercera posición," *ibid.*, November 10, 1959, 2).

[44] On October 19, Castro had announced that he would rely "above all" upon the peasants and workers. They would be organized and trained in the militias, thereby enabling the revolution to calculate "how many federations and how many peasants it could rely upon" (*Hoy*, October 21, 1959, 3, 4).

[45] See *Revolución*, November 20, 1959, 17; and November 23, 1959, 3, 5, 7, 8. Castro demanded the "cleansing" and "complete purging" of the CTC and its "regrouping" with the Communists. He was forced to intercede personally because the overwhelming majority of the delegates to the Congress were affiliated with the Twenty-sixth of July Movement.

[46] Roa, *In Defense of National Sovereignty* (Havana 1959), 7-23.

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affiliated Cuba from the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers and recommended the formation of an independent Latin American trade-union movement.

In the meantime, the November 3 editorial in Castro's organ, *Revolución*, had proposed that Cuba broaden her trade ties with the Soviets and that Mikoyan be invited to stop over in Havana on his return from Mexico. Foreign Minister Roa later disclosed that *Revolución*'s proposal was followed up by his formal invitation to Mikoyan, delivered in Mexico City during the latter part of November. Although the Soviet leader accepted Roa's invitation, he nevertheless left the date of his Cuban visit open. In fact, according to Roa, Havana was not to learn of Mikoyan's arrival date until the end of January 1960.[47]

Overall, these internal-external transformations in the revolution were interdependent and complementary. The new economic course both satisfied Castro's socialist inclination and increased his leverage with Moscow. The Communist alliance not only provided organizational support for his domestic economic goals, but also reinforced his bargaining position with the Soviets. The Center-Left, as a result, had to be eliminated because it was democratic, anti-Communist, and anti-Soviet. Domestically, the turn against the United States provided the revolution with an external enemy and a combative atmosphere, and it justified Cuban overtures to the Soviets, while externally it reaffirmed to Moscow Havana's independence. Similarly, the construction of a new garrison state upon a new sociomilitary basis not only ensured Castro's domestic position, but also provided Moscow with evidence that Cuba sought to avoid "another Guatemala."

THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNISTS

In spite of Moscow's reluctance to commit itself, the PSP had little choice but to align itself with Castro's new policies and to support his bid for effective Soviet solidarity with Cuba. Without the Soviet presence in Cuba the Communists carried little influence with Castro and risked being bypassed by the revolution if they sought to brake its momentum.[48] On the other hand, support for Castro's economic program would enable the party to conclude its "worker-peasant alliance," providing it with an immediate payoff in the labor movement and with an assured role in the emerging "socialist revolution." Moreover, the

[47] Interview, August 16, 1967.

[48] Blas Roca thus warned the October Plenum that the Communists ran "the risk of becoming stagnant, of falling behind events" (*Hoy*, October 7, 1959, 7).

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new direction of the regime not only would maximize Moscow's internationalist obligations, but also could enhance the PSP's value for Moscow as a control agent over the "runaway revolution."

The party's endorsement of the new economic course was given cautiously by Blas Roca on September 20. The PSP Secretary-General supported Castro's position on grounds that the revolution could not limit itself to political changes, but had to undertake the "great task" of economic development, which "consolidates and guarantees national sovereignty." Accordingly, the Communists were instructed to mobilize the working class in full support of the new industrialization drive.[49]

The PSP Executive Bureau, however, delayed its formal endorsement until September 25, perhaps because of the party's indecision over anticipated Soviet criticism of the new course.[50] Hence, four days later, a ranking Communist justified the PSP's position on grounds that if the country did not "advance constantly" by means of "deep economic transformations" it would "retrogress to its former humiliating position."[51] In any event, the renewed pledge of labor support contained in this last endorsement, together with the disclosures made at the October Plenum, indicates that the Castro-PSP alliance had been or was about to be sealed.[52]

Simultaneously, the Communists worked to increase their leverage on Moscow by cultivating the Chinese. For example, in Peking on September 29, Aníbal Escalante, the PSP Executive-Secretary, publicly demanded Sino-Soviet support for Cuba: ". . . We propose—*we call for* —the solidarity of all countries . . . *in particular, the states of the socialist camp*, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and all the

[49] The new course raised serious doctrinal, strategic, and tactical questions for the PSP. Hence, although endorsing Castro's program, Blas Roca also advised against precipitous statist and collectivist measures that would unduly alarm the national bourgeoisie and the peasantry ("La gran tarea," *Hoy*, September 20, 1959, 1, 8).

[50] First priority was thus given to agrarian reform and agricultural diversification rather than to industrialization, and the state's new activities were further limited to areas "that are necessary and that have not been undertaken by private industry" ("Resolución del Partido Socialista Popular," *ibid.*, September 25, 1959, 1, 7).

In his interview of August 14, 1967, however, Rodríguez maintained that the PSP had enjoyed complete freedom from Moscow, that Moscow had not opposed Castro's new course, and that the apparent delay in the Executive Bureau's endorsement had been due to "technical problems."

[51] César Escalante, "Doctrina y acción—Los Comunistas y la gran tarea," *Hoy*, September 29, 1959, 7.

[52] Lázaro Peña, for example, alerted the Plenum to favorable developments in the forthcoming National Congress of the Confederation of Cuban Workers which would "appreciably modify the actual state of forces," "produce new alignments," and "open up new paths that could be positive" (*ibid.*, October 10, 1959, 3).

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others."[53] Escalante's direct appeal was paralleled by PSP declarations in Havana on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the People's Republic of China. These declarations pointedly called attention to the relevance of the Chinese revolutionary experience to Cuba, and they hailed Chinese solidarity with the revolution.[54]

Blas Roca's report to the party Plenum in early October contained further clues of additional efforts to influence Soviet policy. He announced that a new party program was needed because "various democratic and national-liberation points" had "already been realized" while others were "in progress." Furthermore, the revolution's full triumph was now possible because of the "degree of attained unity, coordination, or cooperation" in the revolutionary camp and because the favorable "global relations of forces" and the integration of "revolutionary elements" in the Cuban armed forces worked against the repetition of the Guatemalan affair.

Although Blas Roca cautioned the Castro revolutionaries against ignoring the "prior and necessary stage" in revolutionary development, he nevertheless served notice that the revolution could proceed to the "next stage" by a constant process of "uninterrupted development." In both instances, then, the underlying operational assumption was that Castro was headed toward "socialism." This was revealed in a key passage in which Blas Roca envisaged such a "possibility," saying, ". . . The *most advanced elements of the radical sector of the petty bourgeoisie*, which today exercises hegemony over the revolution, will evolve toward the proletariat, *will adopt socialist points of view, and will remain at the head in the process of the transition to socialism*."[55]

Communist assessments in succeeding weeks also conveyed the message that revolutionary advances warranted Soviet support for Cuba. The PSP acclaimed the elimination of Matos and the Center-Left and the creation of a garrison state, as measures that "fortified" the revolu-

[53] *Ibid.*, October 21, 1959, 2, italics added.

[54] See "Declaraciones del P.S.P.—La existencia de la República China; poderosa ayuda a la revolución cubana," *ibid.*, October 1, 1959, 1, 7; and Blas Roca, "Los varios partidos en China," *ibid.*, October 6, 1959, 1, 7.

[55] *Ibid.*, October 7, 1959, 7, italics added. Blas Roca later acknowledged that proletarian hegemony was necessary for the *attainment* of socialism. But he reminded the Plenum delegates that the crucial question was " 'how that hegemony is to be established' " and that this included " 'winning over to the ideology of the proletariat that part of the radical petty bourgeoisie which moves toward the proletariat' " (*ibid.*, October 9, 1959, 7).

In his interview of August 14, 1967, Rodríguez lauded Blas Roca's contribution to the October Plenum, specifically his having avoided the "question of hegemony" and his having foreseen the role of the radical petty bourgeoisie in the transition to socialism.

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tion and that cleared the way for it "to advance even further."[56] Above all, developments were portrayed as ensuring the revolution's viability and as strengthening "all the tendencies for union and coordination" within the revolutionary camp.[57]

Meanwhile, the Communists had revealed their displeasure over the implications of Khrushchev's summit diplomacy for Soviet policy toward Cuba.[58] In mid-August, Blas Roca had warned the party that the upcoming Camp David meeting was unlikely to benefit Cuba, affirming, "We will continue untiringly our anti-imperialist struggle."[59] A month later, the PSP remained reserved in its public expressions regarding Khrushchev and his personal diplomacy.[60] In October and November, *Hoy* also contained indications of Communist irritation concerning the meager extent of Soviet solidarity with Cuba.[61]

In contrast, the Communists were quick to defend Castro's defiant policy toward Washington. Thus, in what may have been a rebuttal of anticipated Soviet criticism, *Hoy* protested that the Cuban note of November 13 was "not the adolescent haughtiness of a people or a few rulers who ignore the limits of their strength [but] the mature, conscious, meditated word of the entire nation that does not defy but also does not resign itself to silence."[62]

SOVIET EQUIVOCATION AND PRECONDITIONS

Thus far Moscow had made only a minimal public response to revolutionary Cuba by its perfunctory sugar purchases in August and September.[63] Moreover, neither *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *International Affairs*,

[56] Blas Roca, "El pueblo con la revolución," *Hoy*, November 1, 1959, 10.

[57] See Blas Roca's report to the Executive Bureau, *ibid.*, November 8, 1959, 2-3.

[58] In his interview, Rodríguez admitted that the PSP had become disturbed by the prospect of a Moscow-Washington accommodation that would adversely affect Soviet policy toward Cuba.

[59] *Hoy*, August 18, 1959, 7.

[60] See "Nuestra opinión—La visita de Jruschov," *ibid.*, September 17, 1959, 5; and "Saludo del Partido Socialista Popular—El cohete a la luna y la visita de Jruschov a EU," *ibid.*, September 18, 1959, 7.

[61] Writing on the small Soviet sugar purchase of September 30, Blas Roca pointedly noted that China had made concrete offers to buy Cuban sugar in "unlimited amounts" ("La compra Soviética de azúcar," *ibid.*, October 3, 1959, 1, 7). In his report to the Executive Bureau, he also listed the solidarity of China ahead of that of the USSR (*ibid.*, November 8, 1959, 2). Finally, the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution was commemorated in *Hoy* solely by a second-rank Communist.

[62] "Nuestra opinión—La voz de la patria," *ibid.*, November 14, 1959, 8.

[63] On August 12 and on September 30, the USSR had agreed to purchase in 1959 and 1960 a total of 500,000 tons of sugar for $31,300,000. However, the USSR had purchased more sugar in 1955 (442,000 tons) and 1957 (351,000 tons) than it was committed to purchase in 1959 (270,000 tons) and 1960 (230,000 tons). Further, because of the very low market price, the total Soviet cash commitment of $31.3 million for the

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nor *New Times* had reported Castro's new economic course, the PSP endorsement, Cuban trade overtures, or Blas Roca's formula for the Cuban road to "socialism." In addition, the Soviet press had carried only a brief account of Castro's October 26 speech, and it had failed to report Roa's diplomatic note of November 13. Presumably, therefore, the Soviets viewed the emerging new character of the revolution with some misgivings.[64]

Diplomatically, Cuban developments conflicted with Khrushchev's personal stake in the "spirit of Camp David." Strategically, the prospects of a pro-Communist and socialist revolution increased Moscow's internationalist obligations, while simultaneously raising the specter of "another Guatemala."[65] And economically, Soviet-bloc resources could be strained if called upon to underwrite Castro's socialist-industrialization experiment.[66]

Nevertheless, as an example for Latin American governments, Castro's nationalist and anti-imperialist posture did serve the cold-war interests of the Soviet Union. This was indicated by an article in the October issue of *Kommunist* which listed Cuba among the politically independent underdeveloped states.[67] But even here Moscow may have felt that close ties with Castro might nullify its efforts to normalize relations with the rest of Latin America.[68]

1959 and 1960 deliveries was less than the cash outlays for the *single* years 1955 ($35.7 million) and 1957 ($47.1 million). The 1959 agreements, therefore, appear to have been routine commercial transactions with little political significance; this was evidently recognized by *Hoy*'s commentators on August 14 and October 3.

[64] Hence, *Pravda* and *Izvestia* did not cover Cuban developments between September 6 and October 18; the first political analysis devoted entirely to Cuba did not reappear until *Pravda*'s edition of November 11.

[65] The Guatemalan refrain was markedly in evidence in the Soviet press following the Matos "plot" and the Florida-based raids. See L. Kamynin, "Yuzhnoamerikanskaya vesna" [South American spring], *Izvestia*, November 3, 1959, 3; and V. Levin, "Na mezhdunarodnyye temy: Kuba bditel'na i yedina" [On international themes: Cuba is vigilant and united], *Pravda*, November 11, 1959, 6.

[66] Soviet writers thus stressed the primacy of agrarian reform as a liberationist and developmental vehicle, and they virtually disregarded Cuba's industrialization objectives. See Kamynin, "Yuzhnoamerikanskaya vesna"; A. Burlak, "Cuba—Enemy Provocations," *International Affairs*, No. 12 (December 1959), 92; and Konstantin M. Obyden, *Kuba v bor'be za svobodu i nezavisimost'* [Cuba in the struggle for freedom and independence] (Moscow 1959), in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, No. 3563 (July 18, 1960), 7-9.

[67] These were listed in the following nonalphabetical order: India, Indonesia, UAR, Iraq, Burma, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Guinea, and Cuba (M. Lavrichenko, "Ekonoomicheskaia pomoshch SSSR slaborazvitym stranam" [The economic assistance of the USSR to the underdeveloped countries], *Kommunist*, No. 15 [October 1959], 110).

[68] Brazilian and Chilean trade delegations were scheduled to arrive in Moscow in late 1959 and early 1960. On the need for Latin America to normalize relations with

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Moscow's most pressing problem was to keep Cuba from accelerating beyond the "bourgeois-democratic" and "national-liberationist" stage, even in name only. For this stage, Soviet doctrine held that the national bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped states were to play a leading role in the antifeudal and anti-imperialist struggle.[69] Hence, one writer had claimed in August that the Cuban revolution was led by "anti-imperialist elements among the national bourgeoisie."[70] On the other hand, in his book published in late 1959 but based upon the PSP's assessments at the beginning of the year, Konstantin Obyden acknowledged that governmental control was held principally by the radical petty bourgeoisie. However, the implication of this observation was countered by Obyden's subsequent assertion that the PSP's goal was the formation of a broad "Democratic National Liberation Front," which would include the national bourgeoisie, and by his exclusive references to the PSP's earlier programmatic statements that corresponded to the first stage of the revolution.[71] Accordingly, the Soviets did not publicize Blas Roca's report to the October Plenum—in which both current hegemony and forthcoming leadership in the "transition to socialism" were assigned to the radical petty bourgeoisie—precisely because of its implication that Cuba was entering an advanced stage.

Moscow's position on Cuba was defined in a key article written by the visiting PSP Executive-Secretary, Aníbal Escalante, and published by *Pravda* on December 4.[72] Significantly, Escalante had been the advocate of the "Chinese road" earlier in the year, arguing that the Cuban revolution was an "exceptional case" that thereby opened up the possibility of rapid Communist ascendancy over the revolutionary camp. Now, however, his *Pravda* article reflected the more cautious Soviet viewpoint. Escalante thus referred to the Cuban revolution as being equivalent to "*every bourgeois-democratic revolution* in the colonies, semicolonies, and dependent states" and as being "agrarian and anti-

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the USSR, see V. Andrianov, "Latin America—An Imperative Demand," *International Affairs*, No. 10 (October 1959), 102-3; and Trinidad Martillo, "Evolution of the Inter-American System," *International Affairs*, No. 1 (January 1960), 62.

[69] See Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961* (Princeton 1962), 245-58; and G. Levinson, "Two Tendencies in the National Bourgeoisie," *World Marxist Review*, No. 9 (September 1959), 75-77.

[70] Y. Bocharyov, "Storm in the Caribbean," *New Times*, No. 33 (1959), 8. The importance of the national bourgeoisie in Latin America's liberation movement was also stressed by V. Levin, "Latin America on the March," *International Affairs*, No. 10 (October 1959), 73, 75, 78.

[71] Pp. 6, 11-12.

[72] "Segodnya i zavtra Kubinskogo naroda" [The present and future of the Cuban people], 5.

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imperialist in character" [emphasis added]. He also took the Soviet position on the importance of the national bourgeoisie in asserting that the revolution sought a "widening unity front" that would include not only the working class, peasantry, and petty bourgeoisie, but also the national bourgeoisie, all of whom constituted its "moving force." Consequently, he did not allude to the socialist and pro-Communist tendencies of the Castro government, and he indicated that working-class hegemony over the revolution was not contemplated for the foreseeable future.

In addition, Escalante's article mirrored Soviet concern over the vulnerability of the Cuban regime. On the one hand, he gave assurances that "the internal counterrevolution is not cause for much worry." But on the other, he noted that Cuba's greatest threat stemmed from United States pressures and even direct armed aggression and that it would be dangerous for Cuba "to forget completely about the existence of such expansionist plans." Conversely, he protested that the revolution "was not created in order to attack the United States" and that Cuba desired "peace with the American people."

In contrast to his earlier address in Peking, Escalante did not appeal directly for Soviet support. He concentrated instead on the defensive measures being adopted by the Castro regime. In this regard he affirmed that Cuba "has not been nor will it be another Guatemala" and that the revolution would "defend itself and move forward."

Escalante's article seemed to suggest that any future Soviet involvement would be contingent upon Cuba's fulfilling three minimum preconditions. First, the Castro regime alone would have to defend the revolution and to guard against the repetition of "another Guatemala." Second, the external tension between Cuba and the United States would have to be eased in order to minimize the foreign threat. And third, Cuba would have to adhere to a limited "bourgeois-democratic" and "agrarian and anti-imperialist" revolution that included the national bourgeoisie, which meant postponing the socialist ambitions of Castro and the PSP.

III. International Bargaining and the Mikoyan Mission

Throughout December, the Castro government fulfilled the first condition by stepping up the recruitment and training of the popular militias and by intensifying Cuba's new garrison-state atmosphere.[78]

[78] Castro warned on December 15, for example, that Cuba would have to remain on a "complete war footing" and that no quarter would be given to the counterrevolutionaries (Castro, *Una Sola Bandera, Un Solo Ideal: ¡Cuba!* (Havana 1959), 34, 48).

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Regarding the second condition, Foreign Minister Roa made conciliatory pronouncements on December 10 and 11, and Castro for the most part muted his anti-American attacks until well into January.[74]

Castro, however, could not accept a "bourgeois-democratic" revolution, with its concessions to the national bourgeoisie, because it would seriously compromise his domestic revolutionary goals and power. Equally important, in light of Moscow's anxiety over "another Guatemala," such a condition would reduce his leverage in obtaining firm Soviet commitments, thereby leaving the revolution exposed to the United States. Similarly, from the Communist viewpoint, a "bourgeois-democratic" revolution would signify the postponement of further domestic advances. Moreover, Soviet nonengagement in Cuba would result in the Communists' becoming excess baggage in the revolution, while the establishment of strictly governmental ties between Moscow and Havana would allow Moscow to ignore the party's interests, a tendency that had already been demonstrated by Soviet policy toward other nationalist regimes. The interests of the PSP thus coincided with those of Castro in ultimately rejecting a "bourgeois-democratic" revolution, and by the end of 1959 both appeared to be exerting maximum pressure on Moscow.

THE RADICALIZED REVOLUTION

For his part, Castro evidently sought to obtain tangible Soviet solidarity by threatening Moscow with a *fait accompli*—that is, by accelerating the socialist and pro-Communist tendencies of the revolution. In early December, the Cuban regime disclosed that INRA's collectivization of the countryside had proceeded rapidly with the creation of 485 "agrarian cooperatives" and more than 400 "people's stores."[75] The Cuban press subsequently announced the extension of INRA's activities into mining and industry and INRA's takeover of several industrial enterprises.[76]

Simultaneously, Castro continued to stress the class content of his revolution. Before the National Federation of Sugar Workers (FNTA) December 15, for example, he attacked the "privileged classes" and defended his "radical" and "social" revolution. Most significant, he

[74] Roa appealed for a revision of the U.S. tariff, expressed readiness to discuss compensation for expropriated American-owned properties, and indicated that nonagricultural foreign investments would be welcomed in Cuba (*Hoy*, December 11 and December 12, 1959, 1, 4).

[75] See the report by Captain Nuñez Jiménez in *Revolución*, December 4, 1959, 1, 4.

[76] *Ibid.*, December 21 and December 22, 1959, 1; and *Hoy*, January 6, 1960, 1.

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referred to the FNTA as "a genuine fusion of the peasantry and workers," corresponding to "the image of the revolution" which was "the tight union of the workers and peasants."[77] This appeared to preclude any role for the national bourgeoisie in the future.

Castro also openly courted the Communists. Throughout most of December, anti-Communist trade-union leaders were replaced by pro-Communist and Communist elements.[78] In early January, the purge authority of the CTC Executive Committee was strengthened to dislodge the remaining anti-Communists.[79] Furthermore, in the trial of Major Matos in mid-December, Castro had publicly signaled his acceptance of the PSP as a full ally by declaring that it was "proper and moral" for Communists to serve in the Rebel Army as long as they served the revolution.[80] Castro could thus rightly claim that the revolution was entering its second year under a "tremendous impulse" and with the opposing camps "well defined."[81]

In the meantime, it had been announced on December 12 that the Soviet industrial, art, and cultural exhibition would open in Havana in late January 1960.[82] While this was encouraging, the Cuban regime nevertheless was not to learn the date of Mikoyan's visit until seven weeks later. Evidently uncertain over Moscow's ultimate intentions, President Dorticós announced at the end of December that during his forthcoming trip to the Mediterranean countries Foreign Minister Roa would make arrangements for an economic conference of the underdeveloped states.[83] This appears to have been a stopgap measure to determine the extent of neutralist support for Cuba. Simultaneously, there was a pronounced shift in *Hoy*'s editorial line at the end of December which signaled a major Communist offensive to secure Soviet solidarity with Cuba.

THE PSP OFFENSIVE

Initially, the PSP had moved to restrain Castro by complying with Moscow's position on the "bourgeois-democratic" revolution. On December 9 and 10, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez had asserted that the

[77] Castro, *Una Sola Bandera*, 25-26, 38, 45.
[78] See *Hoy*, December 4, 1959, 1, 3; December 12, 1959, 1, 3; and December 15, 1959, 1.
[79] See *ibid.*, January 7, 1960, 1, 5; and *Revolución*, January 7, 1960, 4.
[80] *Hoy*, December 17, 1959, 2.
[81] *Revolución*, December 18, 1959, 2.
[82] Three days later, Alexander Alexeyev (subsequently Soviet Ambassador to Cuba) registered in Havana as a Tass correspondent. According to Rodríguez, Alexeyev subsequently played an instrumental role in the formulation of Soviet policy toward Cuba (interview, August 14, 1967).
[83] *Revolución*, December 29, 1959, 6.

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national bourgeoisie should be included among the "participating elements" in the national-liberation stage of the revolution.[84] *Hoy*'s editorial of December 11 also had followed the Rodríguez-Moscow line by intimating that the agrarian reform should aim at the creation of small private farms rather than at collectivization.[85]

The compliant Rodríguez line, however, was discontinued shortly after the return of Aníbal Escalante to Cuba on December 10. The timing of the termination, the subsequent two-week delay in Escalante's public report on his trip, and the report's vague allusion to having found "international solidarity" for Cuba suggest that privately he had reported unfavorably on Moscow's intentions.[86] Thus, under Blas Roca's and Escalante's leadership, the PSP launched an offensive in *Hoy* on December 27, the first phase of which appealed indirectly for Soviet involvement on the basis of the advanced character and viability of the revolution.[87]

In his first article in three weeks, Blas Roca asserted that the chief feature of the revolution had been its "continuous advance" despite the "enormous advantages" enjoyed by imperialism. The revolution had become more "profound, transcendent, and strong," gaining greater support among the "popular, working, and peasant masses." The revolutionary ranks had been "cleansed, step by step," resulting in increased "unity" and in anticommunism's "full retreat."[88]

A companion editorial also called for Moscow's fulfillment of its internationalist obligations. First, it declared, "For us, the national and international situation is now favorable for the Cuban revolutionary process." Second, it dismissed the idea of an accommodation with Washington by claiming, "For us, North American imperialism . . . will not accept any of the Cuban revolutionary measures, . . ." but will remain the "irreconcilable enemy." Finally, it argued that the revolution could survive because the main threat would be economic, diplomatic, and political action rather than direct armed aggression and because the

[84] See "Los industriales, los obreros y la revolución," *Hoy*, December 9 and December 10, 1959, 1, 4.

[85] "Nuestra opinión—Una fecha histórica," *ibid.*, December 11, 1959, 1, 4. The party's position was reversed a month later in an editorial that endorsed collectivization. See "Nuestra opinión—Un Sueño campesino hecho realidad, *ibid.*, January 10, 1959, 1, 11.

[86] For Escalante's public report, see "Sano orgullo nacional," *ibid.*, December 24, 1959, 1, 4.

[87] *Hoy*'s editorial line had been ambiguous between December 11-27, perhaps indicative of PSP uncertainty as to which position to adopt toward Castro and Moscow.

[88] "Reflexiones sobre el primer aniversario," *Hoy*, December 27, 1959, 1, 4.

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Castro government had already taken countermeasures against a Guatemalan-type operation.[89]

The second phase of the PSP offensive exploited the emerging Sino-Soviet dispute. Beginning in early January, *Hoy* gave prominent coverage to Chinese statements of solidarity while similar Soviet declarations were virtually disregarded until January 24. But of greater significance was Aníbal Escalante's public exaltation of Peking's position on Cuba in an interview on January 9. Escalante declared that their revolutionary experience enabled the Chinese "to understand [the Cuban] position more easily" and to consider the revolution as "a profound revolution." Because of imperialism's proximity, he added, the Chinese "understand our difficulties; and this makes them admire the Cuban revolution much more and to extend greater sympathy to us." Consequently, he had the "absolute certainty" that China stood ready to trade with Cuba.[90]

The third phase of the Communist offensive combined a defense of Castro's foreign policy with a criticism of Khrushchev's policy of accommodation. On January 7, ostensibly refuting the position of the nonrevolutionary press on the advisability of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States, *Hoy* pointed out, "What the leaders of the major military power of the world can do without prejudicing its position in negotiations, the representatives of a small country cannot permit themselves to do. . . . Not to *understand this is to commit the gravest sin of ignorance*. What for the USSR and Khrushchev is a disposition for peace and benevolence, *for us would be a dangerous venture*."[91]

On January 16, agreeing with a statement by Guevara, *Hoy* asserted, "The easing of international tension has not yet been reflected here," and it protested that the "aggressions" against Cuba had been made possible "solely through the cooperation and support of the imperialists."[92] The following day, Blas Roca published a lengthy article sharply at variance with the Soviet passive line toward Latin America.

[89] "Nuestra opinión—Contra el entreguismo," *ibid.* The PSP's anniversary statement also stressed the radical nature of the revolution. See "Alocución del PSP—A los obreros y campesinos; a todo el pueblo," *ibid.*, January 1, 1960, 1, 4.

[90] *Ibid.*, January 14, 1960, 2.

[91] In turn, the editorial defended Castro's posture toward the Eisenhower Administration, which it labelled as "one of the most representative of Yankee finance capital" ("Nuestra opinión—La historia pondrá los puntos," *ibid.*, January 7, 1960, 1, 4, italics added).

[92] "Nuestra opinión—Las medidas de desarme sovieticas, demostración efectica de paz," *ibid.*, January 16, 1960, 1, 4.

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Seemingly endorsing Castro's revolutionary strategy, he called for the immediate "overthrow" of oligarchical governments and for the establishment of "revolutionary, progressive, and democratic governments of the popular classes" following the Cuban example.[93]

Although the PSP's offensive may have been directed in part to domestic circles, its primary thrust appears to have been aimed at the international Communist movement and at Moscow in particular. First, the party engaged in polemics that had special significance for a Communist audience: it published revolutionary assessments conveying implicit demands for Soviet involvement; it gave prominent attention to the Chinese position on Cuba; it criticized the feasibility of "peaceful coexistence"; and it espoused Castro's independent revolutionary line. Second, after the end of December, *Hoy* published collective editorials; this suggests not only the existence of intraparty divisions, but also an attempt to protect Blas Roca and Aníbal Escalante for their advocacy of a hard line toward Moscow. Finally, these two top PSP leaders were conspicuously absent from the party delegation greeting Mikoyan on his arrival in Havana on February 4.[94]

THE DISPATCH OF THE MIKOYAN MISSION

In the meantime, the Castro regime had taken further steps to advance the liberationist and pro-Communist character of the revolution. On January 6, INRA expropriated some 70,000 acres of American-owned lands. Five days later, the Cuban government rejected the State Department's protest, declaring its determination to "accelerate" the agrarian reform.[95] But most significant, in commemorating the death of the founder of the Cuban Communist party, the National Director of the Twenty-sixth of July Movement revealed that the Castro regime was considering the "agglutination of all revolutionary forces" into a "single integrated unity."[96]

For its part, the Soviet press contained little and contradictory evidence of an impending turn in Moscow's policy as seen by its selective reporting of Cuban developments. Soviet commentaries and dispatches,

[93] See "Sobre un mensaje de la juventud democratica cristiana," *ibid.*, January 17, 1960, 4.

[94] Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, on the other hand, was among the delegates meeting Mikoyan (*ibid.*, February 5, 1960, 1, 4). In his interview of August 14, 1967, Rodríguez mildly objected to the interpretation given above, maintaining that no serious rift had existed within the party or with Moscow and that the absence of the two PSP leaders had been due solely to "tactical considerations."

[95] *Revolución*, January 12, 1960, 1.

[96] See the statement by Carlos Olivares in *Hoy*, January 7, 1960, 7.

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for example, virtually omitted all references to Castro's socialist and pro-Communist policies, but instead continued to stress the importance of the agrarian reform and the national bourgeoisie.[97] On the other hand, the Soviet press did recognize Cuba's new state of military preparedness and her liberationist posture.[98] Nevertheless, *Pravda* and *Izvestia* remained silent on Cuban developments between January 13 and January 29.[99]

On the Cuban side, Foreign Minister Roa had been unsuccessful in obtaining firm commitments from the neutralist states.[100] This state of affairs was reflected in Castro's address of January 20, which made an implicit appeal for Soviet assistance. For the first time in several weeks he stridently denounced Washington for its "international conspiracy," and he portrayed Cuba as a besieged "solitary nation" undertaking a "program of national liberation." He went on to lament that very few of the underdeveloped states exercised international influence; consequently, he said, ". . . We must depart from the reality that we are a nation alone in this struggle."[101]

A new element appears to have affected the bargaining process on January 26, when President Eisenhower issued a conciliatory statement in regard to Cuba. The President pledged that the United States would observe a policy of nonintervention, that it would not enact reprisals against Cuba, and that it would respect Cuba's right to undertake a social revolution.[102]

Eisenhower's declaration was immediately challenged by the Communists. *Hoy*'s editorial of January 27 denounced the hostile acts against the "patriotic and democratic, national-liberationist and agrarian revolution," arguing that Eisenhower's new conciliatory tactics had been

[97] B. Alexandrovsky, for example, declared that "the agrarian reform will radically change Cuba's social structure. . . . The leading role in the villages will be played by the free farmer and the national bourgeoisie will become the dominant factor in the economy" ("The Cuban Example," *New Times*, No. 2 [1960], 11).

[98] "The Cuban people and the Castro government are alive to the menace to their country. . . . Militia units have already been formed and tens of thousands of Cuban patriots are undergoing military training in them" (*ibid.*, 12). See also V. Chichkov, "Slavnaya godovshchina revoluycionnoy Kuby" [Glorious anniversary of revolutionary Cuba], *Pravda*, January 6, 1960, 4. On January 7, *Pravda* also carried extensive excerpts from the January 4 editorial in *Revolución*, denouncing the proposed "revitalization of the Monroe Doctrine."

[99] On January 13, *Pravda* and *Izvestia* carried dispatches on Cuba's determination to proceed with the agrarian reform and to avoid becoming "a second Guatemala." Thereafter there was a fifteen-day lapse in their coverage of Cuba.

[100] See the Cuban report of the results of Roa's visit to Yugoslavia in *Revolución*, January 20, 1960, 1, 2.

[101] *Hoy*, January 22, 1960, 3, 4.

[102] *New York Times*, January 27, 1960, 10.

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devised solely because the revolution had become stronger and more revolutionary and liberationist. Most significantly, in a pointed reminder to Moscow, *Hoy* repeatedly charged that the "so-called spirit of Camp David" was not being observed toward Cuba. In this regard, *Hoy* maintained that to defend Cuba's sovereignty and to defend revolutionary power would be the "best contribution to the cause of peace and the triumph of the so-called spirit of Camp David." But after noting that "all lovers of peace" understood this position, *Hoy* once again listed China first, followed by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, as having sent messages of "warm solidarity" to Cuba.[103]

In effect, *Hoy*'s editorial indicated Communist anxiety that the revolution had reached a critical turning point because of continued Soviet equivocation. At the same time it sought (1) to dispel any illusions Moscow (and Castro) might have entertained concerning a possible rapprochement between Washington and Havana; (2) to reaffirm the viability and Communist potential of the revolution; and (3) to provoke the Soviets into extending assistance to Cuba.

Castro's own uncertainty concerning the availability of Soviet support may also be seen in his reported vacillation regarding the Argentine Ambassador's attempt to mediate differences between Washington and Havana following Eisenhower's declaration.[104] However, on January 31, *Pravda* and *Izvestia* finally announced that Mikoyan would open the Soviet exhibition in Havana. And on February 3, an *Izvestia* editorial hinted that the USSR would render economic assistance to Cuba. Significantly, *Izvestia* also observed that the possibility that the United States would repeat the "experiment of Guatemala" was unlikely in the immediate future.[105]

At the end of his ten-day visit on February 13, Mikoyan signed a trade and aid pact with the Havana government. The USSR agreed to purchase 425,000 tons of sugar in 1960 and 1,000,000 tons annually during the next four years at world market prices and, in addition, to supply Cuba with $100,000,000 in long-term credits and with technical

[103] "Nuestra opinión—El 'Espíritu de Camp David' y las amenazas y los ataques a Cuba," *Hoy*, January 27, 1960, 1, 4.

[104] At the request of the United States, Argentine Ambassador Julio A. Amoedo held a lengthy conference with Castro on January 27 and at the last moment secured minor concessions from the Cuban Premier. He reports that his efforts "proceeded satisfactorily until the arrival of Mikoyan. From that moment on the Castro regime virtually paralyzed the negotiations . . . until the Cuban-Soviet pact was signed on February 13" ("Negotiating with Fidel Castro," *The New Leader*, April 27, 1964, 10-12).

[105] L. Kamynin, "Zametki obozrevatelya: Kuba dayet otpor" [Observer's notes: Cuba gives rebuff], *Izvestia*, February 3, 1960, 1.

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assistance. The restoration of diplomatic relations, however, was to be discussed at a more "convenient" time.[106]

CONCLUSION

Until the dispatch of Mikoyan, the Soviets had appeared ambivalent toward Cuba: they saw the cold-war advantages to be gained in supporting Castro; but they also feared the diplomatic repercussions, and especially the ideological and security implications of Soviet involvement in a "runaway revolution." Paradoxically, then, in overcoming Moscow's hesitancy and in pressing for effective solidarity, Castro and his Communist allies not only capitalized on the Soviet Union's cold-war interests, but also exploited its professed commitment to revolutionary expansion.

Hence, Castro rapidly transformed the Cuban system for external as well as internal reasons, thereby confronting the Soviets not only with a "national-liberationist" revolution, but also with an emerging socialist and pro-Communist revolution. Simultaneously, his garrison-state measures reduced the likelihood of "another Guatemala" for Moscow—a perception that may have been strengthened by Eisenhower's conciliatory statement of January 26. For its part, the PSP rendered Castro invaluable assistance in enlisting Soviet support. Through their Aesopian communications, the Communists defined and publicized the revolution, availed themselves of the opportunities created by the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and in effect demanded Moscow's fulfillment of its internationalist obligations.

In thus maximizing Cuban pressures on Moscow, Castro and the PSP performed complementary roles. On the one hand, only the "Maximum Leader" could radicalize and reorient the revolution. On the other hand, only the Communists could authoritatively assess, verify, and communicate the significance of these transformations to Moscow; and only the Communists could fully exploit Soviet sensitivity on a range of issues and demand the rendering of assistance to a fraternal party.

The resulting Mikoyan visit and the ensuing economic ties, in turn, marked the beginning of the Soviet Union's investment in Cuba and signified that Castro had taken his first successful step in opting into the socialist camp. In this regard, the reconnaissance aspect of the Mikoyan mission proved to be a major purpose and result of the visit.

[106] *Hoy*, February 14, 1960, 1. Diplomatic relations were established on May 7, and Soviet-bloc military aid began arriving in the summer of 1960.

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In his interview, Rodríguez confirmed that the Soviet leader had departed with first-hand information and favorable impressions concerning the viability and Communist potential of the revolution. This was also intimated publicly at the time in Mikoyan's admission that the national bourgeoisie could no longer be relied upon and that consequently a "peasant democracy" was emerging in Cuba.[107]

The Soviet Union's belated presence in Cuba, therefore, may have been calculated to establish some measure of control over the otherwise "runaway revolution" and thereby to prevent the precipitous emergence of a "socialist state" so near the United States. Yet Moscow appears to have overestimated the extent of its available leverage in view of the fact that the Cuban Communists and Castro had already demonstrated a mutuality of interests and considerable independence. Indeed, the "Maximum Leader" evidently went on to ignore Soviet (and Cuban Communist) restraints in rapidly nationalizing the economy by the fall of 1960 and in proclaiming a "socialist revolution" in April 1961, while subsequent developments have shown him in open conflict with Moscow over the October missile crisis, revolutionary strategy, and economic policy.

[107] "Kubanskiy narod stroit novuyu zhizn" [The Cuban people are building a new life], *Pravda*, February 10, 1960, 5. *Pravda* also began reporting on the statist and collectivist plans of the Castro government on February 9; and the creation of a Central Planning Commission was reported on February 22.

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FROM SOCIAL DARWINISM TO CURRENT THEORIES OF MODERNIZATION

A Tradition of Analysis

By ALI A. MAZRUI*

MUCH of the most interesting work in political science in the last decade or so has been concerned with processes of modernization, institution-formation, and sociopolitical change at large. In fact, modernization and political development have been, along with system analysis, the most important themes of the new political science. In this article we are addressing ourselves to this developmental revolution in political science. We propose to argue that the idea of analyzing and classifying nations on the basis of the stage of modernization reached has long-standing historical connections with a tradition that goes back to social Darwinism and beyond. But it must be emphasized from the outset that this argument is not intended as a criticism of the new political science. On the contrary, there might even be special strengths in a revolution of thought which finds strong antecedents in a dynamic, if somewhat mistaken, period of intellectual theorizing in the past. Much of intellectual history itself is indeed a history of wave-formation—each succeeding wave owing something to the strength of what went before.

In its earliest forms, social Darwinism had a strong and perhaps inevitable biological bias. Differing stages in the evolution of human societies were sometimes attributed to biological distinctions among peoples. This was the influence of Charles Darwin on racism in Europe. The ideological repercussions were indeed long-term.

Then there was also in social Darwinism an optimistic strain, assuming a line of development that leads to greater sophistication and effectiveness in human organization. This, too, is a theme that has continued in different forms to the present day.

Thirdly, there were in Darwinism the beginnings of conflict theory —a belief in functional *struggle* with and compulsive *adaptation* to the challenges of environment within each society. Again, this is a theme that has come to affect later academic explanations of the process of

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development. We propose to examine each of these trends in the tradition of analysis that extends from social Darwinism to these latter-day theories.

From Racism to Ethnocentrism

In 1859 Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published. It was soon to produce long-term repercussions both for the study of biology and for the study of social science. Racists could now proceed to demonstrate, by the utilization of the theory of natural selection, that major differences in human capacity and human organization were to be traced to biological distinctions among races. But to some extent this theory was much older than Darwin. What Darwin added to it was the dynamism converting mere classification of beings into a *process*. The static version of the theory goes back to the ancient idea that God had so organized the world that the universe and creation were arranged in a "Great Chain of Being"—that all creatures could be classified and fitted into a hierarchy extending "from man down to the smallest reptile, whose existence can be discovered by the microscope."[1]

But it was not just the species that were so classified. Even within the highest species (that of human beings) there were in turn divisions. Theories of the Great Chain of Being assumed that the Almighty in His wisdom did not want a big gap between one type of creature and the next. There had to be intermediate categories between orangutans and white men. As early as 1713 naturalists began looking for the "missing link" between men and apes and apparently speculated on the possibility that Hottentots and orangutans might stand side by side in the "scale of life," separated only by the fact that orangutans could not speak.[2]

What Darwinism helped to put into specific theoretical form was the element of motion in this process, the idea that the backward people might be on the move toward a higher phase and that those in front might be moving further ahead still.

The link between racism and ethnocentrism is not difficult to see. Even for the earliest racist theories there had been no difficulty about deciding where to place the white man in the chain of being. As Philip D. Curtin puts it in discussing these early biological theorists, "Since there is no strictly scientific or biological justification for stating that

[1] Charles White, *An Account of the Regular Graduations in Man* (London 1799), 1. See also A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936).

[2] Lovejoy, 233ff.; also Lovejoy "Some Eighteenth-Century Evolutionists," *Popular Science Monthly*, LXV (1904), 327.

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one race is 'higher' than another, the criteria of ranking had to come from non-scientific assumptions. All of the biologists . . . began by putting the European variety at the top of the scale. This was natural enough if only as an un-thinking reflection of cultural chauvinism. It could be held to follow from the assessment of European achievements in art and science. . . . It was taken for granted that historical achievement was intimately connected with physical form—in short, that race and culture were closely related."[3]

The dynamic element in ethnocentric theories of evolution inevitably led to assumptions about white leadership in the whole process of historical change. And within the white races themselves specific leadership was assumed to come from the "tougher" of the European stock. For example, in his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford in December 1841, Thomas Arnold gave a new lease on life to the ancient idea of a moving center of civilization. Arnold argued that the history of civilization was the history of a series of creative races, each of which made its impact and then sank into oblivion, leaving the heritage of civilization to a greater successor. What the Greeks passed on to the Romans, the Romans bequeathed in turn to the Germanic race and of that race the greatest civilizing nation was England.[4]

Notions of leadership very often led on to notions of the right to rule the less developed. Even that prophet of liberalism, John Stuart Mill, could argue that despotism was a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement.[5]

In Mill also there began to emerge the notion that democratic institutions constitute the ultimate destination of much of sociopolitical development. And the capacity to operate democratic institutions was already being regarded as an index of political maturity and institutional stabilization. Mill even seemed to share some of the reservations held by current modernization theorists about the possibility of operating liberal institutions in multiethnic situations: to use Mill's formulation, "Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of

[3] *The Image of Africa* (London 1965), 38-39. We are indebted to Curtin's book for bibliographical guidance and for some insights.

[4] See Arnold, *Introductory Lectures on Modern History* (New York 1842), 46-47; consult also Curtin, 375-77. See also Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, *Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold* (London 1845), esp. 435, 438. This notion of a moving center of civilization is also discussed in Mazrui, *Ancient Greece in African Political Thought* (Nairobi 1967).

[5] Everyman's Library ed., *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government*, with introduction by A. D. Lindsay (London and New York, 1948), 198-201, 382-83.

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different nationalities."[6] Here, then, is the essential assumption of some of the current theories of integration—a process toward the fusion of nationalities within a single territory into a new entity capable of sustaining the stresses of a more liberalized polity. At least one major approach in theorizing about political modernization in our own day has rested on what Robert A. Packenham describes as "the idea that political development is primarily a function of a *social system that facilitates popular participation in governmental and political processes at all levels and the bridging of regional, religious, caste, linguistic, tribal, or other cleavages.*"[7]

Packenham goes on to argue that one form that this particular approach has taken today is by the assessment of the social correlates of democracy. These correlates are supposed to include relatively high "scores" on such sociological variables as an open class system, literacy and/or education, high participation in voluntary organizations, urbanization, and a communication system. Much of this kind of analysis assumes that the highest of modern institutions must inevitably be those that have been devised in the West. The Darwinian evolution toward modernity is evolution toward Western ways. Edward Shils seems to have been expressing as much his own view of the matter as that of some members of the Afro-Asian elite when he said, " 'Modern' means being Western without the onus of dependence on the West." And much of the rest of Shils' theorizing on the process of development bears the stamp of ethnocentric preference for "a regime of representative institutions" of the Western kind.[8]

There have been models of theorizing about developments which have gone so far as to classify political regimes in the world in terms of, first, the Anglo-American type; second, the continental European

[6] Everyman's, 361. More recently Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., for example, makes a similar point when he argues that "the dangers to stability presented by ethnic and other parochialisms are magnified in most African states by a lack of that fundament of common values and widely shared principles of political behaviour generally termed 'consensus.' Typically, the terms of a consensus prescribe that the pursuit of group interests be conducted peaceably and within established institutions of the constitutional framework" ("Democracy and the New African States," in Kenneth Kirkwood, ed., *St. Antony's Papers on African Affairs*, No. 2 [London 1963], 26). Comparable arguments abound in the literature on democracy in new states.

[7] See Packenham, "Approaches to the Study of Political Development," *World Politics*, XVII (October 1964), 115. The italics are original. For subsequent additional insights we have benefited from conversations with Gwendolen Carter, William O. Brown, and James S. Coleman.

[8] See esp. Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague 1965), 10ff.

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types; third, totalitarian types; and fourth, the types that are found in Africa and Asia.[9]

Evidently, this is ethnocentrism which has strong links with older theories of Anglo-Saxon leadership as a central force of a new wave of civilization. Again, theories of evolutionary change culminating in the preeminence of a single nation had major *philosophers* of the West among their proponents. Not least among these philosophers was Hegel, for whom the entire process of change in the universe had for its human culmination the emergence of the Prussian state and the Germanic genius. Hegel, too, was in a sense a pre-Darwinian social Darwinist, both in his notion of a creative tension among thesis, antithesis, and synthesis and in his notion of a purposeful evolution toward the emergence of a higher species.

More recently there have been *historians* who have seen human evolution in terms of the progressive rise to preeminence of their own nation or group of nations. William H. McNeill in our own day—though by no means lacking in humility—has interpreted world history in such a way that he might easily belong to this tradition.[10] McNeill challenges in part the pessimistic Spenglerian view of a Western decline and the whole conception of history as a collection of separate civilizations, each pursuing an independent career. For McNeill, human cultures have had a basic interrelationship—and their history has been leading to a global preeminence of Western civilization.

In the field of *sociology*, Talcott Parsons has talked about "evolutionary universals" in terms which indicate a belief that ultimately development is in the direction of greater comparability with the political systems of the Western world. Parsons argues that the existence of a definitive link between popular participation and ultimate control of decision-making is crucial for building and maintaining support for the political-legal system as a whole and for its binding

[9] Gabriel Almond has shared such a vision of political development, especially in his earlier work. A more cautious but related formulation is that of Eisenstadt, who says: "Historically, modernization is the process of change towards those types of social, economic, and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and have then spread to other European countries and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South American, Asian, and African continents" (*Modernization: Protest and Change* [Englewood Cliffs 1966], 1). Consult also the series of books entitled "Studies in Political Development" sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council of the United States. Of special interest as a study of value-systems is Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton 1965).

[10] See McNeill, *The Rise of the West* (Chicago and London 1963).

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rules and decisions. Consequently, insofar as large-scale societies are concerned, the "democratic association" is an "evolutionary universal." In defending this proposition against anticipated criticism Parsons declares, "I realize that to take this position I must maintain that communist totalitarian organization will probably not fully match 'democracy' in political and integrative capacity in the long run. I do indeed predict that it will prove to be unstable and will either make adjustments in a general direction of elective democracy and a plural party system or 'regress' into generally less advanced and politically less effective forms of organization, failing to advance as rapidly or as far as might otherwise be expected."[11]

A similar ethnocentrism is evident in the approach of J. Roland Pennock to the study of political development. Pennock enumerates principles such as "justice according to law," "the rule of law," and "due process" as among the political goods that are delivered when a society attains a certain degree of political development. Pennock declares, in a long footnote, "It might be objected that modern totalitarian dictatorships may not subscribe to the standards of justice according to law outlined above. Are we then to call them less 'developed' than modern constitutional regimes? . . . I would be quite happy to say that to this extent they are in fact less developed, less fitted to fulfil the needs of men and society."[12]

Later in the same article Pennock refers to other tendencies in the discussion of political development which bear the ethnocentric theme that the history of human evolution is toward institutions and ideals of the type cherished in the Western world. Pennock does not describe these institutions and ideals as "Western," but tends to refer to them as "world culture." This kind of inclination to discern an upward movement of human evolution toward Westernism is recurrent in the literature. In the words of the concluding sentence of Pennock's article, "It is common today to compare or rank states by the degree of party competition, or their adoption and use of the major devices of representative government, or their social mobilization. It is my suggestion that, to see a more nearly complete picture and to make more highly discriminating judgments, anyone who is concerned with political development in any way involving measurement or comparison should

[11] "Evolutionary Universals in Society," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (June 1964), 356. See also in the same issue of the journal, S. N. Eisenstadt, "Social Change, Differentiation, and Evolution," 375-86.

[12] "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 424.

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take full account of some of the measurable elements of the political goods of security, justice, liberty, and welfare."[13]

Of course by the time of our current theories of modernization, the racialist element in theories of human development had virtually disappeared, at least within the ranks of scholarship. This racial component was what had given social Darwinism a continuing biological feature borrowed from the Darwinism of the *Origin of Species*. In fact in the heyday of racial theories it was by no means entirely clear where biological Darwinism ended and social Darwinism began. But in the modern theories of modernization Darwinism has been "debiologized." It is no longer racial bigotry that is being invoked to explain stages of political growth. What is now invoked is at the most ethnocentric cultural pride.

Evolution and Optimism

The shift from biological explanations to cultural explanations of human backwardness had important implications. Biological differences imply a slower rate of mutation of character. The African thus could not help lagging behind for many generations simply because he could not help the biological traits he had inherited from his own subspecies. There is a quality almost of immutability, or retardation, when a lack of development is attributed to hereditary characteristics within the race. But as ideas on social evolution took a turn more toward cultural determinism, the notion of a backward people's catching up with more advanced people was at last brought within the bounds of credibility.

The shift from biological determinism to cultural determinism had its transitional moments. Let us take W. R. Greg as a case of intellectual transition in this field of theorizing. Greg inherited the leadership of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism from Thomas Arnold. Upon Arnold's death, Greg speculated further in the *Westminster Review* on the whole destiny of human evolution. He noted that some backward races elsewhere were indeed becoming extinct. But in Africa the Negro race seemed to retain a striking resilience. Further, figures from North America indicated that Negroes could continue in a healthy persistence even when they were transplanted

[13] 434. Pennock cites an appendix to Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960); and Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (April 1963), 253-64. A more recent discussion by Almond of some of these issues is his article "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," *World Politics*, XVII (January 1965), 183-214.

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from Africa to the very different environment of North America and to the very different experience of constant contact with Europeans. Greg was indeed of the opinion that Africans were devoid of the possibilities of intellectual originality. But in his judgment they had the one thing that was most important from the point of view of successful acculturation. Africans were endowed with a significant imitative genius and could therefore assimilate what the West could bequeath to them. This view had implications for the whole notion of progress. Greg was in fact to some extent a precursor of theories of "demonstration effect." Human progress was possible because the more backward of the races had at least the ability to imitate. And European achievements could therefore be grafted onto African stock.[14]

Some of these notions were to last well into the period of colonial expansion in Africa and the legitimation of individual colonial policies consequent upon annexation. To some extent the whole paraphernalia of ideas of the French assimilationist policies had direct intellectual contact with the kind of tradition to which Greg belonged—the kind that permitted the African a capacity to emulate without permitting him a capacity to create. The policy of attempting to Gallicize Africans was firmly within the flow of this historical stream. As independence came, theorists in the Anglo-Saxon world discussed for a while the feasibility of upholding some of the institutions inherited from colonialism. The argument about whether or not Ghana could sustain the "Westminster model" was also part of this argument about the potential imitative capacity of African political man. But gradually theories of political development attained a sophistication that differentiated them more sharply than ever from simple biological judgments of whether or not there was an important emulative genius within the African subspecies. Ghanaian capacity to maintain the Westminster model, or the ability of Nigeria to cope with inherited federal and Westminster institutions, became now more firmly associated with varied constraints and preconditions that the Western world had already managed to cope with but that the rest of the universe had yet to evolve.

Nevertheless there was a firm conviction that the direction of change would be toward a greater approximation to Western achievements. In the meantime, political science as a discipline had embraced more fully the comparative ethos—the idea that different cultures *could* be compared in terms of what was being accomplished in the political process.

[14] Greg, "Dr. Arnold," *Westminster Review*, xxx (January 1843).

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Almost any two political systems could be a subject of such comparison. There have indeed already been comparisons between Ghana and Spain, Mexico and Uganda, Tanzania and the Soviet Union.

The comparative dimension in political science has been both a manifestation and a further reinforcement of the acceptance of cultural relativism and the toleration of major differences. To some extent, then, the Darwinian evolutionary tendency achieved a high level of cross-cultural accommodation when the structural-functionalists in political science began to discern comparable functions, performed by different structures, among varied societies.

But side by side with this toleration and indulgence has come the conviction that progress is almost inevitable for the more backward societies. And the direction of that progress is toward greater similarity of values, norms, and structures to those of the Western world.

In discussing the processes of change examined in the varying contexts of the five geographical areas reviewed in Almond and Coleman's book, *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, James S. Coleman asserts that the consequences have been by no means uniform and yet "in general the changes have brought the countries concerned nearer the model of a modern society." And what is a modern society? Coleman's own view as expressed elsewhere is more detached and less ethnocentric. But in the book he edited with Almond, Coleman derives a definition of a modern society from Almond's introduction to the book and from Shils' model of a "political democracy." The attributes of a "modern system" are thus enumerated. On the basis of these, Coleman concludes that "it is clear from this list of attributes that the Anglo-American qualities most closely approximate the model of the modern political system. . . ."[15]

Frederick W. Frey has pointed out also that "the most common notion of political development in intellectual American circles is that of movement toward democracy." He finds this a congenial notion, combining pride in one's own cultural achievements with optimism that the rest of mankind is on its way in the same direction.[16]

Sometimes the movement is described not as one toward democracy but as one toward participation. Again the definition of participation

[15] Almond and Coleman, 533, 536. In his introduction to *Education and Political Development* (Princeton 1965), Coleman defines political development more neutrally in terms of enhancing "political capacity." See esp. 15-16.

[16] Frederick W. Frey, "Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey," Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1963), 301.

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verges on being the liberal democratic one. And again there is also a conviction that this is the ultimate destination of the progress of new nations. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba assert that the "new world political culture will be a political culture of participation. If there is a political revolution going on throughout the world, it is what might be called the participation explosion. In all the new nations of the world the belief that the ordinary man is politically relevant—that he ought to be an involved participant in the political system—is widespread. Large groups of people who have been outside politics have been demanding entrance into the political system."[17]

This optimism has ancestral roots in Darwinism, both biological and social. Certainly in the biological ideas that Darwin brought together in the *Origin of Species* there is a conviction of a progressive evolution toward greater complexity and greater sophistication in the structure of beings. In Chapter 8 of the *Origin of Species* Darwin talked of the "one general law leading to advancement of all organic beings." The direction of change is toward greater flexibility to cope with environment and with needs. Those who cannot cope with such demands do indeed fall by the wayside and die. There is an element of pessimism implied in this expiry of those that are not strong enough; and yet it is pessimism only for those who are soft and romantic about these matters. For the hard-headed this is a defiant optimism. In Darwin's declaration, "Multiply, vary, let the strongest live and the weakest die."[18]

Twelve years after the *Origin of Species* Darwin published *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*. In this, Darwin's optimism extended beyond the purely biological to a vision of man's social and cultural destiny. In his vision of man he saw "the standard of his morality rise higher and higher," and he looked forward to the day when "the struggle between our higher and lower impulses will be less severe, and virtue will be triumphant." Looking at history he concluded that, "It is apparently a truer and more cheerful view that progress has been much more general than retrogression; that man has risen, though by slow and interrupted steps, from a lowly condition to the highest standard as yet attained by him in knowledge, morals and religion."[19]

[17] *The Civic Culture* (Princeton 1963), 4.
[18] *Origin of Species*, 1st ed. reprinted (London 1950), chap. 8.
[19] *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (London 1871). Stanley Edgar Hyman has rightly remarked, "*The Descent of Man* is wrongly titled, at least in

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This optimism about the future has certainly been inherited by many schools of theories of modernization in contemporary scholarship. That is why Samuel P. Huntington's essay "Political Development and Political Decay" is such an important landmark in the literature on political development. In his essay Huntington complains about the gap between theory and reality in many concepts of political development. He points out, among other things, that in the past these concepts were usually one-way concepts; little or no provision was made for their reversibility. It is true that according to these theories societies, like Darwin's creatures, became more complex as their structures became more differentiated. But the modernization theories were not making enough provision for social regression. Huntington points out that structural differentiation may indeed occur but so also might structural "homogenization." Huntington detects in many of the theories "an underlying commitment to the theory of progress [which] is so overwhelming as to exclude political decay as a possible concept. Political decay like thermonuclear war becomes unthinkable."[20]

He cites Almond again as an example of someone who measures not just political development but *political change* by "the acquisition by a political system of some new capability." The specific capabilities that Almond has in mind are those for national integration, international accommodation, political participation, and welfare distribution. Before the Renaissance, Almond argues, political systems "acquired and lost capabilities . . . in anything but a unilinear, evolutionary way." Modernization, however, reduced "the independence of man's political experiments." Change was "far from unilinear," but it was indeed toward "the emergence of world culture."[21]

But Huntington asserts that modern and modernizing states can change by losing capabilities as well as by gaining them and that a theory of political development needs therefore to be mated to a theory of political decay.[22]

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that its dominant mood is onward and upward. Man fell into the savage state, but he is rising out of it and he will abolish it." See Hyman, *The Tangled Bank* (New York 1966), 56.

[20] "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 392-93. But see also S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XII (July 1964), 345-67. For another "hardheaded" analysis of unpredictable change see C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," *World Politics*, XIX (January 1967), 190-217.

[21] "Political Systems and Political Change," *American Behavioral Scientist*, VI (June 1963), 6.

[22] 393. Eric Dunning, a sociologist, makes a similar point when he appeals to fellow sociologists to feel less inhibited about using the term "development." Sociologists have

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Evolution and Creative Conflict

Huntington goes on to suggest that theories of instability might tell us more about the "developing areas" than do their more optimistic opposites. He seems to imply that instability is an indication of political decay. But in fact there have been theories that postulated a degree of functionality in certain types of instability, and these theories have in turn some intellectual connection with Darwinian assumptions of earlier social speculation. One form of relevant instability in this regard is the kind that arises from intense competition and conflict. Darwinian postulates of a struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest affected movements of thought both in conservative and liberal circles on one side and in radical and Marxist circles on the other. The process of natural selection provided a means for explaining and legitimating certain directions of social process. The American political economist William Graham Sumner (1840-1910), for example, saw society as a context in which each individual struggled for his own good and had to encroach upon some interests of others in order to realize his own interests. Survival was for the imaginative, the ruthless, the industrious, the frugal. The indolent and extravagant lost out in the struggle, incapable as they were of adapting to the realities of life. They were therefore eliminated by a process of "social selection." Sumner presented society with an alternative: either "liberty, inequality, survival of the fittest" or "not liberty, equality, survival of the unfittest." Self-made millionaires were a model of the fittest. They were "a product of natural selection, acting on the whole body of men to pick out those who can meet the requirements of certain work to be done."[23]

Darwinism did seem to provide some kind of additional credibility to Adam Smith's theory that each individual pursuing his own interest might indeed gain at the expense of another, but that somehow an "invisible hand" guided this process of intensive individualistic com-

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been more aware than have political scientists that theories of development tend to echo social evolutionism. But Dunning argues that the concept of development is an improvement over the concept of "social evolution." " 'Development' avoids the taint of biological reductionism. Societies are *sui generis* and contain their own mechanisms of change. Social development, furthermore, is reversible; organic evolution is not." Dunning goes on to point out that "nineteenth-century errors are not unavoidable concomitants of the study of social development" ("The Concept of Development: Two Illustrative Case Studies," in Peter I. Rose, ed., *The Study of Society* [New York 1967], 891-92).

[23] See Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought 1860-1915* (Philadelphia 1944). See also Herbert Schneider, "The Influence of Darwin and Spencer on American Philosophical Theology," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, VI (January 1945), 3-18.

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petition toward a better capability of the species as a whole. Man's innate tendency to "truck, barter, and trade," when given natural freedom to express itself free of encumbrances from the state, would automatically develop in the direction of the economic well-being of the society as a whole.

The left-wing side of social thought also experienced the impact of Darwinism on its postulates. Karl Marx wanted to dedicate the first volume of *Das Kapital* to Charles Darwin, but Darwin declined the honor. In 1860 Marx wrote to Engels after a month spent nursing his sick wife: "During my time of trial, these last four weeks, I have read all sorts of things. Among others Darwin's book on *Natural Selection*. Although it is developed in the crude English style, this is the book which contains the basis in natural history for our view." Marx elaborated this point elsewhere, arguing that in place of a war of nature he provided a theory of the "fierce strife of classes." And Engels in his funeral oration over Marx's grave in 1883 said, "As Darwin discovered the law of evolution in organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of evolution in human history."[24]

In all this there is a definite assumption that historical materialism as a process, though involving class struggle, is nevertheless in the direction of better times in the future. Superior classes triumph over those that have decayed or become less fit; this process leads ultimately to the triumph of the proletariat in the penultimate stage of human progress. The steps toward this destination may be painful, and the path toward austere proletarian happiness is littered with the broken glass of more decadent ages. But out of the weariness and anguish, out of the tears and ashes of human experience, development *does* take place—and mankind staggers one more step forward.

A similar kind of belief in creative conflict has sometimes animated theories of modernization in our own day. Huntington finds that this kind of belief represents an incapacity to allow for the feasibility of several steps backward. He complains, "Almost anything that happens in the 'developing' countries—coups, ethnic struggles, revolutionary wars—becomes part of the process of development, however contradictory or retrogressive this may appear on the surface."[25]

[24] Hyman has a perceptive discussion on Marx's enthusiasm for Darwin and of the relationship between historical materialism and the theory of natural selection (121-26).

[25] 390. Among more systematic and influential conflict theorists in related disciplines are George Simmel (see his *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations*, trans. by Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix [New York, 1964]) and Max Gluckman (see his *Custom and Conflict in Africa* [Oxford, 1963]). Within a related persuasion may

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It may be true that sometimes what Huntington complains of is merely a failure to distinguish that some directions of change are reversible. But there are occasions when the modern theorists are consciously asserting that behind those tensions and coups, behind that bitterness in new countries, is a creative process of nations in the making. And even the clash between modernity and traditionalism itself is sometimes seen not as something that delays the process of modernization, but as something that leads to its full realization. The idea of a thesis' colliding with an antithesis and resulting in the improvement of a synthesis is sometimes taken for granted in current theories of modernization. David E. Apter seems to regard the very struggle between traditionalism and modernity as an exercise in preparation—a method of giving society some readiness to meet the challenges of modernized change. And Eisenstadt also discusses the functions of "eruptions," the nature of protest and the process of developing change-absorbing institutions in a manner that again sometimes takes for granted the functionality of social conflict in the process of modernization.[26]

Conclusion

It is by no means rare for major schools of intellectual analysis to have significant antecedents in earlier traditions. As we have indicated, that perhaps is what intellectual history is all about: a succession of waves, or alternatively a long chain of moments of inspiration linked together into a tradition of thought. We have attempted to demonstrate in this article that current theories of modernization do have ancestral ties with earlier notions of social evolution and Darwinism. There have been drastic changes in many of the postulates of this line of intellectual analysis. In fact, the change sometimes has been from racism to broad humanism. But the form of humanism has often been one animated by the self-confidence of ethnocentric achievement.

In many of the current theories of modernization, as indeed in old theories of social Darwinism, there has persisted a certain optimism about the ultimate destination of human history. It is an optimism

be placed Mazrui's paper "Pluralism and National Integration," Proceedings of the Colloquium on Pluralism, University of California, Los Angeles, 1966.

[26] See Eisenstadt, *Modernization*; and Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965). See also Apter, "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda," *World Politics*, XIII (October 1960), 45-68. Consult also Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. Von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, *Issues of Political Development* (Englewood Cliffs 1967).

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which believes that, although every birth leads on to death, there is a constant process of rebirth in the history of human societies. Hence the deep belief in creative friction. The new nations are sometimes in total social anguish. But out of upheavals, societies may indeed be uplifted; and out of the depths of despair, development may still be feasible. Darwin's ultimate gift to human knowledge may well be the gift of an incorrigible scientific optimism. And the new political science is often inspired by this optimism.

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Research Note

THE INTERACTION OF REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS

Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpowers

By KARL KAISER*

A GAP seems to exist between present theory of international regional integration and political reality. The theory explains, generalizes about, or predicts regional integration almost exclusively on the basis of processes and factors *internal* to the region under consideration. When theory considers phenomena outside the region, they usually appear as residual categories which are left insufficiently examined and about which we know little. Moreover, theory has remained relatively silent about the role of the superpowers.

Political reality of the postwar period, however, gives a different impression. First, the two superpowers have decisively shaped developments within regions in which integration has occurred. Second, in most forms of regional subsystem, an outside factor has played a role in the subsystem's formation or later evolution. This is obvious for alliances, such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, or ANZUS, which owe their existence to a threat perceived in the outside world. But external factors can also have a decisive impact on integration. Thus, the three European Communities owe a great deal to direct American help at their inception and to the existence of the Soviet threat. Their evolution and later crises under De Gaulle cannot be separated from developments in the Western Alliance and American-European relations. Finally, regional subsystems affect each other. EFTA would hardly exist without the prior formation of EEC, nor would Comecon without Western efforts at cooperation. Similarly, the evolution of Central

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American and South American economic integration has been influenced by the EEC, perceived as both a model and a threat.

"External factors" therefore appear relevant to internal development of regional subsystems, including integration. This connection seems all the more real since the present international system is characterized by a shrinking of distance between countries, a growing interdependence of nations, and the emergence of a transnational society permeating the old nation-states. The absence of a systematic treatment of these "external factors" therefore constitutes a serious gap in the literature.

In this article we want to take a step toward examining the "external factors" in the evolution of partial international systems of the regional type by selecting one particular external factor: the interaction between regional subsystems, considered together with the role of superpowers. On the basis of three ideal types of regional subsystem, the article submits a number of hypotheses on how subsystems interact during their formation and their evolution. This is a first attempt of this kind. Therefore our propositions do not cover the whole range of relevant phenomena; nor can these propositions be anything more than hypothetical. They require further testing and refinement on the basis of empirical work. Our aim is to point out an unsearched field of enquiry, formulate questions, and attempt preliminary answers.

I. Regionalism, Integration, and Regional Subsystems: A Note on the Terminology

We are interested in the impact of external factors on the evolution of partial international systems of the regional type, particularly in the form of integration.[1] But this does not mean that our focus is on "regionalism," a term that covers such diverse functional as well as geographical-regional phenomena as European integration, NATO, the Commonwealth, and voting blocks in the UN. This concept is, in fact, so ambiguous that we can only agree with a recent suggestion that the time has come to replace it by more precise terms.[2]

Nor are we exclusively interested in "regional integration" as we

[1] The term "partial international system" has been introduced by Stanley Hoffmann and is here used synonymously with "subsystem." See Hoffmann, "Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System," in Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr., eds., *The Atlantic Community: Progress and Prospects* (New York 1964), 3-31.

[2] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in the introduction to his *International Regionalism: A Reader* (Boston 1968).

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understand it now, although it will remain near the center of our concern. Since the apparent disregard of external factors, such as alliance problems or policies of superpowers, by present theory of integration has been the very cause of our investigation, it seems advisable to go beyond a conceptual framework that has conceivably acted as a filter or blinder, preventing the examination of important political phenomena.

A more open framework of analysis is provided by a systemic approach to the study of international politics. Because of its implied stress on interdependence of social action, the concept of "system" can accommodate a wide variety of phenomena—which we desire. On the other hand, since "systems" are but analytical tools designed to study reality according to criteria of the scholar's own choice, they enable us to proceed selectively—which is necessary.

An international subsystem shall be loosely defined as a pattern of relations among basic units in world politics which exhibits a particular degree of regularity and intensity of relations as well as awareness of interdependence among the participating units.[3] Such a definition covers alliances, international organizations, regional integration, "security communities" in Deutsch's sense,[4] and a number of other arrangements. But we shall confine our analysis to *regional* subsystems—that is, partial international systems whose members exist in geographical propinquity (a relation that may occasionally be posited despite significant physical distances, as, for example, among NATO members). "Regional subsystems" therefore refers to organized groupings such as EEC, NATO, SEATO, the OAS, or LAFTA as well as to patterns of relations without institutional or legal accompaniments as they may exist in regions with societal interaction in the form of trade or flow of men.

II. The External Factor in Present Theory of Integration

Theory of integration has achieved one of the most significant

[3] In choosing a systemic framework of analysis we follow the tradition of "historical sociology," as it has been outlined and partially applied by Raymond Aron and Stanley Hoffmann, rather than "systems theory," as it has been developed, for example, by David Easton or Morton Kaplan. Hence we are interested in systems as mere tools to analyze concrete historical situations. For the first approach, see Aron, *Peace and War* (New York 1967); and Hoffmann, "International Systems and International War," in his *The State of War* (New York 1965), 88-122, and "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," *World Politics*, XI (April 1959), 346-77. Notable examples of systems theory are Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs 1965); and Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957). For an up-to-date assessment of the state of systems theory, see Oran R. Young, *Systems of Political Science* (Englewood Cliffs 1968).

[4] Karl Deutsch and others, *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton 1957).

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advances in the discipline of political science during the last ten years. The reasons for its contribution themselves give us some perspective on its treatment of the external factor. First, writings and theorizing about integration, pioneered by Ernst Haas[5] as well as by a group headed by Karl Deutsch,[6] were the first efforts in political science to choose national polities and the international environment as *one* field for their inquiry.

These works first brought into relief the fact that there were political processes located neither solely *inter nationes* nor solely *intra nationes*. And they did so several years before James Rosenau perceptively pointed to the necessity and the possibilities for a radically new approach transcending the old distinctions, methods, and fields of inquiry.[7] In particular, Haas's work using intersocietal political processes among pressure groups, political parties, elites, and so on, as a focus for generalizations and prediction about integration in Europe has inspired a number of other works testing or further developing his framework and findings.[8]

Second, theory of integration has provided in a remarkably short time a great deal of insight into new processes in contemporary international politics and has reached a degree of sophistication enabling it to venture on the most difficult phase of social science theory, the attempt at prediction.[9]

Third and finally, theory of integration has become comparative. The findings and propositions derived from work on the European case have been tested and refined by studying integration in other areas —in particular, in South and Central America and in Africa.[10] Other

[5] In particular, Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford 1958), and *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford 1964).

[6] Deutsch and others, *Political Community*.

[7] Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston 1966), 22-92.

[8] See, for example, Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford 1963); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Pan-Africanism and East African Integration* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); Stuart A. Scheingold, *The Rule of Law in European Integration* (New Haven 1965); Lawrence Scheinman, "Some Preliminary Notes on Bureaucratic Relationships in the European Economic Community," *International Organization*, xx (Autumn 1966), 750-73; Philippe C. Schmitter, *The Process of Central American Integration: Spill-Over or Spill-Around?*, Monograph Series, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley (1967), mimeographed.

[9] See, for example, Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns: Projections About Unity in Latin America," *International Organization*, xviii (Autumn 1964), 705-37.

[10] See, for example, Haas and Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns," and their *The Politics of Economics in Latin American Regionalism: The Latin American Free Trade Association After Four Years of Operation*, University of Denver Monograph

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attempts have suggested a framework that encompasses several areas from the onset.[11] The comparative work has greatly added to our knowledge not only about integration but also about the societies under consideration and the problems they face.[12]

But the removal of traditional barriers to analysis which the work on integration has achieved has halted at the frontier of the region. We now know to some extent how in the process of integration, societies, pressure groups, parties, and governments interact across national frontiers *within* the region, but not how they interact with the outside world. From these studies we have learned a great deal of how integration in various regions differs, but we know practically nothing about what happens *between* regions—in other words, about how they interact.

To be sure, theory of integration would probably not have achieved its relative precision and internal coherence if research had tried from the very beginning to extend the field of inquiry beyond the integrating area and to accommodate external factors. Nor have these factors been entirely neglected. In fact, several exceptions from this general trend of research, as well as a beginning awareness of the need for dealing with the outside element in integration, should be noted.

First, we should mention Amitai Etzioni's *Political Unification*, which represents the only example in integration theory proper of an attempt to deal systematically with and generalize about external factors. His contribution has been analyzed in greater detail elsewhere.[13] He accommodates external elements in his theoretical framework in

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Series in World Affairs (Denver, February 1965); Christopher Mitchell, "The Role of Technocrats in Latin American Integration," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, XXI (Summer 1967), 3-29; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Central American Regional Integration," *International Conciliation*, 562 (March 1967), and his *Pan-Africanism*; Schmitter, *The Process of Central American Integration*; Miguel S. Wionczek, "The Latin American Free Trade Association," *International Conciliation*, 551 (January 1965); and Miguel S. Wionczek, ed., *Latin American Economic Integration* (New York 1966). Though its emphasis is less theoretical, see also Sidney Dell, *Trade Blocs and Common Markets* (New York 1963). Some important contributions are collected in *International Political Communities: An Anthology* (Garden City 1966); and Nye, *International Regionalism*.

[11] Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces* (New York 1965). For a framework trying to encompass a spectrum of integration covering urban, regional, national, and international integration, see Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia 1964).

[12] See, in particular, Haas's brilliant review of his earlier propositions in *The Uniting of Europe* in the light of recent work on Latin America, "*The Uniting of Europe* and the Uniting of Latin America," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, V (June 1967), 315-43.

[13] Karl Kaiser, "The U.S. and the EEC in the Atlantic System: The Problem of Theory," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, VI (June 1967), 388-425.

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the form of a "common enemy."[14] More important is his reference to the role of "external elites" in the evolution of integration, such as the United States' role in European unification. He submits that the manner in which functions of the "external elite" are "internalized" by the integrating group is of great importance for the evolution of integration, and he submits a number of propositions to this effect.

Second, the external factor has been stressed by the critique of theory of integration. Indeed, an approach to international relations which stresses the importance of traditional interstate politics and conflict, as, for example, Stanley Hoffmann's work has done, is bound to note and criticize the absence from the writings on integration of an explicit treatment of the role of superpowers, defense policy, matters of prestige, and tensions extending beyond the area of the integrating states.[15]

Third, some scholars working on non-European cases of integration where the role of outside forces is conspicuous have noted the need for accommodating outside elements in the theory. Thus Joseph Nye concluded from a critical review of a theoretical contribution by two other scholars that there is a need for a concept such as "catalyst" to supplement the internal variables that theory had singled out to explain integration.[16] A "catalyst" could be the policy of an outside power, the use of military force, or economic aid to underdeveloped countries, though only further systematic research into this phenomenon will enable us to become more specific.[17]

Beyond these contributions, the systematic investigation of regional integration in various areas has at best devoted only marginal attention to outside factors and has in any case abstained from explicitly incorporating them into any set of theoretical propositions. Curiously, this treatment not only contrasts with the still unproven commonsense assumption occasionally appearing in the literature on regionalism that there must be some connection between different processes of integra-

[14] Deutsch and his associates had investigated this factor in their earlier work. Though these scholars as well as Etzioni concluded that an outside threat seems to aid integration (the Deutsch study, however, regards it as "nonessential"), we still do not know why some unions survived the initial threat while others dissolved with it. See Deutsch and others, 44-46, 123-61.

[15] E.g., Hoffmann, "Discord in Community," and "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," *Daedalus* (Summer 1966), 862-915.

[16] "Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration," *International Organization*, XIX (Autumn 1965), 870-84.

[17] Nye's own monograph on Central American integration, "Central American Regional Integration," is a step in this direction, devoting attention to external factors. At the present state of our knowledge, however, concepts like "catalyst" are difficult to operationalize and tend to undermine the conciseness of existing theory.

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tion ("Integration in Western Europe is producing integration by induction in Eastern Europe"),[18] but also contrasts even more with those writings that analyze regional phenomena without attempting to contribute to theory of integration.[19] Notably in the historical studies of United States policy toward European unification the American contribution to the success of unification appears absolutely indispensable—a factor that theory does not reflect.[20]

III. Three Ideal Types of Regional Subsystems

In order to enable us to differentiate among various kinds of regional phenomena and, we hope, to identify their impact on the nature of *inter*regional connections, we shall construct three ideal types of regional subsystems. They are ideal types in the Weberian sense and therefore do not exist in reality in their pure form. (This becomes particularly obvious if we apply them to the Communist world.) In these constructions the nature of the interaction between *national* systems is emphasized and used to distinguish among three ideal types of *regional* systems. These constructions differ according to where social, economic, and political interaction between the participating units is anchored in the national systems or, put differently, according to the location of the elites who make decisions on matters relevant to relations between the members of the regional subsystem.

These ideal types constitute our tools for investigating the interaction between regional systems; they accommodate not only phenomena of integration but also other aspects that are relevant to an understanding of the internal processes in regional subsystems, ranging from the field of "high politics," such as alliances or matters of prestige, to economic or cultural relations between the participating societies.

The Transnational Society Subsystem of the Regional Type

In the Transnational Society Subsystem, relations between national systems are handled and decided upon by nongovernmental elites and pursued directly between social, economic, and political forces in the participating societies.

This ideal type refers to phenomena that assert themselves conspicu-

[18] Marshall D. Shulman, "The Communist States and Western Integration," in Wilcox and Haviland.

[19] E.g., Dell, *Trade Blocs and Common Markets.*

[20] See, for example, Max Beloff, *The United States and the Unity of Europe* (London 1963); and Ernst van der Beugel, *From Marshall Plan to Atlantic Partnership: European Integration as a Concern of American Policy* (Amsterdam 1966).

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ously in contemporary international politics, namely, the growing variety and quantity of processes and transactions between societies, such as trade, investment, migration, exchange of technical information and ideas, and activities of transnational pressure groups (e.g., Monnet's "Action Committee for the United States of Europe"). The participating elites act independently of the governments, and though the resulting transactions between societies bypass the traditional decision-making institutions, they nevertheless affect the context within which these institutions have to make decisions.[21] The example of a balance-of-payments deficit resulting from private capital outflow but bringing drastic consequences for foreign policy and military involvement abroad comes immediately to mind.



FIG. 1 NATIONAL SYSTEM AND TRANSNATIONAL SOCIETY SUBSYSTEMS

We know relatively little about the deeper implications that these processes within transnational society have for political relations between national systems. Yet, though some voices warn us against premature conclusions,[22] we make a commonsense assumption that they act as catalysts for a growing interdependence within the international system. Neither do we know how a transnational society, which permeates several regional systems, "connects" them and affects their interaction (for example, what is the impact of increased cultural exchange and tourism on relations between East and West?). An ideal type with

[21] On this problem see the perceptive observations by Oran R. Young of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, "The Actors in World Politics," mimeographed. The term "transnational society" was introduced by Raymond Aron; see his *Peace and War*, 104.

[22] Thus, the application of communication theory to political science has resulted in a number of propositions according to which processes of self-closure seem to appear more frequently than it was assumed they would ten years ago. For references, see Karl Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government*, 2nd ed. (New York 1966), x. But these findings, as well as Gunnar Myrdal's thesis of growing international disintegration as a result of the steadily growing welfare functions of the modern state, do not necessarily disprove the postulate of increasing interdependence within the present international system. The two seemingly opposite processes may well work simultaneously on different functional levels. Myrdal elaborates his thesis in *Beyond the Welfare State* (New Haven 1958).

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transnational processes as one of its key elements introduces an analytical instrument that should facilitate further scrutiny of their relevance.

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM

In the Intergovernmental Regional Subsystem, relations between national systems are handled and decided upon by elites located in governmental institutions.



FIG. 2 INTERGOVERNMENTAL REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM

This category covers alliances and intergovernmental regional arrangements for the purpose of coordinating policies in specific fields. International regional organizations can assist the governments in pursuing their regional aims, but the secretariats are relatively weak; all important decisions are made by representatives of the governments. The OEEC in its early phase, the European Conference of Ministers of Transport, or some of the (often shortlived) African subgroupings[23] would be examples that come near to this characterization. But we must remind ourselves here that we are dealing with ideal types that do not exist in real life in their perfect form. At a time when governments have become highly interventionist, alliances or intergovernmental international organizations are usually accompanied by intersocietal relations; they may even result from them. Therefore alliances such as NATO, ANZUS, or the Warsaw Pact correspond to this ideal type only if we focus on relations between the participating units along *functional* lines. With regard to military affairs, therefore, NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be Intergovernmental Regional Subsystems.

THE COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM

In the Comprehensive Regional Subsystem, relations between national systems are handled and decided upon by both governmental and nongovernmental elites with a view to attaining identical, similar, or related objectives. Some of these decisions may be taken jointly or in consultation, though consultation will increase as such a system moves nearer toward political community.

[23] On this point, see I. William Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," *International Organization*, XXI (Summer 1967), 545-64.

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

FIG. 3 COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM

Comprehensive Subsystems can be regions in which economic interaction on the societal level is being stimulated or directed toward specific purposes by joint action of the governments (e.g., EFTA or Comecon) or through coordination of national policies with the assistance of supranational institutions (e.g., EEC). Comprehensive Subsystems include groupings involved in "integration" and the building of "political community," as, for example, Haas defines it,[24] or of "security communities," in Deutsch's sense,[25] or in a "federalizing process," as C. J. Friedrich has delineated it.[26] But they must stop short of political community or federation since with their attainment of such an objective we would no longer be able to speak of a "regional subsystem." Instead, a new national or quasi-national system would have emerged.

IV. The Interaction of Regional Subsystems: Some Hypotheses on Causal Relationships and Recurrent Patterns

When regional subsystems interact, particular regularities occur, and under specific conditions certain cause-effect relationships appear frequently. This section attempts to list these regularities and relationships in a certain order. The propositions are hypothetical ones, supported by partial but not conclusive evidence. Most important, since we are dealing with social phenomena, our if-then propositions are not intended to be monocausal interpretations.

In ordering our hypotheses we shall distinguish between two sets of interactions that generate different patterns: "overlapping" and "nonoverlapping" regional subsystems. The first category refers to the interaction of different subsystems that extend simultaneously to one or several national systems. Atlantic cooperation and European integration or the OAS and LAFTA would be examples of two sets of over-

[24] Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," *International Organization*, XV (Summer 1961).

[25] Deutsch and others, *Political Community*.

[26] "International Federalism in Theory and Practice," in Elmer Plischke, ed., *Systems of Integrating the International Community* (Princeton 1964), 117-55.

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lapping regional subsystems. "Non-overlapping subsystems" refers to interaction between partial international systems that are geographically separated, as, for example, the interaction between EEC and Comecon or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN NON-OVERLAPPING REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS

Following the life cycle of any political system, we shall first deal with the *formation* of the groupings. Do regional systems stimulate, induce, or contribute to the formation of other systems? And if so, can any patterns be observed? After we have attempted an answer we shall then examine how they *interact* when (at least two) regional systems exist.

1. *Do regional subsystems stimulate, induce, or contribute to the formation of other subsystems?*

The Equilibrium Postulate (first hypothesis): *Intergovernmental Regional Subsystems stimulate the formation of other regional subsystems of the same type if the former are active in the realm of "high politics."*

"High politics" is here understood as pertaining to matters of national prestige, survival and defense, or power status in international politics, as perceived by the participating actors.[27] This hypothesis is not new. It only reformulates an essential pattern of behavior in international politics which has been observed before by the school that stresses the importance of equilibrium or balance of power, often summed up in the postulate "Alliances breed counteralliances."[28] There is no evidence yet that states in the modern world have entirely abandoned what was generally regarded as an essential rule in the international system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, namely, to make sure that the establishment or increase in power of an actually or potentially hostile grouping of states is compensated for by measures that include the formation or strengthening of a countergrouping or the denial of potential allies to the opposing states. During the postwar period the Eastern and Western alliance systems acted in this way. But it can rarely be clearly ascertained when a change in the opponents' capabilities and willingness to back up a threat were "real" or when they were a matter of (sometimes erroneous) perception (a point the "revisionist"

[27] See, however, the remarks on the problematic character of this concept and its usage in Kaiser, 389-404.

[28] For example, George Liska, *International Equilibrium* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957); and Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 4th ed. (New York 1967).

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rewriting of the history of the Cold War constantly stresses). Nor is there a clear pattern of moves and countermoves, since formal and visible steps often only brought into the open changes that had already occurred earlier. While, for example, the foundation of the Cominform followed the announcement of the Marshall Plan, the Warsaw Pact was formally established not immediately after the formation of NATO but only when Germany joined it about six years later. In the meantime, however, the Soviet Union had built up military forces in the satellites which had been put under Soviet command.

The Inducement Postulate (second hypothesis): *Comprehensive Regional Subsystems contribute to the formation of other subsystems of the same kind if (a) there has been prior mutual involvement on the level of societies (as in Transnational Society Subsystems) and if the Comprehensive Subsystems have hurt or can be expected to hurt the interests of other regions (the "threat effect") or if (b) the Comprehensive Subsystems are relevant as models to other regions (the "demonstration effect").*

What preliminary evidence supports this hypothesis? The formation of EEC threatened economic interests of other regions whose societies had pursued trade with the members of this grouping. EEC thus provided an incentive (to be sure, among several others) for South American and Central American economic integration and was the prime cause for the formation of EFTA.

But the European Communities also had some effect in Eastern Europe by contributing to raising Comecon from its previous verbal existence to a real one. In this case no mutual significant involvement between the societies of EEC and Comecon members existed, but the "demonstration effect" constituted a transmission belt from one area to another, and here, as in other instances, it worked in two ways. First, it served as a model for problem-solving: Khrushchev's grudging acknowledgment of EEC in 1962 as a new way of organizing the capitalist international economy and the twenty-two theses on European economic integration, as well as the increasing volume of Communist writings and pronouncements, bring this out.[29] Second, EEC demonstrated how a group of nations involved in integration enhance their weight and standing in international politics. In the case of Comecon the perception of such a consequence of integration was, of course,

[29] On this point, see Gerda Zellentin, *Die Kommunisten und die Einigung Europas* (Frankfurt 1964). For a sound warning on the degree of interaction see Andrzej Korbonski, "COMECON," in *International Political Communities*, 351-404.

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amplified by the existing rivalry and hostility between the two regional subsystems.

But the demonstration effect is also observable in other contexts. EEC acted as a model for problem-solving in the eyes of a number of crucially located Latin Americans, particularly the *técnicos* of ECLA and the proponents of LAFTA. Similarly, EEC served as an example of how the divided Latin American nations could gain greater standing in world politics and carry more weight in defending their interests. Both themes occurred time and again in the writings and statements of Latin Americans.[30] Moreover, the demonstration effect has been observed by a number of scholars who have studied both South American and Central American integration.[31]

The impact of EEC on underdeveloped areas is not the sole example of the demonstration effect, though this kind of effect will be more frequent because of Europe's central role in the world economy. The Central American Common Market has also had a demonstration effect on Latin America.[32]

A Question (instead of a third hypothesis): *Do Transnational Society Subsystems stimulate other regional subsystems, and how do they interact, when at least two of them exist?*

With this question we expand our field of concern from the problem of formation of regional systems to that of interaction after such systems have come into existence. But no specific patterns are observable here, and many important questions remain unanswered: Do processes between societies of such a system—for example, on the economic level—stimulate responses on a regional level somewhere else? How do certain regions react to the elaboration of specific policies of international trusts or firms vis-à-vis those regions? What are the consequences of a grouping like ADELA (Atlantic Development Group for Latin America), a consortium of banks and financial groups to coordinate economic policies toward Latin America.

The interaction between Transnational Society Subsystems *prima facie* appears important since this is an area of social action in which

[30] See, e.g., the "Proposals for the Creation of the Latin American Common Market," submitted to the Latin American governments in 1965 by four leading Latin American personalities, and reprinted in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, v (September 1966), 83-110.

[31] See Sidney Dell, *A Latin American Common Market* (London 1966); Nye, "Central American Regional Integration"; Mitchell, "The Role of Technocrats in Latin American Integration"; and Schmitter, *The Process of Central American Integration*.

[32] Nye, "Central American Regional Integration."

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one of the constituents of "interdependence" can be located. In economic theory this problem has been touched upon in generalizations about international trade—for example, Viner's concepts of "trade creation" and "trade diversion."[33] Students of integration have investigated some of these phenomena *within* a regional system, such as activities of business and labor, of pressure groups, and of political parties; others have examined the processes of "informal integration," such as university exchanges, tourism, and cross-national intermarriage.[34] But these endeavors, in so far as they attempt to *explain* dynamic processes, have not been carried beyond the borders of the regional systems to study the interaction with external systems.

The analysis of transaction flows, that is, the application of communications theory to the social sciences, at first sight seems to offer methods that are particularly suited to study processes within transnational society. Indeed, various efforts have been made to use this approach to identify clusters of national systems among which a particular intensity of relations (as expressed, for instance, in trade or shared membership in international organizations) or a similarity of action (as expressed, for example, in UN voting behavior) exists.[35] So far, these attempts have at best been able to *register* some of these phenomena in transnational society, but not to *explain* their social and political relevance, let alone their causes.[36]

[33] Jacob Viner, *The Customs Union Issue* (New York 1950).

[34] The first volume of a series of such studies has appeared: Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Politische Dimensionen der europäischen Gemeinschaftsbildung* (Cologne 1968).

[35] See e.g., Steven J. Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System," *American Political Science Review*, LX (December 1966), 880-88; Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System* (Chicago 1967).

[36] But even a mere inventory of social transactions in transnational society is difficult since it presupposes that they lend themselves to quantification, which they rarely do. The inference of certain sociopolitical meanings from the few kinds of messages that can be measured is often problematical. For example, the number of personnel in embassies accredited to foreign countries, used by Brams, is at best an indicator of the salience of mutual relations *relative to other countries*; it says very little about the nature of bilateral relationship in absolute terms. Shared membership in international organizations, a second indicator used by Brams, is only marginally relevant; it reveals nothing about the most important aspect, namely, what states *do* inside or outside international organizations. Voting behavior in the UN, one of the areas investigated by Russett, says something about voting behavior in the UN but practically nothing about the rest of the foreign policy of a country; there is no better proof of this contention than Russett's finding that French foreign policy under the Fourth and the Fifth Republics was consistent—in the UN. The discovery of subsystems of UN voting blocs therefore has only limited value. But, most important, transaction flow analysis, besides registering and listing some regional phenomena on the basis of often debatable indices, has not yet made any substantial step toward the most essential process in the social sciences, namely, explanation and if-then propositions (a fact that Russett freely admits, pp. 206ff.).

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HOW DO REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS INTERACT?

2. With the analysis shifting its focus to the interaction between already existing (non-overlapping) regional subsystems, the object of investigation becomes even more complex, since the time dimension and constant feedback make social and political processes more difficult to identify. As a result our propositions become less specific.

First, we turn to Intergovernmental Regional Subsystems in which two patterns of interaction occur frequently, but only in the field of "high politics." Pierre Hassner has observed such patterns in the interaction between the Eastern and Western alliance systems, and we can expand his concepts for our use here.[37] Since it is not entirely clear under what conditions one or the other pattern occurs—in fact, they sometimes seem to be at work simultaneously—we cannot yet formulate a more specific hypothesis.

The Symmetry Pattern: *The regional subsystems interact in such a way as to produce similar processes within both systems.*

In the case of alliances, if one side steps up its strength, increases its potential threat, and reorganizes its forces, the other side will follow. This in turn will cause a reaction in the first system toward further strengthening. In strategy this process is known as escalation. This pattern can be observed in relations between the Eastern and Western alliance systems during the early years of the cold war. The desire of the participating subsystems to preserve an equilibrium (as each side sees it) generates the driving force behind this pattern.

But the symmetry pattern works not only with regard to military matters. Very often certain processes of strengthening or reorganizing a regional subsystem are followed, sometimes even mirrored, in the other regional subsystem with which it interacts. For example, in recent years both major contemporary alliance systems have attempted to reorganize the relationship between the superpower and the other members, trying to cope with the difficult question of coordinating their policies with demands for greater autonomy by the smaller allies.

The symmetry pattern can consist not only of a mutual strengthening but also of a mutual weakening of existing regional subsystems. With regard to alliances, the process described above can be reversed, resulting in a gradual de-escalation of strength and mutual threat. This seems to be the present trend in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact

[37] "German and European Reunification: Two Problems or One?" *Survey*, No. 61 (October 1966), 14-37.

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countries. Moreover, similar processes of transformation toward a loosening-up of the previous system take place in both systems. Rumania sometimes gives the impression of copying De Gaulle's policies. Moreover, both camps mutually reinforce certain trends, namely, nationalism and steps toward greater national autonomy, which weaken their previous cohesion. This raises the interesting question of whether and what kind of a Transnational Society Subsystem is emerging which comprises both Eastern and Western Europe. According to a study in progress, the economic and institutional reforms in the Communist countries result in societies with sectional interests oriented toward economic rationality in their attempts at welfare maximization.[38] This study submits that these interests tend to interact with neighboring areas independent of their political systems. In pursuance of older ties (for example, Balkan or Danubian) or economic connections (DDR-CSR-Poland-Hungary) they work toward confederal or functional kinds of cooperation or integration which exclude the Soviet Union. Some of these countries begin interacting with Western Europe at an early stage; but a more widespread interaction can be expected later.

The Contrast Pattern: *The regional subsystems interact in such a way as to produce different, if not opposite, processes within each subsystem.*

In alliances or military affairs, the contrast pattern postulates: the stronger we are the weaker the other side becomes. The more we are united and effective, the better we can exploit the weaknesses and divisions of the other side. In the late 1940's and early 1950's some of the opponents of German rearmament argued on the premises of the symmetry postulate: Germany's rearmament would force the Communist states to strengthen their own system and would hinder the assertion of polycentrism, whereas the defenders adhered to the contrast postulate: only a "policy of strength" could lead to the weakening and collapse of the Communist system. The contrast pattern seems to be observable also on the issue of a Non-proliferation Treaty; here the Soviet Union is able to improve its own position by exploiting the divisions in the West.

Turning from Intergovernmental Subsystems to interaction between Comprehensive Regional Subsystems, we can again observe a symmetry

[38] Gerda Zellentin, "Intersystemare Beziehungen Zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa," in progress. See also J. F. Brown, *The New Eastern Europe* (New York 1966), 212-36; and Ghita Inonescu, *The Politics of East European Communist States* (New York 1967), 271-90.

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pattern and a contrast pattern, but it appears possible to give greater precision to our proposition. The symmetry pattern can be observed under the following conditions:

> The External Threat Postulate (fourth hypothesis): *Comprehensive Regional Subsystems tend to reinforce each other if (a) there exists a mutual involvement between the societies of the two subsystems and if (b) regional processes within one subsystem hurt the interests of the other and if (c) there is no real possibility of participation in the other subsystem.*

Here again the "threat effect" constitutes the main transmission belt. Put less abstractly, this hypothesis suggests that success of one regional subsystem (for example, the elaboration of certain external policies by EEC) hurts another regional subsystem (such as Latin America). This effect forces the latter to coordinate policies among national systems and to arrive at common positions resulting in a strengthening of this subsystem. But since under these circumstances the latter is able to affect the originator more effectively than without the original threat, it tends to strengthen cohesion there.

Schmitter has observed this phenomenon in the Central American Common Market. He suggests that relations with the outside world are a major factor influencing the development of integration: once internal integration has passed a certain level of success, "the participants will find themselves increasingly compelled—regardless of their original intentions—to adopt common policies vis-à-vis non-participant third countries." If such efforts are successful they are likely to elicit reactions —often hostile reactions—from outsiders, which in turn increase pressure for common positions. Schmitter submits it as an "externalization hypothesis."[39]

The working of this pattern can also be observed in the interaction between EEC and Latin America. Indeed, feelings about EEC expressed in ECLA pronouncements sometimes reach quasi-hostility.[40] LAFTA members and other countries in the region have begun to coordinate their policy vis-à-vis EEC.[41] Similarly, they acted as a group in the Kennedy Round negotiations—as did other regions involved. In fact, the whole Kennedy Round can be looked on as a regulated conflict between regional subsystems.

[39] *The Process of Central American Integration*, 6.
[40] See, e.g., the statements quoted in Dell, *Trade Blocs and Common Markets*, 160ff.
[41] Cf. on this point the Latin American "Proposals for the Creation of the Latin American Common Market."

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The contrast pattern, in turn, can be observed under the following conditions:

The Postulate of Alternative Opportunities[42] (fifth hypothesis): *Comprehensive Regional Subsystems weaken other regional subsystems of all three varieties if (a) they hurt the interests of members of other regional subsystems and if (b) they are reasonably strong and offer rewards for participation and if (c) participation in or access to the benefits of the Comprehensive Subsystem is an option that is reasonably open to individual members of the other subsystems.*

Thus, EEC weakened the prospects of the Pan-African movement because of the direct association of a certain number of African states which thereby participate in the benefits of the Comprehensive Subsystem in Europe.[43] EEC also weakened EFTA for the same reasons: EEC offers great enough rewards and is sufficiently "open" to make direct participation through membership, association, or special arrangement a reasonable alternative for some of the members without leading to the overall settlement between West Europe's two trading groups which EFTA has been seeking.

The pattern formulated in our fifth hypothesis can also be observed, though with some qualifications, in the interaction of EEC and Comecon. The existing possibility, or even the mere prospect, of directly participating in the prospering EEC system through trade, investment, or cooperation agreements weakens Comecon. Rumania's policy provides some evidence, but so does the policy of Poland and Czechoslovakia, although their action toward Western Europe is both more discreet and more cautious.[44] Of course, other factors are even more important in weakening Comecon, notably nationalism and the national focus of socialist planning, which make economic cooperation across borders difficult.[45]

If an "open" subsystem exists and if it hurts the interests of members

[42] The term was suggested by Ernst Haas in a discussion.

[43] On the other hand, EEC was not able to split such an intra-African grouping as the East African Common Market.

[44] On this point see the research report "Die Kommunisten und der Gemeinsame Markt," *Europa-Archiv*, XXII (November 1967), 815-24; see also the sources cited in fn. 38 above.

[45] On this point see Michael Kaser, *COMECON: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies* (London 1967); Korbonski, *COMECON*; Rolf Krengel, "Die wirtschaftlichen Integrationsbestrebungen und *Integrationshindernisse im Ostblock*," in Erik Boettcher, ed., *Ostblock, EWG und Entwicklungsländer* (Stuttgart 1963); and John Pinder, "EEC and COMECON," *Survey*, No. 58 (January 1966), 101-17.

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of another regional subsystem, the units thus affected have the choice between two alternatives: either they can strengthen their own subsystem (the symmetry pattern), or they can individually seek a direct accommodation with or participation in the other subsystem. But if they choose the second alternative, they do so at the cost of undermining their own subsystem.

Contrary to widespread opinion, a regional subsystem can therefore become a threat to the survival of other regional subsystems, not when it is closed (or "inward-looking," as this was frequently described in the case of EEC), but when it is reasonably open, willing, or potentially willing to concede participation in the benefits of the system to outsiders. But such a possibility presupposes that there are real rewards for participation and that such a course is a genuine alternative. This would not be the case if a significant geographical distance existed in combination with an absence of closer political ties. Thus, the Latin American countries had and have no choice but to pursue the symmetry pattern in the face of EEC, whereas a number of African countries, tied to EEC by bonds dating back to the colonial period, could seek participation through association agreements (with the Commonwealth member Nigeria following later in the wake of the EFTA weakening).

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN OVERLAPPING REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS

Overlapping regional subsystems, it will be remembered, are partial international systems that extend simultaneously to one or several national systems, as it is the case with regard to NATO and EEC, for example. When regional subsystems overlap, the interaction networks become more complex than in the case of subsystems that are geographically separated. Consequently it appears impossible, at this stage of our knowledge, to differentiate according to formation and coexistence of overlapping regional subsystems as we have done earlier with regard to non-overlapping subsystems. Moreover, the higher variety and volatility of patterns of interaction permit us to submit only two propositions on the interaction of subsystems, one of which refers to the role of superpowers.

The Postulate of Political Regularization (sixth hypothesis): *Within overlapping regional subsystems that also share a Transnational Society Subsystem, the pressure to form or strengthen Comprehensive Regional Subsystems in the area will grow with the increasing intensity of interaction in the transnational society.*

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Put in less abstract terms, this hypothesis asserts that growing interaction on the level of societies puts pressure on the governments of the participating national systems to regulate their mutual relations in a more permanent and institutionalized manner. It should be stressed that this hypothesis is based on intuition and observation of prevailing trends in international politics, rather than on conclusive empirical evidence, and is meant to provoke discussion.

The case can be argued as follows: With the growing permeability of the modern nation-state, not just in the military field (as Herz has perceptively demonstrated)[46] but in numerous realms such as trade, investment, and flow of men and ideas, socially and politically relevant developments among societies increasingly bypass traditional decision-makers. But, as we suggested above, these developments change the environment within which the decision-makers must act and constitute parameters of their decisions. (The hypothesis is therefore less valid—but not invalid—for the Communist world, where governmental elites control transactions between societies to a considerable degree.) Given the welfare objective of modern governments and the ensuing necessity of intervention in social and political affairs, these intersocietal developments cannot be left to themselves, with their possibly negative consequences for social and economic welfare, stability, or the political objectives of the national systems involved.[47]

Faced with such developments, national governments theoretically have the option between, on the one hand, national self-encapsulation to stop intersocietal interaction or to bring it under complete national control and, on the other, regularized consultation, and even coordination of policies, with the governments of the other national systems involved in order to cope with the problems created on the level of societies. But since many states have a stake in transactions such as trade, investment, tourism, and exchange of technical information, the first option is often not a feasible course. For example, international trade and investment can deeply affect the balance of payments or economy of states. But purely national intervention is unable to cure some of the problems that may consequently arise (as the American and British governments well know): hence, pressure to consult or to

[46] John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York 1962).

[47] For two perceptive attempts to examine some of the problems involved see Horst Mendershausen, *Transnational Society vs. State Sovereignty*, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, March 1968, mimeo, and Raymond Vernon, "Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty," *Harvard Business Review*, March/April 1967, 156-72.

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coordinate policies with the governments of the other national systems involved.

The transformation of OEEC into OECD and the strengthening of various activities within this organization such as the "Group of Ten" have some similarity with this pattern. The interaction on the level of societies which was taking place within the Atlantic area as a whole created pressures to develop a wider framework than the merely European regional subsystem of the OEEC. As a result, OECD, including the United States and Canada, was formed. Similarly, the financial problems, in particular the balance-of-payments problem of the United States, which had been caused by economic transactions on the level of societies, resulted in a steady strengthening of intergovernmental consultation mechanisms to cope with them, namely, within the "Group of Ten."[48]

This hypothesis is not a reformulation of Jean Monnet's approach to unification. Monnet suggested that under welfare-state conditions economic integration would eventually lead to political community. Our hypothesis asserts that strong intersocietal interaction calls for regularization of relationships among governments or—if such relationships already exist—their strengthening. Such measures could theoretically cover anything from loose consultation to integration. They could also include steps toward political community, once integration had led to a strong increase in intersocietal interaction that resulted in greater popular solidarity or demands for parliamentary control. For the time being, however, the building of Comprehensive Regional Subsystems would hardly go beyond consultation and voluntary coordination of policies and would thus extend at the most to an initial stage of integration. If the states in the course of such pursuits lose a small portion of their autonomy they lose it in two contexts: within those arrangements they deem necessary with other states (including institutional solutions) and within a diffuse transnational society that permeates the traditional nation-state and can be influenced but not entirely mastered.[49]

Finally, our last proposition refers to the role of superpowers in the interaction of overlapping regional subsystems:

[48] On this point see Karl Kaiser, "Strukturwandlungen in der atlantischen Zusammenarbeit," *Europa-Archiv*, XVII (December 1962), 815-30; and the more recent study by Henry G. Aubrey, *Atlantic Economic Cooperation: The Case of the OECD* (New York 1967).

[49] On this point see Hoffmann, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," 371.

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The Autonomy Postulate (seventh hypothesis): *Overlapping regional subsystems in which a superpower participates interact in such a way as to foster the formation of advanced forms of Comprehensive Regional Subsystems excluding the superpower.*

Wherever this pattern has occurred, the desire to gain greater autonomy vis-à-vis the superpower has been one of the major driving forces. In the Western cases this development has often had the acquiescence, if not the support, of the superpower, as, for example, in the case of European integration.

Within the overlapping regional subsystems of the West, the attempts to strengthen Europe as a second center of decision-making in the Atlantic system, the European "third force" concepts, and particularly the establishment of EEC could be suggested as cases in point.[50] Within the Western Hemisphere and its overlapping subsystems, the attempts at integration in Central and South America represent examples. In this case, the desire to gain greater autonomy vis-à-vis the superpower has been one of the external incentives, along with the formation and existence of EEC, which acted as a model and a threat. (And here again, the United States acted as a sponsor for an advanced Comprehensive Regional Subsystem in the form of economic integration in both Central and South America, though its attitude has been ambiguous.)[51] The group of Far Eastern and Pacific countries that formed ASPAC in 1967 may conceivably evolve according to this pattern, but ASPAC is still too undeveloped to permit any conclusion as to its nature.

The East European socialist states may possibly follow the same pattern in the future by establishing Comprehensive Regional Subsystems among themselves, excluding the Soviet Union, while continuing to participate in a regional subsystem (or several of them) that includes their superpower. These new Comprehensive Subsystems could emerge along the lines suggested earlier—that is, in the form of confederal or functional cooperation in the Balkans, along the Danube, or among CSR, DDR, and Poland.

[50] See Kaiser, "The U.S. and the EEC in the Atlantic System," for an effort to review in systematic terms the attempts to change the structure of the European and Atlantic subsystems.

[51] On this point see James D. Cochrane, "United States Attitudes Toward Central American Economic Integration," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, XVIII (Autumn 1964); Christopher Mitchell, "Common Market—The Future of a Commitment: Punta del Este and After," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, XXI (Winter 1967), 73-87; Nye, "Central American Regional Integration."

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But the preceding hypothesis can be reformulated to focus more specifically on the role of the superpower in processes of change:

> *A transformation of overlapping regional subsystems toward a type of Comprehensive Regional Subsystem that involves advanced integration is improbable if a superpower participates.* Put differently, *the greater the integration, the slighter the chance for participation of the superpower.*

Within the Atlantic overlapping subsystems, all attempts have failed to establish an "Atlantic Union" of the federal kind that various private groups have advocated for a number of years. Nor have governmental initiatives aimed at integration including the United States been successful. Efforts to create such new structures in the military, political, or economic fields have been handicapped either by the unwillingness of many smaller powers to accept a structure that perpetuates American dominance or by America's reluctance to accept a structure that implies some restriction of its own freedom of action (as a result of majority voting, strong international secretariats, firm commitments tieing American policy, and so on).[52]

Similarly, within the Communist subsystem, Soviet attempts under Khrushchev to transform Comecon into a more advanced regional system of integration (for example, through greater prerogatives for Comecon in influencing national economic plans) failed because the smaller members—in particular, Rumania—were unwilling to let the Soviet Union solidify, or extend its dominant position within the Eastern system.[53]

Developments in the Western Hemisphere have followed a similar pattern. The few attempts to initiate integration—for example, in the form of a Western Hemisphere Common Market as it was proposed at an OAS conference in 1957—came to nothing. Indeed, resentment of Washington's strong position has been so great that such attempts never had any chance; nor has such a concept been part of the United States policy toward Latin America. Indeed, as a student of Latin America recently observed, the United States' very support of integration there has made integration suspect in the eyes of some elite groups.[54]

[52] This reluctance was also expressed in President Kennedy's offer of a "Partnership of Equals" since it *de facto* postponed a genuine "partnership" until the moment Europe had become an equal, which was unlikely to occur in the near future.

[53] On this point see Brown; Kaser; Korbonski; and Pinder.

[54] Mitchell, "Common Market."

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V. Conclusion

In the preceding pages we have tried to show how regional processes —notably in the form of integration—interact with international politics and to suggest that consequently both should and can be studied *together*. We have done so by examining how regional systems (in the form of alliances, integration, or societal interchange) interact and by submitting a number of hypothetical if-then propositions on these processes.

Attempts at building theory on regional processes (in particular on integration) and on international politics in a wider sense should draw upon one another more intensively—indeed, should explicitly proceed jointly. Both branches of political science—thus far unduly separated—can profit from such a joint undertaking. The analysis of regional processes may thereby succeed in encompassing the hitherto neglected element of external factors, particularly the role of the superpowers and the interaction of regional subsystems. If, in response to the propositions of this article and breaking with habits of the past, students of regional integration pay attention to data on the role of external factors and use them to test (or refute) these propositions, one of the article's purposes will be fulfilled. Theory on international politics as a whole, in turn, may thereby be able to incorporate integrative developments within regions, which, after all, have become one of the salient characteristics of contemporary politics.

Finally, we have tried to draw attention to the phenomena of intersocietal relations whose consequences for international politics are barely known and to offer some suggestions on their possible implications and how to study them. Though these brief concluding remarks do not allow us to substantiate this point, it is our feeling that the emergence of and developments in a "transnational society" could change the structure of the contemporary international systems as significantly as regional integration has begun to do. The time has come to pay greater attention to both—in conjunction—and it was the purpose of this article to suggest some initial working hypotheses and to provoke further discussion.

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Reviews

THE CONCEPTUAL WORLD OF THE YALE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

By GIDON GOTTLIEB

Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and James C. Miller, *The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967, xxi, 410 pp. $9.75.

INTERNATIONAL agreements perform functions worthy of the closest attention of the student of international affairs. They are a principal tool of diplomacy and the aim of most negotiations. Many such agreements are not intended to create legal relationships, and the demarcation line between legally binding agreements and other consensual relationships is correspondingly hazy and uncertain. International agreements have not, however, received in recent times nearly the degree of attention devoted in international studies to "force" and "power." This is so despite the fact that they generally reflect the participants' power calculations and shared expectations. They are an essential mode of guidance and regulation in international relations, helping to shape decisions and claims sometimes even in the course of armed conflicts. International agreements loom large in the actual experience of statesmen, jurists, and military men—their conclusion, their application, and their breach represent complex political decisions with frequently serious outcomes leading to shifts in power relationships.

The need to restate these truisms is in itself significant and reflects the inadequate concern with "nonobjective" considerations in modern approaches to international relations. International legal relations, however, are predominantly governed by international agreements. Indeed, in the Soviet view they are exclusively so determined. The law of international agreements is largely concerned with their conclusion, application, breach, and termination. It is law *about* agreements.

The publication of *The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order* by McDougal, Lasswell, and Miller is a major event in the annals of modern legal scholarship.[1] It adds another cyclopean

[1] For an incisive analysis of this work, see Richard A. Falk, "On Treaty Interpretation and the New Haven Approach: Achievements and Prospects," *Virginia Law Review*, LIV (May 1968).

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stone to the gigantic edifice of learning painstakingly erected by McDougal and his associates at the Yale Law School. The work is one of high legal craftsmanship informed by a broad range of interests clearly transcending narrow disciplinary considerations. The quality of concern and its breadth no less than its vigor combine to make McDougal's scholarly achievements monumental and awe-inspiring. The flowering of scholarship on the sturdy branches of an original system of analysis is a rare phenomenon. It consolidates the existence of a true "school" of learning in the classical sense of the word. The five volumes by McDougal and his associates taken as a whole display a consistency of approach and a unity of purpose that assure them a towering place in the vast field of international law.[2] No scholar or critic of international law can afford to ignore these forceful doctrines whose full impact is beginning to be felt, as it is transmitted by the rapid spread of their teaching in scores of universities across the country. The *Interpretation of Agreements* is clearly destined to become an influential work. It must, however, be situated not only in the context of McDougal's own corpus but also as part of the international collaborative attempts to develop and codify international law about international agreements which have recently been completed by the Institute of International Law, the American Law Institute, and the International Law Commission of the United Nations.[3] The *Interpretation of Agreements* adds another volume to the short shelf of those works on international agreements which are essential for every international law scholar and practitioner. It joins on that shelf the *Harvard Research in International Law, Law of Treaties*; Lord McNair's *The*

[2] The first four volumes are: Myres S. McDougal and Associates, *Studies in World Public Order* (New Haven 1960); McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order* (New Haven 1961); McDougal and William T. Burke, *The Public Order of the Oceans* (New Haven 1962); McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and Ivan A. Vlasic, *Law and Public Order in Space* (New Haven 1963). For a consideration of modern trends in international law, see Richard A. Falk, "The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law: Gaps in Legal Thinking," *Virginia Law Review*, L (March 1964), 231, and "New Approaches to the Study of International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, LXI (April 1967), 477. For other books reflecting the Yale approach, see Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven 1950); Douglas M. Johnston, *The International Law of Fisheries: A Framework for Policy-oriented Inquiries* (New Haven 1965); and B. F. Murty, *The Ideological Instrument of Coercion and World Public Order* (New Haven 1967).

[3] In 1956 the Institute of International Law adopted a resolution in which it formulated two articles containing some basic principles of interpretation (*Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International*, XLVI [1966], 359). In 1965 the American Law Institute published the final text of the *Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the United States*. In 1966 the International Law Commission of the United Nations published the final text of *Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties*, UN Gen. Ass. Off. Rec., 21 Sess., Supp. No. 9 (A/6309/Rev. 1).

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Law of Treaties, the six reports and draft articles on the law of treaties of the International Law Commission, and De Visscher's *Interprétation Judiciaire en Droit International Public*.[4] It relies on a broad concept of relevance to inject considerations of policy, values, and the shared expectations of parties. McDougal is faithful in this work to his commitment to open up new areas for inquiry and to broaden the traditionally narrow investigation of textual provisions.

Interpretation as Deference to Shared Expectations

A principal purpose of the *Interpretation of Agreements* is to challenge traditional approaches to prescriptions and agreements which arrogate to the *text* of a document the role of serving as the exclusive index of the shared expectations of the parties to an agreement. McDougal is here again challenging the heavy legalistic emphasis on mere words, texts, and rules in legal processes of interpretation. He is bringing to the fore the expectations, policies, and values that written instruments are designed to serve. The problem of interpretation is compounded by the difficulty that "contemporary professional opinion, scholarly and other, is, however, today much confused about both the feasible goals of interpretation and the possibilities of achieving useful principles of interpretation to guide and assist decision-makers" (p. 6).

The *recommended* primary goal of interpretation advanced by McDougal and his associates is designed to serve "fundamental policy," the "basic patterns of value distribution and the fundamental institutions that are compatible with the preferred system of public order." The particular goal suggested should enable decision-makers to give effect to the goals of a public order of human dignity and to defend the dignity of man—that is, "to respect *his* choices and not, save for overriding common interest, to impose the choices of others upon him" (p. 41). These values serve in McDougal's scheme as the keystone of a complex edifice. The primary distinctive goal stipulates "that decision-makers undertake a disciplined, responsible effort to ascertain the genuine shared expectations of the particular parties to an agreement" (p. 40). This primary goal, however, must also be viewed in the context of overriding common interests. In other words, "policing" is required

[4] See also V. D. Degan, *L'Interprétation des accords en droit international* (The Hague 1963). For recent periodical literature see the "Law of Treaties" issue of the *American Journal of International Law*, LXI (October 1967); Shabtai Rosenne, "Interpretation of Treaties in the Restatement and the International Law Commission's Draft Articles: A Comparison," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, V (New York 1966), 205; and Oliver Lissitzyn, "The Law of International Agreements in the Restatement," *New York University Law Review*, XLI (March 1966), 96.

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to "examine the significance of every specific controversy for the entire range of policy purposes sought by the total system" (p. 41), so as to reject, when need be, the explicit expectations that contradict constitutive policies.

The goals that the authors postulate for the world community enable them to set firmly the recommended course for all interpretation. Having established deference to the genuine shared expectations of the parties as the principal desirable end of interpretation, McDougal devotes the greatest and most valuable part of his work to an analysis of the trends or practice of international tribunals. This analysis is made in terms of his, by now familiar and firm, analytical framework—goals, participants, objectives, situations, base values, and so on. This exploration of "past trends in the management of principles of interpretation" enables him to appraise their conformity to the policies he recommends. He and his coauthors then also recommend a variety of sophisticated tools and strategies of interpretation by articulating principles of content and procedure designed to lead to the fullest recovery of the genuine shared expectations of the parties, drastically broadening the range of relevant inquiry. Since they have found some past trends of interpretation wanting because of undue emphasis on words and textual considerations, the authors identify the factors conditioning such past inadequacies. They believe that the remarkably confused and contradictory practices of international tribunals result first and foremost from the honest intellectual difficulties of decision-makers, torn between two positions that can be stated in extreme terms: on the one hand, "interpretation is as automatic as the working of a well-designed and -operated slot machine" and, on the other, "all interpretation is a genteel hoax" (p. 371). The authors believe that the fundamental difficulties encountered in interpretation, in the "discovery" of the genuine shared expectations of parties to an agreement, can be minimized by turning to new scientific knowledge, and especially to communication theory, which could solve the intellectual difficulties that have so far beset interpreters. In this optimism they express the great American tradition of faith, first, in science and data as the panacea for a host of intellectual problems, and, second, in education as the means for introducing necessary modifications into vital decision processes of the world community. The evangelical zeal that lends vigor and impetus to their argument also provides armor against the facile barbs and sniggers that more traditional legal scholars might direct against some of their unconventional proposals for the accumulation of data on the vocabu-

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lary, posture, and gestures of participants in the international agreement-making processes.

The authors recognize that it is most unlikely that their principal recommendations will be adopted by international decision-makers in the near future. The International Law Commission draft articles on the law of treaties are intended to set international decision-makers on a course of interpretation far removed from the course recommended by McDougal and his associates. The authors' hopes lie in the education of future decision-makers and in modifications to be introduced by new personnel. The value of the *Interpretation of Agreements* does not, however, hinge on the adoption of recommendations of any sort; it rests in the clear statement of serious intellectual problems, in the brilliant analysis of a wide set of practices of interpretation, and in challenging proposals for the resolution of the intellectual confusion that now characterizes interpretation.

The Functions of Language in Legal Texts: The Philosophical Allegiances of the Yale School of International Law

McDougal's associates have served him well in the past, but in this work their usefulness is perhaps questionable. The sections devoted to communication theory are unsatisfactory, referring loosely to a poorly identified body of scholarship. The relevance of this body of knowledge is asserted but not demonstrated. McDougal's cyclopean effort suffers thus from the defects of cyclopean construction—between the boulders smaller stones are precariously lodged without mortar. The sections discussing communication theory are inserted, without much conviction, between the massive chapters on judicial interpretation. This is so despite the fact that Miller, then an assistant professor of psychology, has recognized elsewhere that

> an important issue confronting lawyers and law teachers, attempting to utilize theoretical tools such as decision theory, symbolic logic, and semantics [which together constitute much of what is known as communications theory] is of course whether or not they are translatable into practical legal situations without losing their unique value in the translation. While I am not well acquainted with the applications of decision theory, my understanding of symbolic logic and of semantics (either speculative or quantitative) would lead me to be skeptical of their importance in direct application to legal communications. Having just completed a work on the interpretation of treaties, I am impressed with the relative

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infrequency of logical problems in interpretation, and with the deep-seated inadequacy and irrelevance of contemporary semantic theory for decision makers in practical day-to-day situations. I suspect that as to all three disciplines the common problem is this: the closer one gets to practical decision-making problems, the more decision, logical and semantic principles become irrelevant as guides for decision and, in some cases, even as guides for analysis of the context.[5]

The adoption of a communication-theory model for McDougal's theory of interpretation poses serious conceptual problems that go to the very root of the policy-science approach to law and interpretation.

McDougal and his associates, in their analysis of the character of the intellectual difficulties that are the "real" cause of inadequate interpretation, write,

> The important task is to identify the character of the intellectual difficulty whose consequences are so strikingly manifest. Judgment is lagging behind available knowledge, less in the sense that specified items are overlooked or obscured, than that new bodies or methods of thought are insufficiently taken into account. In the theory and practice of interpretation the principal intellectual obstacle would appear to be the failure by decision-makers and publicists to conceive of the agreement-making process—to say nothing of the processes of claim and decision—as a process of *communication*, and to view this process in its widest context through the powerful lenses of modern communication studies.
>
> To acknowledge that the interpreter is inextricably involved in interrelated processes of communication is . . . to commit him [not only] to the goal of full contextuality (i.e., to examining without advance bias all features of the context relevant to decision), but also to the acquisition of an appropriate framework for conceiving the context he is requested to analyze. The *conception* of agreement as a process of communication, then, involves viewing all signs and acts of collaboration between the parties as an effort on their part to mediate all relevant subjectivities of commitment. This means in turn that such signs and acts of collaboration are not to be interpreted in isolation or as ends in themselves, but as instrumentalities for achieving the goal of communicating demands to

[5] James C. Miller, "Research Tools Available to Lawyers," in Layman E. Allen and Mary E. Caldwell, eds., *Communication Sciences and Law* (New York 1965), 27.

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> appropriate audiences, and eventually for mediating expectations concerning the content of the agreement. Seen in this way, communication involves the transmission of signs through channels to targets or audiences with the goal of mutual understanding on the part both of the sender and receiver of the messages. It is the possible inadequacies in transmission—usually through the inherent shortcomings in the capability of words and other signs to communicate shared subjectivities—that place the communications analyst on guard that only a total contextual survey, systematically examining "who said what to whom through what channels and with what effects," will suffice in performing his difficult task of determining the genuine shared expectations of the parties.
>
> It would be quite impossible, we believe, for a competent analyst who is acquainted with the study of language and gesture to commit himself seriously to the one-sided assertions that clutter the literature of interpretation. The "plain language" case would be seen in context as a rare set of circumstances more often approximated, or imagined, than achieved. Similarly, the idea that meanings are utterly chaotic and consequently that communication is a delicate plant which seldom flowers in actual life is an hypothesis more appropriate to the exegesis of modern poetry than to interpreting the prose of important international agreements (pp. 371-72).

Legal scholarship is indebted to McDougal for his analysis of agreement and interpretation as *processes*. The multiple *sequences* of events involved in both processes had not previously been sufficiently emphasized. It is perfectly evident that no single ingredient or event in the sequences can account for the whole process involved. But surely the *text* of the agreement must not itself be confused with the *process* of agreement that led up to it.

The communication model of analysis for processes of agreement and interpretation raises great difficulties. It is mystifying to read that "such signs and acts of collaboration are to be interpreted as *instrumentalities for achieving the goal of communicating demands* to appropriate audiences, and eventually *for mediating expectations concerning the content of the agreement*" (p. 372, italics added). Language in international agreements or in treaties is taken to represent the effort to mediate all relevant subjectivities of commitment. Such language is merely a means for expressing the shared subjectivities of communicators, while interpretation is geared to the discovery of "the shared expectations that the

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parties to the relevant communication succeeded in creating in each other" (p. xvi).

In McDougal's conceptual universe, language in agreements is reduced to the role of "mediating"—an unfortunately opaque term—between the "subjectivities" of parties. The subjectivities of parties, their expectations, and the communication of their demands are what interpreters are told to bear in mind, and the language of agreement is treated as an important, but not the only, tool or strategy for ascertaining the genuine shared expectations of the parties. In McDougal's view, it is not the interpretation of the text that matters but the discovery of the shared expectations of the parties, a discovery that can be assisted but not governed by the text. Correspondingly, the entire context of events in which the agreement took place assumes importance as it sheds light on these expectations. This view of the role of language in legal instruments is also expressed in McDougal and Feliciano's *Law and Minimum World Public Order*. McDougal's concern in that work is to discover relevant "policies," a concept which performs there the role that "shared expectations" performs in *Interpretation of Agreements*. In *Law and Minimum World Public Order* he writes, "The realistic function of . . . rules, considered as a whole, is, accordingly, not mechanically to dictate specific decision but to guide the attention of decision-makers to significant variable factors in typical recurring contexts of decision, *to serve as summary indices to relevant crystallized community expectations*, and, hence, to permit creative and adaptive, instead of arbitary and irrational, decisions."[6]

The problem raised by McDougal is, therefore, that of the nature and function of *text* and *language* in legal instruments generally, whether statutes, agreements, or other documents. McDougal's work is built on the thesis that legal language—rules and agreements—is designed to serve as a summary index to relevant crystallized community expectations and the shared expectations of the parties. This is the thesis that reliance on legal texts is but a strategy for *discovering* nonobjective facts: the expectations that the parties have succeeded in creating in each other. Interpretation, according to this thesis, is deference to relevant expectations. It contrasts with the traditional legal approach of deference to textual provisions. Fidelity to legal provisions and deference to the expectations of text-makers are very different matters.

McDougal's emphasis on the social sciences, on the one hand, and on the subjectivities of parties to an agreement, on the other, bears strong

[6] P. 57, italics added.

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echoes of positivist doctrines that classify sentences as logically true (analytic) or false (contradictory), factually true or false, or merely emotive.[7] Under this outmoded but still influential classification of sentences, legal statements would be relegated to the uncomfortable category of "emotive," unless otherwise somehow "salvaged." Legal Realism has thus traditionally put a premium on scientific and mathematical discourse. These governing preferences are also reflected in McDougal's emphasis on expectations, which are subjective "facts" of sorts. Processes of agreement and interpretation, shared expectations, communication theories, even the mediation of subjectivities by science are all concepts that fit comfortably in sophisticated social and behavioral science approaches. They all have one common feature: they *refer* to things, events, or processes and have factual referents. Predilection for scientific modes of reasoning leads to the virtual emasculation of the traditional role of prescriptive language in the form of rules, precedent, and other textual provisions. These are relegated to the role of summary indices and strategies for the discovery of subjective factors such as expectations and demands. This allegiance of the Yale School to scientific method goes back to the Legal Realist movement.[8] It now receives a modern expression in the policy science approach.

The serious inadequacy of this approach rests in intellectual difficulties that have in recent years been the subject of much important philosophical analysis. The principal intellectual weakness in the theory and practice of interpretation recommended by McDougal and his associates is their failure to conceive of legal language in rules and agreements as a device for the guidance of processes of inference leading to choices, decisions, judgments, and the like, rather than as a device for bringing subjective facts to the focus of attention of decision-makers. This is the difference, so to speak, between a device for selecting and assembling information and another for channelling and controlling its flow.

Rules and legal language are not primarily designed to *refer to*, *notice*, or *draw attention* to unobservable facts, expectations, demands, or other subjectivities. Reference is not the whole story about meaning, especially not about the meaning of rules.[9] The notion that rules and signs of all sorts function as inference guidance devices—for the guid-

[7] Herbert Feigl, "Logical Empiricism," in Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, eds., *Readings in Philosophical Analysis* (New York 1949), 10-11.

[8] See Cassius J. Keyser, "On the Study of Legal Science," *Yale Law Journal*, XXXVIII (February 1929), 413, 415, for an unequivocal statement by an early Realist.

[9] McDougal appears to rely heavily on the philosophically discredited referential theory of meaning. For a critique of this theory, see Alice Koller, *A Hornbook of Hazards for Linguists* (1967), 155, 186, mimeographed.

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ance of mental *processes* of inference—is gaining recognition among philosophers influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The function of legal language can best be understood by referring to the *experience* of being guided by it. Let us consider the experience of being guided and ask ourselves what this experience consists in when, for instance, we follow instructions in filling out a form or in playing a new card game. Evidently, rules do not guide physical movements. To use a Wittgenstein metaphor, they are more like the letters of the alphabet which enable us to read. When we use a rule we allow our minds to be guided. We may not always understand what a mental process is, but surely we are familiar with what it is to let our reasoning be guided. We can ask what it was, what took place when we suddenly reached a conclusion. When we allow our reasoning to be guided by a rule, we feel that the rule is the reason why we concluded such and such—that is, we justify the reasoning by the rule.[10] To follow or to apply a rule involves, then, a mental occurrence that must not be misrepresented as a mere matter of "feeling." That is to say, to follow or apply a text is *not a causal phenomenon*; it does not involve a psychological reaction or an emotional response to signs or to the text itself. The process of inference involved in the application of texts is a clockable activity. It requires submission to guidance. *In other words, following a text, a rule, or an agreement, does not require either surrender to superior force or having a feeling of obligation. Why* one follows legal provisions does not shed any light on what is involved in being guided by them. One may submit to guidance of a particular kind for a variety of reasons—fear, feelings of obligation, or habit—but deference to such guidance involves mental operations distinct from the motives for resorting to it. Resort to the guidance of a text requires submission to guidance similar to the submission of a woman to the guidance of her dancing partner. This process is admittedly elusive since it involves the direct guidance not of physical movements but of mental inferences required for the *application* of rules in concrete situations. This suggests that the meaning of words is to be sought not in their author but in the person addressed and ". . . in the defendant who is charged with violating the statute, in the conduct of any person who is acting under the authority and either within or without the authority of the words to be interpreted. Words are but delegations of the right to interpret them, in the first instance by the person addressed, in the second and ultimate

[10] Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford 1953), 170, 172.

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instance by the courts who determine whether the person addressed has interpreted them within their authority."[11]

Language in legal documents, therefore, does not fix meaning but circumscribes it. It is important to stress the function of the written text after its adoption. The fulfillment of the text, so to speak, lies in its being applied. On application, there is a natural tendency to read back into the text as originally adopted something that is really decided only later on—to claim, that is, as an attribute of the text something that was not originally part of it. Thus it is common, for example, to say that a text about vehicles "includes" airplanes, although what this really means is that the text referring to vehicles—which was perfectly silent about planes—was subsequently applied to planes. This way of speaking naturally gives rise to the impression that there is more in the original text than meets the eye. This is very convenient for interpreters who then seem to be deciding less and discovering more about the text interpreted. Since a text permits a whole range of potential inferences, the problem of interpreting it is not to discover the meaning of words, but is entirely different. It is to discover whether the person to whom the words were addressed acted reasonably in choosing and acting on one of many meanings. The main problem of interpretation, in other words, is to decide whether the inference drawn in accordance with the text is authorized or required by it—to decide not what the meaning of words in the text is, but whether the words authorize the inference made in reliance on them. The problem of interpretation has thus entirely changed its character: it involves not *discovering* something in the text, but finding guidance for its application. The problem of interpretation involves finding guidance for the *choice* between rival applications of a text. The role of the consideration of the function of a text is to provide such guidance. (The terms "function" and "purpose" are here used interchangeably.) Let us now examine how functions can guide the interpretation of texts in two distinct situations: (1) when the event to which the text seems to apply falls within the penumbra of meaning of the words and (2) when the event to which the text seems to apply falls squarely within the core of meaning of such words.

To illustrate the second situation first, let us use as an example a hypothetical agreement between the Occupying Powers in Berlin "prohibiting the access of vehicles" to a certain part in the city. The agreement would certainly seem to apply to a truck in perfect working

[11] Charles R. Curtis, "A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation," *Vanderbilt Law Review*, III (April 1950), 407, 424.

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order. But can we afford to pay no heed to the function of this provision even when the facts seem to fall within the language? What if some local patriots want as a memorial to mount on a pedestal in the park a truck used in the German defense of Berlin, while other citizens, regarding the proposed memorial as an eyesore, oppose its erection on the authority of the "no vehicle" agreement? What if the Americans espouse the claim of the citizens supporting the monument while the Russians oppose it? Surely in such a case it would be somewhat arbitrary to apply the text in order to exclude the truck, for the agreement was clearly not adopted to control the erection of monuments. To invoke it in these circumstances would be to allow a decision to be guided by a text that accidentally happens to refer to "vehicles"—accidentally, that is, because the text of the agreement was not designed for such eventualities.[12] Purpose (or function) can thus be used to preclude the application of a text in situations that seem to fall squarely within its language when such application would lead to results alien to its purpose (or function). This conclusion satisfactorily disposes of assertions that decisions of penumbral questions are the only occasions on which some determination of the purpose of the text is required.

The other situation involves the question of the penumbra of meaning. When an occurrence falls within the so-called penumbra of meaning of words in a text, it is generally admitted that reference to the function of the text is required to determine whether the occurrence should be governed by it. A function is then used to determine the inclusion or exclusion of marginal occurrences. Thus the applicability of the "no vehicles" rule to roller skates or to toy automobiles would depend upon whether the rule was designed to preserve quiet in the park, to protect children and strollers from injury, or to prevent vehicular access to the vicinity of the Berlin Wall.

It is characteristic of functions and purposes of this order that they do not involve grand considerations of world public order and policies. They function as unglamorous aids to decision, *for the guidance of choices between rival applications of a text.* But if modest texts have modest purposes, more fundamental provisions, like the provisions contained in the Charter of the United Nations, have more fundamental purposes. But even such fundamental purposes are then attributable to the treaty provisions themselves rather than to the international legal system as a whole. These are the purposes not of a world public

[12] See Lon L. Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart," *Harvard Law Review*, LXXI (February 1959), 630-33.

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order but of the provisions of the agreement themselves. Interpreters need not refer to loosely defined public policies or other indeterminate expectations to ascertain the purposes of legal provisions, however broad and general they may be. Fundamental treaty provisions are not aimless experiments. They presuppose a congeries of purposes and policies that they are designed to promote. The difficulties with the use of purposes for the resolution of problems arising from the application of provisions to factual situations are numerous. There is always the problem of what should be admissible as evidence of these purposes—how far resort to the *travaux préparatoires* is permissible. We do not propose to discuss these matters here. We merely wish to emphasize that textual provisions in international agreements are *purposive* inference-guidance devices and that the application of these provisions requires consideration of their purposes. Policy and purpose can obviously also be applied directly, without reference to the written provisions. Such use of policy and purpose, however, involves a totally different type of activity and must not be confused with the interpretation of the written provisions themselves. In other words, in our view, the shared expectations of parties to an agreement become relevant only in so far as they refer to the purposes of the provisions to be interpreted. The interpreter who in good faith seeks to be guided by the written provisions need not *always* have to resort to consideration of purposes.[13]

Sovereignty of States and Principles of Interpretation

Interpretation therefore initially involves submission to the guidance of the text, rather than direct deference to the shared expectations of the parties. The distinction is important, for if interpretation were to consist merely in deference to the shared expectations of parties to an agreement, it would necessarily involve a broad degree of delegation of authority and discretion to the interpreter. The interpreter's reasonable or permitted range of decision would be widened in proportion to doubts about the precise nature of the shared expectations of the parties. Moreover, the shared expectations of the parties are seldom related to specific problems of application. It is one thing to draft texts and other provisions with certain purposes in mind and another to attempt to resolve their *application* in concrete situations in advance of their occurrence. Shared expectations about desired purposes may exist among

[13] On the different techniques involved in reliance upon rules and policies for guidance, see Gidon Gottlieb, *The Logic of Choice: An Investigation of the Concepts of Rule and Rationality* (New York 1968), chap. 8. We have frequently referred to this book without acknowledging every reference.

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parties to an agreement. Parties rarely, if ever, share expectations about difficult contexts of application; they attempt to *guide* applications, but seldom try to determine in advance the factual application of their directives.

The profound line of disagreement separating the views of McDougal from those of other commentators cited in his book involves the role to be assigned to the text. In McDougal's view, as we have pointed out, the function of interpretation is to use the text, as one of many indices, for determining the genuine shared expectations of the parties. In our view, the function of interpretation is to apply—seek the guidance of—the text in concrete situations, to refer to the text, and when problems arise about its application to seek *further* guidance for application in the light of the purposes and ends that the text was genuinely designed to promote. In other words, guidance is needed at two levels: initial guidance is needed to determine what to do in the unique, concrete circumstances of the situation; and then guidance may also be needed to decide *how to apply* the initial guidance device. At the second level what is sought is guidance for the use of a guidance device—the text being itself a guidance device. The shared expectations of the parties are, in our view, proper guidance for the use of the *text*; McDougal's thesis, however, is that shared expectations can be used *directly* on the raw, concrete events of a situation. It is possible, in his view, to use such expectations not in order to guide the application of textual provisions, but in order to direct a decision without other mediation. In our view, shared expectations are a meta-guidance device that McDougal treats as if it were a first-level guidance tool. Initial reliance on the text rather than on the shared expectations of parties is much more likely to give effect to the genuine shared expectations of the parties than is McDougal's own proposed procedure. There are two principal reasons for this:

1. Parties who go through the arduous process of drafting an agreement genuinely expect deference to the textual provisions of that agreement. We must not lose sight of the fact that they draft textual provisions rather than statements about their "focal agreement" or their "shared expectations." They expect that deference to the provisions drafted will in normal circumstances best realize their "genuine shared expectations" and that doubts about application of the text will be resolved in a manner consistent with its purposes. In other words,

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the genuine expectations of the parties themselves require initial deference to textual provisions.

2. Parties, especially sovereign states, who enter into agreements expect deference to *their* agreement. States, whether we like it or not, are notoriously jealous of their sovereignty. They genuinely expect in most instances to delegate as little discretion to interpreters as possible. States generally prefer, therefore, the adoption of guidance devices that leave little discretion to the interpreter. These considerations vary evidently with the type of treaty involved; in the case of a treaty of a constitutional character like the Charter of the United Nations, states naturally contemplate that a considerable degree of discretion will be left to interpreters. The role of major purposes is then dominant indeed. The important point to notice, however, is that *genuine expectations of states exist also about the role and the discretion of interpreters.*

It was said that words are but delegations of the authority to interpret them. So are texts, functions, policies, purposes, and shared expectations. The differences among them lie in the *precision* of guidance and the degree of discretion granted the interpreter. We look at textual provisions as devices designed to guide inferences leading to choices and judgments that tend to promote some end in view. We have seen that texts delegate the authority to interpret them and that considerations of purpose may have to be made also by those who apply them. Shared expectations, no less than texts, can be relied on as inference-guidance devices; like all such devices they limit the discretion of their users. By a limitation of discretion we refer to the necessary effect of all guidance techniques. Free discretion, by way of contrast, involves a choice unbounded by external considerations. In this sense, both texts and shared expectations do not merely guide but also limit discretion and tend to exclude private preferences as a proper ground for choice and judgment. The reasoning appropriate to decisions in terms of shared expectations differs therefore from reasoning required by texts. When only shared expectations are available to direct decisions, interpreters are free to determine when to act and what to do, provided that their decisions lead to the required goals. Deference to shared expectations contemplates, therefore, the delegation of a considerable degree of authority to interpreters and presupposes a correspondingly significant indeterminacy in measures to be adopted.

Where firmer and more specific guidance is needed, the adoption of firm textual guidance is advisable. Thus, in the Charter of the United

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Nations, the purposes laid down in the Preamble and Article 1 and the principles specified in Article 2, such as the principle that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations," do not offer guidance as specific as Article 53, which provides that ". . . no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state. . . ."

It is easy to exaggerate the contrast between textual guidance and discretion. Indeed it can be shown that commands, rules, and policies no less than shared expectations all preclude complete discretion, in the sense that they set a limit on authorized behavior. It can, however, also be shown that none of these can entirely exclude discretion, although the discretion of the recipient of a command is clearly less than that of the addressee of a rule, the interpreter of a text, or the executant of a policy. Interpretation of texts leads to the consideration of shared expectations and choices between purposes and policies, but it postpones these until after the scrutiny of authorized or required applications of textual provisions to the particular concrete situation at hand.

McDougal's theory of interpretation suffers, therefore, from a contradiction: for the sake of shared expectations, it runs counter to the genuine shared expectations of states who do not generally contemplate the delegation of unnecessary discretion to interpreters.[14]

The Functions of Rules of Interpretation

In McDougal's view, principles of interpretation function like scanning devices for the selection of relevant features of the process of agreement: "The appropriate function of principles of interpretation—the more general purpose for which they may usefully and authoritatively be employed—as we have indicated above, is that of *calling* the *attention* of the decision-maker, in an orderly and economic way, to the various features of the process of commitment and its context which must be taken into account in determining the parties' genuine shared expectations and *identifying* relevant general community policies" (p. 111, italics added).

It is profitable to compare this theory with other relevant views about

[14] See Charles De Visscher, *Théories et Realités en Droit International Public*, 3rd ed. (Paris 1960), 317.

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the function of principles of interpretation. Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed that the canons of construction of statutes (he was not speaking of agreements) cannot save us from the anguish of judgment. "Such canons," he wrote, "give an air of abstract intellectual compulsion to what is in fact a delicate judgement, concluding the complicated process of balancing subtle and elusive elements."[15] He pointed out that Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo had all, at one time or another, leaned on the crutch of a canon, but that they had done so only rarely and with the recognition that these rules of construction were not in any true sense rules of law, but rather, in the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, "axioms of experience." Frankfurther thus echoed the perceptive comments of Wurzel that "laws governing interpretation are natural laws, not legal norms," presumably in the sense that they are logical or linguistic laws.[16]

Principles of construction have figured prominently in the practice of international courts, and their conceptual status requires clarification. In easy cases no questions are raised about the application of texts to the facts of the situation. The reason for the application need not then be articulated. The text "obviously" suffices. In more difficult cases, questions arise about the inferences permitted under such texts. Under fairly widespread but misguided theories of interpretation, these questions are understood to arise in connection with the meaning of words in the text. To guide decisions about these questions, there exist in most legal systems bodies of rules for the application of texts and of other rules—principles of interpretation. It is frequently difficult to use them for choosing between competing interpretations of the text. It has been observed that there is scarcely a rule of interpretation, however orthodox, that is not qualified by large exceptions, some of which nearly approach flat contradiction. This, of course, is not new to lawyers, who know that they can usually find some principle to support any advocated interpretation.

Rules, textual provisions, principles, and canons of interpretation are an assortment of tools for the performance of the interpreter's task. The use of principles of interpretation does fulfill a judicial purpose: the preservation of the political neutrality of judicial reasoning and the insulation of the process of interpretation from too overt a consideration of purposes and policies. Significantly, it is near the eye of political

[15] Felix Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes," *Columbia Law Review*, XLVII (May 1947), 527-43.

[16] Wurzel, "Methods of Juridical Thinking," in *Science of Legal Method* (Cambridge 1917), 286-307.

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storms that the demand for "neutral principles" is frequently heard. Principles of interpretation function, however, not as principles of guidance but as principles of justification. A principle of guidance must be capable of guiding a choice *before* a decision is made. It must be possible for an interpreter to act upon it. It cannot guide if a conflicting applicable principle can equally be relied upon, for the decision would then turn on the choice of the appropriate principle. A principle of justification, on the other hand, enables an interpreter to give it as the reason for his decision even though he did not rely on it in reaching his decision. Principles of guidance are also principles of justification, but it can be seen in the case of principles of interpretation that not all principles of justification are also principles of guidance. A principle of justification authorizes certain "moves" in the sense that questions about the legitimacy of these moves can be answered by reference to it. It does not mean, however, that the moves were made in reliance on such principles. Principles of justification can, therefore, sometimes provide a cloak which conceals the effective grounds for a decision.

In other words, principles about the application of texts can provide genuine guidance for such applications—as distinct from mere justifications—only if their proliferation is checked by agreement and if there are not then two opposing principles on almost every point. Codification of principles of interpretation can thus serve to strengthen their guidance potential. To that extent, it evidently also limits the discretion of interpreters. In this area the real difficulties lie in the choice between competing policies: the policy of "effectiveness," giving effect to the purpose of the instrument, and the policy of delegating as little discretion as possible to the interpreter, which we can characterize as a general political concern to enter only into clearly defined undertakings. As De Visscher observed, the interpretation of international agreements frequently involves considerations not found in the interpretation of agreements in municipal law. On the basis of the International Law Commission's draft articles on the law of treaties and on the basis of government comments submitted to the Commission, it is fair to say, as we pointed out, that it is part of the shared expectations of states that the principle of effectiveness will be balanced by the principle that states intend to delegate only a minimum of discretion to interpreters. This is necessary also because of the voluntary character of state compliance with judgments of international organs. Despite the provisions of Article 94 of the Charter, the effectiveness of international judicial decisions essentially depends upon the uncoercible submission of states.

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The principle of effectiveness in the interpretation of agreements is more to the point in the domestic law realm. But even there, the competing policy of certainty may—in the area of commercial law, for example—require interpretation of a more mechanical nature. The distorting pull of McDougal's model erecting shared expectations as the dominating vector of all interpretation can be expressed in another fashion: the process of interpretation does *not* primarily serve *one* dominant goal. It serves a congeries of *competing* purposes, and the discovery of the shared expectations of the parties to an agreement is but one of the many functions assigned to the process.

The proliferation of the functions of the process of interpretation is particularly acute in the international arena with its recurring relations between a small number of participants (states) who are condemned, so to speak, to cohabit with each other. In this type of relationship, the effectiveness of agreements must occasionally give way to other governing concerns, for what is at stake is the *continuing* pattern of relationships among permanent neighbors. Similarly, it has been observed in labor law that the effectiveness of agreements and their interpretation must at times be subordinated to the requirements of the continuing good relationship of management and labor.

Theories about the function of interpretation cannot be abstracted from their social context. Shared expectations may loom larger in municipal than in international law. The process of interpretation of international agreements requires consideration of what has been called the "horizontal proliferation" of purposes. This consideration involves assessing the consequences of the application of agreements not only in terms of their own ends, but also in terms of the purposes and policies generally upheld by the system. These are not the purposes latent in a text, but the purposes actively canvassed and promoted by other applicable arrangements and texts in force. Any single purpose is an incomplete thing when severed from the total system of which it forms a part. This has been fully recognized by McDougal, who emphasizes the need for policing and integrating interpretation with the system of public order.

Principles of interpretation *themselves* have purposes, and these must be thrown into the hopper of shared expectations. In other words, McDougal's concept of shared expectations refers either to those attached to a given agreement or to those attached to the whole pattern of relationships between the parties, including procedures for the interpretation of agreements. In the first case the concept distorts by sup-

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pressing other relevant functions of the process of interpretation, and in the second case it is too vague to provide any useful guidance at all. It is therefore questionable whether this opaque concept contributes much to existing terminology, whether it be "common purpose," "common policy," or "common design."

The unavoidable issue, which McDougal does not fully face in his analysis, is not one of postulating a hierarchy of goals of interpretation and designing strategies for achieving them. It lies rather in choosing and weighing *competing* goals involved in the process of interpretation. McDougal objected in *Law and Minimum Public World Order* that the trouble with rules is "that the rules of the law of war, like other legal rules, are commonly formulated in pairs of complementary opposites and are composed of a relatively few basic terms of highly variable reference. The complementarity in form and comprehensiveness of reference of such rules are indispensable to the rational search for and application of policy to a world of acts and events which presents itself to the decision-maker, not in terms of neat symmetrical dichotomies or trichotomies, but in terms of innumerable gradations and alternations from one end of a continuum to the other; the spectrum makes available to a decision-maker not one inevitable doom but multiple alternative choices."[17]

The "trouble with" rules is equally that of policies and shared expectations. There are the expectations of drafters, the subsequent expectations of claimants. There are competing rules, competing principles of interpretation, competing policies, competing formulations of shared expectations, and competing values. It has frequently been pointed out that it is easy to exaggerate the extent to which these are in effect competing. Ultimately, however, the responsibility for choices between them cannot be avoided. But these choices are reached toward the end of a hard sequence of mental operations: in the beginning there is a text; then there is a situation governed by one of competing readings of the text; then there are competing principles for applying the text; then there are also competing purposes and policies that the competing readings of the text and other relevant principles are designed to promote (and problems about evidence of these purposes and policies); then, finally, there is the need to choose between these competing purposes and policies and also to adopt procedures for making all these choices. The very *postulation* of fixed goals for interpretation is bound, therefore, to have a distorting and misleading effect, for what is at stake

[17] P. 57.

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in interpretation is *not* a means-end form (type) of calculus to design means for reaching fairly stable ends. We have attempted to show elsewhere that reasoning guided by rules and other textual provisions does not fit into existing models of rationality.[18] Guided reasoning, such as is involved in interpretation, requires constant guided *choices* between competing relevant but shifting alternatives. It does not involve the use of available means to achieve a primary postulated goal. The postulation of goals and values does not resolve questions about the choices between them.

McDougal's analytical framework is extremely useful in bringing a multitude of relevant considerations to the attention of decision-makers and interpreters and in requiring explicit consideration of policies and values. This contribution alone certainly vindicates the vast efforts invested. However, when McDougal "recommends" giving preference to a particular *goal* of interpretation rather than suggesting ways for weighing competing goals of interpretation, then objections begin to mount. The unfortunate dependence of his analytical framework on the postulation of goals does, however, create difficulties even for analysis.

Political and Judicial Interpretation

Interpretation of agreements by political organs displays characteristics quite separate from those associated with judicial interpretation. In judicial interpretation *deference*, the will to be guided—whether by intent, shared expectations, textual provisions, or preferred policies—is the operative disposition. In political interpretation the designs of interpreters are very different indeed. They must first establish their authority or competence, in order to make clear that they are not acting as naked power organs, but rather within the range of permitted or delegated authority. Political interpreters do not frequently defer to the policy choices of others, but try rather to cloak their own *ad hoc* policy decisions in the mantle of legitimacy woven out of the cloth of preexisting textual authority. While judicial interpretation involves submission to preexisting provisions, expectations, or preferred policies, political interpretation does not involve deference to such considerations at all, but contemplates unfettered choosing within the boundaries set by governing instruments. Since in either case neither discretion nor guidance can be entirely eliminated, the boundary between political and juridical interpretation is bound to remain unsettled and fluctuating. Discretion is an unavoidable feature of text-guided decision-mak-

[18] Gottlieb, *passim*.

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ing, while limitations on competence are a characteristic of most political applications of constitutive texts. Nevertheless, the discretion expected in political interpretation is considerably wider than that contemplated in judicial interpretation. It does not preclude autonomous policy judgments that may be out of place in legal proceedings.

McDougal and his associates concentrate on interpretation by judicial organs, despite the rather general language of their introductory chapter, which leads one to expect that they will also use their powerful analytical tools to study the practice of the political organs of the United Nations. They do not make manifest the distinctions between the kind of interpretation involved in the process of making claims and that involved in the process of adjudication. *Claimants* before a tribunal do not really attempt to defer to expectations. They try rather to justify and press a case that meets the requirements of the time and place, but the process of claim nevertheless itself involves the interpretation of preexisting texts or agreements. An analysis that does not draw distinctions between these significantly different forms of interpretation surely misses something important about the process. It is to be hoped that any future edition of the work will devote some pages to the distinctive features of interpretation by political bodies, interpretation by claimants, and interpretation by a legal tribunal.

Concepts of Rationality

The quality and range of scholarship which make the Yale School of International Law unique suffers from too massive a commitment to the narrow exclusiveness of social science methodology. It brings to mind the comments of John Ward Smith, who wrote,

> Perhaps nothing so confines and encumbers our ways of approaching philosophical questions as our tendency to conceive of the demands of rationality on inadequate standard models. No need is more pressing in the present scene than the need for reinterpreting what we mean by "rational opinion." We persist in operating in terms of two ideal models of rationality: on the one hand, the model of logico-mathematical deduction; on the other hand the model of piecemeal inductive engineering. We feel that we are being rational only to the extent that we confine ourselves to the enunciation either of demonstrated theorems within deductive systems or of empirical hypotheses which sheer weight of evidence will tend to confirm or confute. Though we may be aware that we

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> cannot confine ourselves to these two ideal ways of talking, we continue to approach intellectual problems as though doing anything else is either careless or at best an unfortunate necessity. Reason is tacitly conceded to be a faculty for seeing everything in system; if an opinion can be shown to be a theorem deducible from axioms, it is conceded to be a rational opinion, if it can be shown to be an hypothesis made probable by experimental evidence, it is conceded to be rational; opinions of any other sort are (whether frowned upon or hailed) conceived to be somehow not rational. . . . Rationality consists in a certain temper of deciding . . . . To conceive of rationality in terms of models which derive from ideal conditions will mislead us when we operate in the middle ground of doubt and uncertainty within which most important decisions are made.[19]

The Yale School of International Law must now expand its intellectual horizons if it is to maintain a relationship with the growth of modern knowledge. To that end, it can ill afford to neglect modern philosophical work on the uses of language and other conceptual tools. We refer here to work published after 1947, when McDougal announced to the American Society of International Law his determination to use the social sciences in the study of international law. This period is dominated by Wittgenstein's later writings, which contain much relevant material on interpretation and the uses of language.[20] Conceptual revisions are needed principally to take into account the inference-guiding functions of judicial language, which is not merely an attention-focusing device. This perhaps is the area in which McDougal's approach has run most directly against the experience of jurists and recent philosophical thinking.

Conceptual revisions are also called for in the model of rationality taken for granted in McDougal's goal-oriented framework of analysis. As we have suggested, the significant difficulties in decision-making,

[19] *Theme for Reason* (Princeton 1957), 6-7.

[20] A modern treatment of interpretation can ill afford to ignore recent works with a direct bearing on the subject. See Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*; Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science* (London 1958); and Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London 1949). See also other relevant writings: Georg Hendrik von Wright, *Norma and Action* (London 1963); Richard Mervyn Hare, *The Language of Morals* (Oxford 1952); Nicholas Rescher, *The Logic of Commands* (London 1966); Arne Næss, *Interpretation and Preciseness* (Oslo 1953); John L. Austin, *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford 1961); Stephen E. Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge 1958); Max Black, *Models and Metaphors* (Ithaca 1962); Friedrich Waismann, *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, Harré ed. (London 1965); and Eric D. Hirsch, Jr., *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven 1967).

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legal or otherwise, are encountered in *choices between* goals, purposes, and ends informed by discerning appraisals of consequences. The means-ends model of rationality pervading McDougal's analytical framework built on postulated goals impoverishes rather than informs inquiry. The framework itself is a legacy of early positivist thinking. The pedagogical goal of educating decision-makers in international legal processes required more than that the analytical framework used furnish a guide for perceiving trends, noticing relevant features, describing processes, and recommending goals. Such a framework of analysis, to facilitate the intellectual tasks of decision-makers, must furnish a guide—or a manual, so to speak—for the *process of drawing inferences* guided by rules and other texts in the light of relevant purposes and policies. To be of immediate usefulness to the decision-maker, such an outline must therefore suggest the sequences of mental operations involved in the application of juridical texts. McDougal's technique of postulating goals, recommending strategies, and drawing the attention of the decision-maker to relevant features does not offer sufficient guidance for the use and appraisal of such data. Recommended goals and data provide too flexible and too loose a guidance to give real comfort to decision-makers. McDougal's technique leaves out a central element of concern to the interpreter: how to draw the inference—how to reach the decision. The widening of intellectual allegiances and fields of references is within the reach of the team-authorship system. Careful analysis of modern philosophical writings by the McDougal team could dispel the uneasy impression of epistemological abdication to a "superior" scientific methodology. This impression is frequently enhanced by the much discussed language, style, and terminology used by McDougal and his associates which, so to speak, proclaim their intellectual loyalties. However, in the large, solid part of the *Interpretation of Agreements* devoted to the analysis of juridical practices, it is evident that the authors themselves do not always feel the need to indulge in their neoscientific language and that its use may be a luxury of style more significant as a badge of allegiance than as a tool of communication or as a "value cleanser" in legal discourse. The expansion of the McDougal team and serious consideration of modern philosophical works might also open up communications with a wide academic audience that is now, unfortunately, impervious and even hostile to this vast scholarly endeavor. This academic hostility has also impoverished those who refuse seriously to analyze and debate the important contributions from the Yale School of International Law.

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Instead of such dialogue, learned periodicals have too frequently carried what were in effect mere declarations of war against or of loyalty to the new doctrines advanced. This is unfortunate indeed, for the works of McDougal and his associates deserve the closest and most sympathetic scrutiny by the widest possible audience, which should not be limited to his fervent and powerful supporters. There is no reason why recognition of the tremendous contributions of the social sciences to jurisprudence should not in its turn lead to a recognition of the contributions that the new philosophy can also make. McDougal has broken new ground by informing legal scholarship with relevant knowledge from other disciplines. It is to be hoped that he will do so again.

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ANOTHER GRAND DEBATE?

The Limitationist Critique of American Foreign Policy

By CHARLES GATI*

J. William Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power*, New York, Vintage Books, 1967, xv, 264 pp. $1.95.
Eugene J. McCarthy, *The Limits of Power: America's Role in the World*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, viii, 246 pp. $5.95.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy 1941-1966*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1966, 126 pp. $3.95.
Ronald Steel, *Pax Americana*, New York, The Viking Press, 1967, ix, 371 pp. $6.95.

THE Vietnam teach-ins are passé, but severe questioning and criticism persist in both the popular and semipopular press and, significantly, in the imposing array of books issued by commercial publishers. Unlike the realist-idealist dichotomy of the late 1940's and early 1950's, which was confined to the academic community, the result of our present involvement in an Asian war is a debate of national proportions, not only about Vietnam but about the nature of America's role and responsibility in international life and about priorities in domestic and foreign policies. Inevitably, much of the literature is polemical, hammering on the major theme: the Johnson Administration has led American foreign policy astray; thus alternatives must be sought.

The alternative offered in the books under review—as well as elsewhere by such scholars and commentators as George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and Hans Morgenthau—is commonly regarded as isolationist or neo-isolationist, often with pejorative implications.[1] Yet both Kennan and Lippmann, for example, accept such a designation: Lippmann has identified himself as a neo-isolationist who supports "economic assistance, technical assistance, the Peace Corps, [and] cultural exchanges" and favors collective military action to defend vital American interests,

* I wish to thank my colleague and friend, Professor Robert Sharlet, for a critical and helpful reading of this review article.

[1] See, for example, Henry F. Graff, "Isolationism Again—With a Difference," *New York Times Magazine* (May 16, 1965), 26-27, 98-100; and Thomas J. Dodd, "The New Isolationism," in Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall, eds., *The Viet-Nam Reader* (New York 1965), 31-37.

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but opposes unilateral military intervention in Asia and Africa.[2] In the historical meaning or meanings of the term, however, this sort of foreign-policy orientation hardly resembles isolationism.[3] After all, Lippmann and others call not for the elimination of American commitments abroad, but only for their reduction. Unlike most isolationists of the interwar period, they argue not against American participation in world politics *per se*, only against the escalation of international obligations. Instead of emphasizing the indivisibility of national sovereignty, a cornerstone of isolationist thought, they tend to underline the importance of international cooperation and multilateral action. If they seek disengagement, it is hardly total disengagement in the geographic sense; for that matter, if they seek to curtail military intervention, they do not in fact completely exclude it from among the variety of instruments to be employed in the execution of foreign policy. The alternative they do offer is one of limited disengagement from what they consider excessive international commitments; hence, they present a limitationist conception of American foreign policy.

The meaning of limitationism is apparent in the context of its antithesis—the Johnson Administration's globalist aspirations. The limitationist critics treat the war in Vietnam, central though it is to their argument, as a mere symptom of the gradual but steady aggrandizement of America's role in world affairs. Identifying the war as the most dangerous and frustrating symptom of what is wrong with the present direction of our foreign policy, they diagnose the illness itself as the false and distorted idea of global American interests. Terrified by the prospect of an American empire pursuing the goal of a Pax Americana, the limitationists thus propose the reduction of foreign commitments in general and military commitments in particular. In addition, they consider the curtailment of executive predominance in the foreign-policy–making process a necessary prerequisite to the development of a more judicious perception of the American interest in world politics.

If another "grand debate" on the general direction of American for-

[2] News release of March 2, 1965, as quoted by Herbert McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York 1967), 53.

[3] See Albert K. Weinburg, "The Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolationism," *American Political Science Review*, XXXIV (June 1940), 539-47. Manfred Jonas, in a major study of isolationism, identifies the "foreign-oriented," the "belligerent," the "timid," the "radical," and the "conservative" isolationist of the 1930's and concludes that the "neo-isolationist" designation today is both confusing and inaccurate; see his *Isolationism in America 1935-1941* (Ithaca 1966), esp. chaps. 2 and 9.

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eign policy is taking shape, then, it is not between isolationists and internationalists. Nor, it should be added, is it a revival of the realist-idealist dichotomy.[4] Indeed, one of the ironic features of the limitationist-globalist debate is that political realism has provided the theoretical foundations of both the limitationist and globalist positions as each side attempts to utilize those aspects of the realist contribution which seem most applicable to its particular case. Thus the globalists emphasize the concept of national interest, which in the nuclear era is interpreted to mean global engagement or world responsibility without geographically defined limits, while the limitationists postulate that since the power of all national actors in international politics is finite, the foreign aspirations and commitments of all nations must be brought into balance with their power.[5]

The following review (1) traces the development of limitationism in the political thought of Lippmann, Morgenthau, and Kennan; (2) analyzes the meaning and substance of American globalism; and (3) presents a systematic critique of limitationism through an evaluation of recent polemical literature.

I

Relevant as the limitationist orientation appears today, it has in fact characterized the writings of Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau, and George Kennan for a quarter of a century or so; Lippmann developed its major themes for the first time in *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*.[6]

In 1943, of course, the central political issue of the day was no longer whether the United States ought or ought not become a participant in international life. Already a full-fledged participant, this country faced a different question, namely, to what extent should the United States assume continuing commitments in the international politics of the postwar world? Lippmann's answer rested on the principle of maximizing the equilibrium between input and output in foreign policy. "The nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium," he wrote, "its purposes within means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to

[4] In order to keep this review within manageable size, it is obviously impossible to deal in any detail with political realism or with the realist-idealist debate. In the context of this review, realism simply denotes that school of thought whose major spokesman after World War II was Hans Morgenthau.

[5] The globalist position is discussed below in Section II.

[6] (Boston 1943) Cf. D. W. Brogan, "The Illusion of American Omnipotence," *Harper's*, 205 (December 1952), 21-28.

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its commitments."[7] On the basis of this classic statement of what limitationism was about, Lippmann sought to offer a middle-of-the-road foreign-policy course to be steered between the two major general alternatives—isolationism and globalism.

He rejected the isolationist position because, first, it was deemed alien to the American experience. Lippmann maintained that the founding fathers were "only too pleased to have allies [when] they thought it would serve the national interest," citing as cases in point Jefferson's acceptance of British diplomatic encouragement in the Louisiana Purchase affair and Washington's rejoicing over Franklin's success with Vergennes in making France an ally.[8] Second, Lippmann took American isolationism to task for its misleading and thus potentially dangerous inconsistency, pointing to obvious discrepancies during the interwar period between what we practiced and what we preached: the United States, he suggested, kept issuing resounding declarations of policy intentions on the one hand, while repeatedly demonstrating unwillingness to carry out these intentions on the other. As an example, Lippmann referred to our Asian policy in the early 1920's when American naval strength was so reduced as to give Japan naval superiority in the Western Pacific, while at the same time our declarations continued to encourage Chinese resistance to Japanese ambitions and even intimated the possibility of American involvement.[9] In short, the United States simultaneously reduced its power and reiterated its commitment, as if words alone could implement policy.

As the isolationist recipe for success in foreign policy was found wanting by Lippmann, so was the other general alternative, globalism, which he felt entailed commitments without proper limits or qualifications. Lippmann was deeply concerned about the possibility of a truly global foreign policy that, unlike President Wilson's ambitions, would be backed by the nation's vast resources as well as by our leaders' willingness to use these resources for the realization of universal aspirations. Specifically, he expressed doubts about the wisdom of American involvement in the future of Eastern and Central Europe after the war, unequivocally stating that the United States must avoid any participation in the shaping of events in the area.[10]

[7] Lippmann, 7.
[8] *Ibid.*, 58.
[9] *Ibid.*, 40-41.
[10] Lippmann observed, "To encourage the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to organize themselves as a barrier against Russia would be to make a commitment that the United States could not carry out. A barrier implies that in conducting their rela-

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Having rejected the twin extremes of isolationism and globalism, Lippmann set forth the two major principles of limitationism: (1) a sphere-of-influence concept that so defined the American sphere as to include Western Europe and presumably Latin America (to which, much later, he added Japan and the Philippines) and (2) the notion of solvency as applied to the interrelationship between domestic and foreign policies, ensuring that foreign undertakings would always harmonize with available national resources and would not as a general rule take precedence over domestic needs.

In his contributions at the end of the 1940's and early 1950's, Hans Morgenthau reiterated Lippmann's general propositions and applied them to the emerging direction of American foreign policy in the cold war.[11] Suggesting that a nation that set its sights too high or too low by not bringing its resources and foreign policy into balance disregarded the requirement of solvency, Morgenthau appealed to the American people to forget "the crusading notion that any nation, however virtuous and powerful, can have the mission to make the world over in its own image," and to remember "that no nation's power is without limits, and hence that its policies must respect the power and interests of others."[12] Specifically, Morgenthau approved the policy of containing Soviet power at certain points, namely, Greece and Turkey. He believed this policy to have been necessitated by the inability of Britain to do the job—and he considered the resulting change in the European distribution of power, together with the possibility of further change, to be harmful to American interests. At the same time, however, Morgenthau emphatically opposed the language and some of the sweeping implications of the Truman Doctrine. Quoting President Truman, who had stated that the United States could not "allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations" and that therefore the United States must assume the role of "giving effect to the principles of the Charter," Morgenthau argued that this was a dangerous exaggeration of America's role and potential.[13]

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tions with Russia the barrier state may count upon the armed support of the Atlantic powers. Yet the region lies beyond the reach of American power, and therefore the implied commitment would be unbalanced and insolvent. We should [not] be in the position of promising these nations a protection we are unable to provide, of encouraging them to pursue policies which we are unable to underwrite, and to take risks which might have consequences which we cannot insure them against" (*ibid.*, 149).

[11] *Politics Among Nations* (New York 1948) and *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York 1951).

[12] *In Defense of the National Interest*, 241, 242.

[13] Morgenthau wrote, "The Truman Doctrine transformed a concrete interest of the United States in a geographically defined part of the world into a moral principle of

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To be sure, Morgenthau and Lippmann were not alone in thinking that the Truman Doctrine could be interpreted to mean a blank check; sensing congressional antagonism, Secretary of State Dean Acheson found it necessary to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate to point out that the doctrine denoted a specific decision to meet a specific problem and that it should not be construed as a doctrine of universal pretensions.

Indeed, the man who had coined the phrase and fathered the notion of containment, George Kennan, also sought to make clear his disappointment over the sweeping interpretations of the Truman message and of his own "X" article on which it was thought to have been based. Associating himself with the limitationist critics, Kennan objected at the time to the wording of the Truman Doctrine, suggesting that it had "amounted to a promise to intervene everywhere in the world where people were threatened by communism, quite regardless of their own efforts to defend themselves and quite regardless of the prospects for success of any efforts that we may make on their behalf."[14] In a lecture at the National War College, Kennan listed three main criteria for extending American assistance—to Greece and by implication to other countries as well:

"A. The problem at hand is one within our economic, technical, and financial capabilities.

B. If we did not take such action, the resulting situation might redound very decidedly to the advantage of our political adversaries.

C. If, on the other hand, we do take the action in question, there is good reason to hope that the favorable consequences will carry far beyond the limits of Greece itself."[15]

Kennan's private and semiprivate interpretations to the contrary notwithstanding—reinforced as they were by Acheson and other Administration spokesmen—the "X" article and the Truman Doctrine created the general impression at home and abroad that the foreign-

worldwide validity, to be applied regardless of the limits of American interest and of American power. Upon what in its immediate import was a limited request for a limited purpose, the Truman Doctrine erected a message of salvation to all the world, unlimited in purpose, unlimited in commitments, and limited in its scope only by the needs of those who would benefit" (*ibid.*, 116). The full text of the Truman Doctrine appears in Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. IX (Princeton and London 1949), 646-50.

[14] *Viet-Nam Reader*, 17.

[15] Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950* (Boston and Toronto 1967), 320.

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policy objective of the United States was nothing short of the containment of communism. The impression gained momentum for three reasons. First, the Truman Administration did not wish to be unequivocal about the precise limits or extent of the American commitment. When Acheson testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, he suggested that the United States would not *necessarily* undertake similar measures in the future; the obvious interpretation of this suggestion was that we might well decide to pursue identical policies. Such purposeful vagueness of declared intentions was clearly intended to confuse and even mystify the Soviet leadership and thus deter it from engaging in similar ventures. Second, given the forthcoming elections of 1948, the Truman Administration was, as it had to be, particularly conscious of and sensitive to domestic reactions to the new doctrine. Accordingly, it appeared to be "good politics" to appeal to moral, anti-Communist, and solution-hungry sentiments and, in the process, infuse the American public with a new sense of purpose. Finally, our policy was elevated to the rank of a doctrine of global implications by what Kennan later called the incessant urge of the American public itself "to seek universal formulae or doctrines in which to clothe and justify particular actions."[16] If general norms were indeed being preferred to individual discretion, particularly executive discretion, the conclusion drawn by the public was only to be expected: the Administration will respond to all Communist challenges the way it did in Greece and Turkey—irrespective of time, place, and the nature of the issue at hand.

In any case, the widespread impression of crusading anticommunism as the underlying feature of American foreign policy impelled Lippmann and Morgenthau to press in public, as Kennan did in private, for a more prudent and restrictive conception of foreign-policy goals. If later, in the 1950's and early 1960's, their limitationist critique lost some of its firmness and determination, it was because they had come to believe that the actual course of American foreign policy, declarations of policy intentions to the contrary notwithstanding, on the whole manifested a sense of balance and proportion. In particular, Korea and Hungary had demonstrated that in the final analysis the United States lacked the will or the desire, or both, to pursue seemingly unlimited or extravagant objectives. To the uninitiated, however, the very consistency of American foreign policy was still obscured by the discrep-

[16] *Ibid.*, 322.

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ancy between what we loudly said we were doing on the one hand and what we quietly were actually doing on the other.

This discrepancy should have been particularly evident during the 1952 presidential campaign and the ensuing Republican Administration. In the campaign, the future Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, condemned the previous Administration's purportedly overcautious (as well as "negative, futile, and immoral") foreign policy and promised to replace it with the rollback of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. He suggested that the United States "should make it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur. The mere statement of that wish and expectation would change, in an electrifying way, the mood of the captive peoples."[17] Significantly, Dulles did not promise to commit American power to achieve his objective; what he promised, in fact, was a balanced budget and the reduction of taxes. As John W. Spanier caustically noted, the Dulles therapy was designed "for a public that refused to accept the facts of America's limited power"; also, it was devised "to roll back the Democrats in the United States, not the Red Army in Eastern Europe."[18]

Once in power, the Republican Administration did not seek to change the general direction of our foreign policy, even though it created new alliances and reintroduced the strategic concept of massive retaliation. Whatever modifications or alterations took place were significant mainly for what they boded for the future, reinforcing as they did the popular hope for an "American solution" in world politics and implying that such a solution was both possible and forthcoming. Small wonder that the eventual response of a good many people was disappointment and a renewed search for simple answers: the *verbal* anticommunism of the previous decade, coupled with *actual* restraint, was bound to lead to demands for a more dynamic foreign policy—demands, indeed, for victory. Bitter, deceived, morally indignant, anti-Communist, and solution-hungry, this vocal minority then made it possible if not imperative for the Republican Party to nominate Senator Goldwater, a man who, like Dulles, was pressing for both victory and a balanced budget.

Under President Kennedy, the discrepancy between word and deed began to narrow. Again, no radical change in the general course of American foreign policy could be discerned; indeed, no withdrawal

[17] As quoted in John W. Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II* (New York 1968), 110.
[18] *Ibid.*, 111.

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from any formal commitments took place. Yet President Kennedy repeatedly voiced the limitationist theme, suggesting that the United States was "neither omnipotent nor omniscient, that we are only six per cent of the world's population, that we cannot impose our will on the other 94 per cent of mankind, that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity, and that therefore there cannot be an American solution for every world problem."[19] On several other occasions, notably in his American University speech in 1963, he categorically rejected the goal of a Pax Americana and said that the United States was now seeking a more modest objective: a diverse world in which different political and social systems could coexist and in which the American sphere of direct involvement would presumably dwindle. For Kennedy, this may have been idealism without illusions; it was also the repudiation of verbal globalism and the authoritative affirmation of limitationism as the guiding principle of American foreign policy.

It is against this background that the limitationist critique of the Johnson Administration can be understood. Put simply, the Administration is being censured now for radically changing the postwar course of American foreign policy. The limitationists charge that under President Johnson the United States has disregarded the principle of solvency and the rule of priorities and discrimination in the use of national power. Moreover, since our globalist ambitions are said to be backed, for the first time, with our vast resources, the long-evident discrepancy between our declared intentions and actual policies has disappeared, creating the problem of globalist consistency. As Morgenthau noted, "What in the past we said we were doing or would do but never did, we are now in the process of putting in practice: to stop the expansion of communism on a global scale by force of arms."[20]

II

What American globalism is *not* may be suggested without further controversy—it does not denote unlimited engagement. The truism is worth repeating: by definition, no foreign or domestic policy is without limits, extravagant or overambitious though it may be. After all, American might has been considerably restrained even in Vietnam. Having said that, it should be noted that Administration statements can, of course, easily be construed as unduly sanguine, promising as they often

[19] *Viet-Nam Reader*, 50.
[20] *Vietnam and the United States* (Washington 1965), 84.

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do the millennium once aggression is stopped.[21] Yet an international utopia is hardly in sight, and thus it is both unfortunate and foolish to expect that the United States can and will eliminate conflict from the fabric of the international system.

However, even if the periodically issued romantic statements are dismissed as naive or, more likely, politically motivated—verbal exercises in the historical illusion of omnipotence—a marked change can still be discerned in the Johnson Administration's perception of the shifting realities of world politics. American globalism today is based on a comprehensive and multidimensional perception of international life whose operative characteristics significantly differ from those of the cold-war era in at least two respects.[22] First, proponents of globalism postulate the end of bilateralism and the rise of a unifocal international system. Second, they maintain that it is this new dimension of the international system which has propelled the United States into assuming the role and obligations of the only imperial power—policing or order-maintaining obligations on a global scale divorced from a territorially defined national interest.

The end of bilateralism in terms of American-Soviet hegemony, it is suggested, stems from the decline of Soviet power vis-à-vis the United States, caused in part by the steady deterioration of the ideological health of the Communist world. Essentially a regional power, then, whose primary concerns are limited to Europe, China, and possibly the Middle East, the Soviet Union is seen to enjoy parity only in the "unreal worlds" of the UN Security Council and the nuclear club:[23] after all, it is noted, Soviet inefficacy has been vividly demonstrated in Berlin, in

[21] Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated in a speech on March 4, 1965, for example, that the United States seeks to create "a world of independent national states, each with its own institutions, cooperating with other nations to further their national welfare, a peaceful world, a world increasingly responsible to the rule of law, a world in which all human beings enjoy their natural rights, regardless of nationality or creed or color, and a world in which all can share in the abundance which modern science and technology make possible" (*Viet-Nam Reader*, 323).

[22] The globalist position is illuminated in Z. K. Brzezinski, "American Globalism," *Survey* (London), No. 58 (January 1966), 19-29; McGeorge Bundy, "The End of Either/Or," *Foreign Affairs*, XLV (January 1967), 189-201; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Implications of Change for United States Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin*, LVII (July 3, 1967), 19-23. See also Albert Wohlstetter, "Illusions of Distance," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVI (January 1968), 242-55; and Irving Kristol, "American Intellectuals and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XLV (July 1967), 594-609. For a critical textual analysis of globalism, see Gary Porter, "Globalism—The Ideology of Total World Involvement," in *Viet-Nam Reader*, 322-27. The theoretical meaning and implications of globalism are treated incisively and systematically in George Liska, *Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy* (Baltimore 1967), and in Spanier, chap. 9.

[23] Liska, 32.

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Cuba, and in the Congo during the past decade. Also, even though the Soviet Union has quickly recuperated from the Arab-Israeli war, its performance in the field and even in the UN was hardly illustrative of a purportedly global power. Finally, its inability, expressed in its unwillingness, to protect a small ally, North Vietnam, against massive American bombardment is construed as an acknowledgment of United States supremacy in Asia and still another humiliating admission of a unifocal world order.

Conversely, the United States is viewed as a thoroughly diversified power spearheading the electronic and technological, indeed post-industrial, revolution of our time, a country possessing *usable* resources whose quantity and quality cannot but deeply impress the rest of the world. Indeed, a decisive affirmation of imperial America is the centrality of the question of anti- or pro-Americanism, not only in Latin America but in Europe and Asia as well: many a country's relationship to the United States has become one of the great political watersheds of the late 1960's.

Finally, the rise of imperial America is thought by proponents of globalism to have concluded the NATO-based policy of containment aimed at the Soviet Union and to have set in motion the processes toward containment aimed at the United States, i.e., the "counter-containment" of American primacy. Originally, containment of the Soviet Union had been embraced by members of NATO and other collective self-defense organizations as part of the balancing process in Europe. In view of Soviet policies in Eastern and Central Europe after the war and the real or assumed Soviet ambition to further Soviet influence in Western Europe, the joint Atlantic interest rested on a firm foundation—the common objective was to contain Soviet ambitions. On the other hand, counter-containment is emerging today because of United States predominance in world politics: the edge of the balancing process is pointed towards the United States as the realignment of secondary powers is beginning to take shape. American economic penetration of Europe, in particular, has created a limited convergence of Franco-Soviet interests in that both seek to curtail American influence in Europe. Moreover, the expectation of the defeat or humiliation of the United States in Southeast Asia has created at least common sentiment between the previously humiliated European colonial powers on the one hand and China and the Soviet Union on the other.[24]

[24] See in particular, *ibid.*, 33-34.

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As seen by proponents of American globalism, then, the international system is characterized by a number of new configurations: the Soviet Union has become essentially a regional power; the beginnings of a trend toward the realignment of secondary powers is discernible; geographic distance has lost much of its restraining force in foreign policy because of vastly improved communications and transport facilities. Above all, the international system is characterized by the emerging primacy of the United States, whose role in the world, therefore, can no longer be conceived in terms of the principle of solvency—in terms of what we can afford to do. It is argued that the United States, as the only imperial power, must account both for what it does and for what it decides not to do, and thus the American sphere of influence cannot be limited to specific geographic areas, nor can the use of the instruments of national policy be restricted to the political *or* the economic *or* the military. "For twenty years from 1940 to 1960," McGeorge Bundy notes, "the standard pattern of discussion on foreign policy was that of *either/or*: isolation or intervention, Europe or Asia, Wallace or Byrnes, Marshall Plan or Bust, SEATO or Neutralism, the U.N. or Power Politics, and always, insistently, anti-Communism or accommodation with the Communists."[25] To Bundy, the right choice is not either/or, but both. In particular, he views the United States as both an Atlantic and a Pacific power, able, though not necessarily willing, to pursue at the same time both its global obligations abroad and pressing socioeconomic tasks at home. He argues, in fact, that American unilateral withdrawal or defeat in Vietnam would result in a massive reaction *against* progressive legislation in the fields of unemployment, urban affairs, education, health, and the like.

In any event, the Administration has assumed universal responsibility for maintaining world order or world stability. Specifically, the United States is said to seek (1) unity in the Atlantic alliance and institutional interdependence in Europe; (2) the development of a looser community of developed countries, both non-Communist and Communist, to transform the current conflicts among the developed nations into the beginning of cooperation with the developing countries; and (3) the establishment of an international environment in which the revolutionary changes taking place in Asia and Africa would not lead to wars of national liberation.[26]

Thus, our objective has become a loosely defined Pax Americana—

[25] P. 191.
[26] Cf. Brzezinski, "American Globalism," 22.

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to the obvious dismay of the limitationist critics of American foreign policy.

III

The four books under review are incisive in content, passionate in sentiment, and eloquent in style. Messrs. Fulbright, McCarthy, Schlesinger and Steel present a reasonable and useful critique of the substance and implications of American globalism. Without calling it that, they develop the limitationist alternative, arguing for the curtailment of foreign involvement and the imposition of restraints on executive decision-making. Their critique is useful because they invite the reader to consider the element of relativity in international life, rejecting sharp dichotomies between good and evil; indeed, they accept the permanence of international conflict, which they seek to mitigate rather than abolish. With a modest perception of what our role in the world must be, they promote a policy that is free of universal or imperial aspirations.

To be sure, such sensible, though at times vague, generalizations are not intended to further systematic research on various aspects of American foreign policy. As has been said in a different context, generalizations of this sort are deep enough for an elephant to swim in and for a child to bathe in too. Thus, the ultimate contribution of limitationism must be measured in terms of its ability to provide operational guidelines for the proper conduct of foreign policy—policy-oriented guidelines that can assist policy-makers to formulate and the public to understand specific action within the framework of the general objectives and direction of our foreign policy. One hastens to add that such guidelines are, for obvious reasons, in short supply. To begin with, their usefulness within the discipline has been minimized as our academic orientation in international politics tends to emphasize and reward empirical studies that promise low-level or at best middle-level generalizations. More important, Washington also neglects policy-oriented grand designs—witness the tenuous position of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State—because even our policy-makers do not care to approach a specific issue or problem from the larger perspective of a theoretical formula.[27] (The exception to this is

[27] Cf. Robert C. Tucker, "Russia, the West, and World Order," *World Politics* XII (October 1959), 1-23, with Tucker's keen observation: "The contrast between [the Soviet] outlook in policy-making and the characteristic Western one scarcely requires documenting. A pragmatic or instrumentalist approach to world problems typifies the Western policy-maker. Not theoretical conceptions enabling him to relate policy to the

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the rather thin concept of containment, of course, but as a grand design it suffers from the single-variable analysis on which it is based: containment takes into account only the Soviet challenge, leaving other variables in the international system largely unrecognized.)

In any event, the limitationist search for a grand design, in the *substantive* aspect of foreign policy, has produced the following: (1) the qualified and merely implicit acceptance of a spheres-of-influence concept; (2) the notion of a multilateral, possibly UN-sponsored, program of international involvement in regard to both economic assistance and, if necessary, military engagement; and (3) the expectation of a diverse and pluralist world order.

THE SPHERES-OF-INFLUENCE CONCEPT

Despite Senator Fulbright's explicit rejection of "the ancient and discredited game of power politics" (p. 240) or Senator McCarthy's repudiation of the applicability of the balance of power today (pp. 232-33), and despite Mr. Steel's view that a spheres-of-influence policy, though "compelling," is "no answer" (pp. 328-29), all have come to the hesitant and grudging conclusion that the only nonisolationist alternative to globalism is a spheres-of-influence policy. Indeed, in his *Pax Americana* Steel quotes Walter Lippmann, who approved American intervention in the Dominican Republic on the ground that "it is normal, not abnormal, for a great power to insist that within its sphere of influence no great power shall exercise hostile military and political force. . . . Recognition of spheres of influence is a true alternative to globalism. It is the alternative to communist globalism which proclaims a universal revolution. It is the alternative to anti-communist globalism which promises to fight anti-communist wars everywhere" (p. 328).

Although Steel finds Lippmann's argument "sane and unprovocative," he raises a number of practical, though hardly novel, questions: Who will decide how far the spheres extend? Would small countries have any freedom of choice? What happens when the spheres overlap? What can be done about China's sphere in Asia? These are very relevant questions indeed, but they present a further dilemma: Can a concept of spheres-of-influence, based on nineteenth-century standards of diplomacy, be revived, and, if so, are the limitationists prepared to accept these standards? Lippmann says yes, Steel says yes and no, the

general trends of events, but know-*how* in the face of concrete problem-situations is what he typically emphasizes. . . . In facing foreign-policy problems it is not the Western habit to attempt first of all to form a valid general picture of the world-setting of events in which the problems have arisen."

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Senators and Professor Schlesinger only skirt the issue. Instead, they all emphasize the fashionable notion of "discrimination" in the employment of national power (Schlesinger, p. 59; Steel, p. 331, for example). We must make a rational decision, they suggest, about our ability and willingness to assume foreign involvement. Rejecting the assumptions of involuntariness or determinism in foreign policy, they posit the existence and importance of choice: in the final analysis, they argue, it is up to us and not to an unstable world to decide what to do.

What it adds up to, then, is that Fulbright, McCarthy, Schlesinger, and Steel do not state explicitly *how* little the United States ought to participate in world politics. Polemics to the contrary notwithstanding, a spheres-of-influence concept is central to their thinking, but the conclusion they draw from their own critique of globalism is expressed only in the inoperative categories of "choice" and "discrimination." However, since they do agree that some states or regions are more important to American security than others, this must be interpreted as an implied acceptance of the concept of spheres-of-influence.

MULTILATERAL INVOLVEMENT

The presumed overextension of American power in general and the Vietnam war in particular have led the limitationists to reappraise the nature and extent of our economic and military assistance programs. They propose the internationalization of these programs, as well as the expansion of economic aid, for two basic reasons: first, they note that economic and military aid have become vehicles for unnecessary American engagement in areas beyond our reach or interest; and second, as a country-to-country or donor-to-recipient proposition, foreign assistance has willy-nilly become charity that is often degrading to the recipient countries. ". . . Consider how a Texas rancher might feel," Senator Fulbright observes in *The Arrogance of Power*, "as the pupil of a group of agronomists from Colombia assigned to teach him how to grow coffee. Would he be humbly and touchingly grateful? Or would his gratitude be tinged with a touch of rancor toward his benefactors because his pride was injured by the feeling of being a recipient and a suppliant?" (p. 226). The Senator approvingly quotes General Ne Win of Burma who, commenting on the impact of American military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Thailand, said: "This kind of aid does not help. It cripples. It paralyzes. The recipients never learn to do for themselves. They rely more and more on foreign experts and foreign money. In the end they lose control of their country" (p. 227).

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Thus, the limitationists seek an international system of distribution so that funds could be made available through the World Bank. The expected result would be the removal of direct United States involvement from many parts of the world; also, cooperation in a multilateral assistance program would presumably improve American-Soviet relations. In addition, the economic development of poor nations would thus become an end in itself, with an integrating effect on the international system, rather than part and parcel of international rivalries.[28] Although the Senator from Arkansas pledges his support for such a fundamental transformation of our assistance programs, realizing that it would require dramatic changes in our conception of economic and military aid, he neglects to take into account (1) the inefficacy of the United Nations, caused only in small part by the United States; (2) the likely reaction of those who, already critical of our programs, would consider the internationalization of foreign assistance as a measure entailing the further erosion of controls over our monies spent abroad; and (3) the consequences for the international system of the removal of an area of *peaceful* rivalry—in fact, the possibility that peaceful competition might then give way to nonpeaceful confrontation. In short, while multilateral involvement is certainly an attractive alternative to unilateral involvement, it raises as many questions as it seeks to answer.

DIVERSE WORLD ORDER

Basing their views primarily on the notion of polycentrism East and West, the presumed decline of ideological fervor, and the phenomenon of nonaligned neutralism in the third world, the limitationists envisage, as they accept, a pluralistic world order. Opposed to the imposition of American or, for that matter, Soviet values on the rest of the world, they are particularly concerned, as we have seen, about unilateral military intervention on behalf of unstable governments, interventions designed to impose the values of the intervening power. As Steel observed, "If self-determination, which we continually proclaim as a guiding principle of international conduct, means anything, it means the right of nations to evolve their own forms of government" (p. 335). On the other hand, if the peace of an entire area is endangered, the

[28] For a variety of viewpoints, see, among others, Robert A. Goldwin, ed., *Why Foreign Aid?* (Chicago 1963); Barbara Ward, *The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations* (New York 1962); Dudley Seers, "International Aid: The Next Steps," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, II (December 1964), 471-89; Marshall I. Goldman, *Soviet Foreign Aid* (New York 1967).

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limitationist critics seem ready to undertake joint intervention, possibly under UN auspices.

To be sure, the resulting world order is seen as unstable and chaotic, as well as pluralistic, but it is preferred to today's taxing instability and chaos. The assumption is that international conflict cannot be eliminated and that self-determination, in fact, cannot be sustained without indigenous support; therefore, there is no alternative to diversity. From a globalist perspective, however, the real question remains unanswered: Can diversity actually prevail under conditions of instability and chaos?

As to the *procedural* aspect of foreign policy, the limitationists, particularly the two senators, seek (1) the restoration of the Senate's powers of advice and consent in the making of foreign policy and (2) the curtailment of CIA activities. Together, the two measures are intended to have an eroding effect on presidential authority in the policy-making process.

THE SENATE'S ROLE

Senator Fulbright makes a clear distinction between the making and the conduct of foreign policy (p. 46). He deplores the congressional tendency to interfere in the day-to-day conduct of policy, but argues that even in our era of permanent crisis, or perhaps because of it, the Senate must render advice on the direction and philosophy of American policies abroad.

The curious thing about the Senator's view is that, despite his current disclaimers, he used to present quite opposite perspectives on the policy-making process. In a lecture at Cornell University in 1961, for example, he posed the question of "whether our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century, is adequate for the formulation *and conduct* of the foreign policy of a 20th-century nation, pre-eminent in political and military power and burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power."[29] He concluded that the President ought to be relieved of the burdens and diversions of ceremony at the same time that he strongly urged the "conferral of greatly increased authority on the President."[30] In 1962, Fulbright reaffirmed his belief that "the President alone commands the authority and the necessary forum for leading the American people to an active understanding of national

[29] "American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under An 18th-Century Constitution," *Cornell Law Quarterly*, XLVII (Fall 1961), 1, italics added.
[30] *Ibid.*, 12.

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objectives" and criticized legislators who "display a distressing tendency to adhere slavishly to the dictates of public opinion."[31] In 1963, in his first book, he again recommended constitutional reform so that congressmen, who "are acutely susceptible to local and regional pressures and to waves of fear and caution," could not interfere with the effective conduct of foreign policy.[32] In fact, he once linked McCarthyism with the need for a *weak* Senate in foreign affairs.[33]

It goes without saying that the Senator is fully entitled to change or modify his opinions. What the preceding discussion indicates, however, is that his position on the policy-making process has not been consistent. One suspects, therefore, that his current view is not an integral part of his limitationist philosophy; it is, rather, an expression of frustration over Vietnam and his own inability to influence the Johnson Administration's globalist policies.

CIA ACTIVITIES

Senator McCarthy devotes a considerable part of *The Limits of Power* to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. His critique is directed against the lack of appropriate procedures for congressional supervision and against the agency's domestic operations. McCarthy acknowledges that, although the Senate did not approve the establishment of a Committee on Intelligence Operations during the 89th Congress, much of the essential purpose of the original resolution was accomplished later when the CIA subcommittee invited three members of the Foreign Relations Committee, including Fulbright, to attend its meetings. As to the domestic operations of the CIA and, by implication, the domestic impact of frustrating foreign involvements, the limitationist critics have all expressed fear about the revival of political irrationality which, in turn, might stifle dissent and curtail the free exchange of ideas.

In the sphere of grand designs in foreign policy—necessary though they may be—there are only three major alternatives: isolationism, limitationism, and globalism. In the wake of Lippmann, Morgenthau, and Kennan, the four books under review present a devastating critique of American globalism. Yet the structure of their own limitationist

[31] "National Goals and National Consensus," in Paul R. Hanna, ed., *Education: An Instrument of National Goals* (New York 1962), 182, 184.
[32] *Prospects for the West* (New York 1963), 113.
[33] Karl E. Meyer, ed., *Fulbright of Arkansas: The Public Positions of a Private Thinker* (Washington 1963), 268-69.

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design, though attractive and sensible, suffers not only from inherent difficulties connected with all such designs but from inconsistencies and contradictions as well. Above all, the limitationists neglect to consider that in the American political system general concepts do not and cannot perform the same function as that they might well perform in the military or in nondemocratic systems. For the process of decision-making in the United States involves people with different backgrounds and divergent views, and the participation of these people in the political process is normally very brief indeed. Thus, the limitationist contribution is primarily educational: alternative assumptions, principles, and policies have been presented. In operational terms, however, the systematic elaboration of limitationism, and of other grand designs in foreign policy, is far from complete.

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CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

China and the United States

By RICHARD M. PFEFFER

Jerome Alan Cohen, *The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1963: An Introduction*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1968, ix, 706 pp. $15.00.

THERE is broad agreement among Western scholars that under the Communists the criminal process in China[1] is arbitrary, highly politicized, and responsive to class and status differences among its targets.[2] It is frequently pointed out, quite accurately, that China has no criminal codes and no public-reporter system of judicial decisions and that important substantive laws often are unpublished or, if published, very vague. Theorists of totalitarianism even doubt the existence of legality within such systems.

Laws not infrequently are applied retroactively and analogically or, to put it most crudely, on an *ad hoc* basis. Application of what we would classify as criminal law, especially of the law of minor crimes, tends to be by administrative rather than judicial institutions. Even where nominally judicial institutions are employed, as is the case with major crimes, their style is heavily inquisitorial, generally *ex parte*, with little opportunity for the defendant to defend himself either directly or through a lawyer. The proceedings of these institutions are not public. There is no independent judiciary and little separation of powers. The entire criminal process in China today tends to be dominated by the police, under strong party control.[3]

[1] This review article does not deal with problems of periodization or of holistic analysis. Nor does it deal with what happens to the Chinese criminal process during times of major social disruption, such as the Great Leap of the late 1950's or the Cultural Revolution of recent years.

[2] Members of the bourgeoisie, for example, tend in like cases to be treated more harshly as suspects and defendants than do members of the peasantry or proletariat.

[3] On these points and others, see Tao Lung-sheng, "The Criminal Law of Communist China," *Cornell Law Quarterly*, LII (Fall 1966), 43-68; Lin Fushun, "Communist China's Emerging Fundamentals of Criminal Law," *Amerian Journal of Comparative Law*, XIII (Winter 1964), 80-93; Henry McAleavy, "The People's Courts in Communist China," *American Journal of Comparative Law*, XI (Winter 1962), 52-65; Franz Michael, "The Role of Law in Traditional, Nationalist and Communist China," *China Quarterly*, XIX (January-March 1962), 124-48; David C. Buxbaum, "Preliminary Trends in the Development of Legal Institutions of Communist China and the Nature of the Criminal Law," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, XI (January 1962), 1-30; Buxbaum, "Horizontal and Vertical Influences Upon the Substantive Criminal Law in China: Some Preliminary Observations," *Osteuropa-Recht*, X (March 1964), 31-51; and Albert

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But is this all there is to say? How does a system so characterized function at all? Why would a political system so lacking in regularized procedures be attacked as bureaucratic by Mao Tse-tung in his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution? What are the standards for the implicit comparisons that are found in the above characterization of the Chinese criminal process? And if, as I believe, those standards ultimately have been derived from the Anglo-American criminal law system, has our understanding of that system been accurate or adequate?

I will argue (1) that until recently, at least for comparative purposes, we have accepted as fact a mythology about the American system of criminal justice; (2) that we have not tried very hard to understand the Chinese criminal process as process; and (3) that sanctioning systems should be compared in their entireties, the comparison ideally involving consideration of how various institutions within each system function and interact at the operating level.

Since most of the writing in the field implicitly or explicitly dwells on the differences between the Chinese and American legal systems, it is hardly necessary for me to belabor these differences. In the light of the argument I offer here, however, the differences, though real and substantial, appear less absolute.

I

The comparative analysis of criminal law processes has been distorted by a perspective that has emphasized the unique and necessary role of the judiciary as the guardian of legality. This perspective has distorted comparisons on two levels. It implies that the role of the judiciary is uniquely legal, somehow wholly distinctive from administrative processes, which implicitly are less than legal. Second, the perspective assumes that it is accurate to characterize our criminal process as "judicial." Since the Chinese Communist criminal process obviously is not a judicial process, the Chinese must reject the principle of legality. We are back to neat dichotomies.

I take legality as rule-following, resulting in the "reduction of arbitrariness by officials."[4] While this definition, like all definitions, is not

P. Blaustein, ed., *Fundamental Legal Documents of Communist China* (South Hackensack 1962), ix-xxix. For an intelligent account of the experiences of two Americans with the Chinese criminal process in the early 1950's, see Allyn and Adele Rickett, *Prisoners of Liberation* (New York 1957).

[4] Jerome H. Skolnick, *Justice Without Trial* (New York 1966), 8. Professor Skolnick, a widely recognized authority on the criminal process in the United States, is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology and a Research Associate of the

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wholly satisfactory, it seems more useful than more inclusive conceptions of legality that tend to incorporate various elements of Western experience, such as an emphasis on individual rights and the judicial vindication of those rights. The differences between judicial and administrative decision-making, though substantial, are differences of degree.[5] Perhaps one might argue that the judicial process incorporates a higher degree of legality, but both processes involve rule-following, and both

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Center for Studies in Criminal Justice at the University of Chicago. My approaches in this review article reflect a substantial intellectual debt to Professor Skolnick's work.

[5] Although it is not here appropriate to discuss these differences at great length, the subtlety of the differences can be indicated by a brief and limited comment on Professor Lon L. Fuller's approach, which is set out in his "Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator," *Wisconsin Law Review* (January 1963), 3-46, esp. 18-42.

Fuller argues, in part, that the kinds of questions that can be solved by adjudication are intrinsically limited. Judicial institutions are peculiarly unsuited to deciding questions involving "apportionment," polycentric problems in which, as in a spider web, if one pulls a strand here "a complex pattern of adjustments runs through the whole web." Polycentric problems are typically those before administrative agencies.

The sorts of problems amenable to judicial action are (1) "more-or-less" issues, where "all of the possible decisions may be represented within a single dimension," such as tort cases where an award can range from zero to x dollars; and (2) "yes-or-no" issues "between parties with opposed interests, no other interests being directly affected by the outcome." While Fuller does not say that courts should never try to resolve polycentric problems, he tends to feel that courts should be very hesitant to do so since, given "the procedural restraints normally surrounding judicial office," the courts should not risk undermining their institutional effectiveness and authority by recklessly venturing to do what they by nature are not well constituted to do.

I have two related reservations to Fuller's approach, which at times seems perilously close to a dichotomous approach to adjudicative and administrative decision-making. First, interests other than those of the parties directly involved are always affected in judicial, as well as in administrative, determinations. Judicial decisions, after all, are not simply relevant to the parties immediately before the court; they also act as precedents. In so far as one believes that in judicial decisions the impact of the decision should be limited to the parties before the court, one is faced with the bizarre result that appellate decisions, which by their nature have a broader impact than those of courts of first instance, are in some way less judicial than the latter. To point out, legalistically, that other parties are not "directly affected by the outcome," while true in a formal sense, presumably may be of little significance in fact.

Second, many, and probably all, issues are more or less polycentric. It is convention, based upon the consensus that provides the foundation for judicial institutions, which allows us to consider particular issues *as if* their ramifications were not infinite. But every issue decided in court is like a pebble dropped into a pond; it creates waves that affect, infinitesimally perhaps, all waters within the pond's expanse. Again, the implicitly polycentric nature of all issues often is clearest at the appellate level, particularly in important constitutional cases, where the range of considerations is endlessly complex, implicitly if not explicitly involving basic decisions on how society will allocate its resources (e.g., *Brown v. Board of Education* and the whole line of recent cases affecting the rights of criminals).

It is true that the polycentric issues involved are judicially resolved only at a very high level of generality, but it is important to recognize that the most fundamental sort of allocative decisions are made by the judiciary, as well as by the legislature and by administrative agencies. Perhaps Fuller's main point is simply that polycentric issues can be resolved more concretely, more explicitly, and more conveniently by a number of nonjudicial institutions. With that point, I am in fuller agreement.

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involve discretion. To put the latter point most blatantly, "Every officer of the law—policeman, President, legislator, attorney, judge, licensing commissioner, draft board member—is in some degree a magistrate. He exercises discretion and thereby affects the rights of citizens."[6]

Now what does this mean for Communist China? The answer requires a broader understanding of legality in its relation to modern organization. Max Weber saw the close relation between purposive organizational regularity and legality. The legal-rational order for him was characterized by the increasing growth of what we would consider modern organizations.[7] Recently, Franz Schurmann has decisively argued that the very goal of implementing social revolution in a country as large and unwieldy as China requires effective, large-scale organization. In the context of the decline of traditional ethos and social institutions, social control in revolutionary China, to a significant extent, is a function of ideology and explicit organization.[8]

The importance of organization in the criminal process and its relation to legality is fundamental. As to the first, I would suggest that for comparative purposes every society's criminal process should be taken as a whole and seen as a *community of organizations*.[9] The organizations that make up the criminal law enforcement community will vary somewhat from society to society, but they frequently will include the police, a prosecutorial branch, a hierarchically structured judiciary embodying an appellate system, other supervisory administrative organizations, and, at times, a professional bar.

The purpose of analyzing the criminal process *in terms of a community* is to indicate that the relations between the various component organizations are continuing in nature, based on common interests, characterized by reciprocal influence, and frequently manifested in face-

[6] Philip Selznick, "The Sociology of Law" (June 1966), revised draft of an article published in *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. The assumptions that have grown up around the basic principle of Anglo-American criminal law that a criminal statute is void if its scope and meaning are vague are confronted in Frank J. Remington and Victor G. Rosenblum, "The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process," *University of Illinois Law Forum* (Winter 1960), 481-99. It is there argued that the prevailing condition of criminal law in the United States is one of ambiguity, resulting in the intended or unintended delegation of broad discretion to enforcement agencies to decide what conduct is to be subjected to the criminal process.

[7] Weber, *On Law in Economy and Society*, ed. Max Rheinstein (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), esp. 334-37.

[8] Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley 1966), esp. 1-16. For contrasting review articles of this important book, see John K. Fairbank, "The State That Mao Built," *World Politics*, XIX (July 1967), 664-77; and Pfeffer, "Contradictions and Social Change in Communist China," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXIX (Fall and Winter 1966-1967), 349-60.

[9] I was stimulated to adopt this perspective by Skolnick's *Justice Without Trial*.

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to-face encounters. The purpose of analyzing the process *in terms of separate organizations* is to indicate that within the community there are likely to be antithetical interests and perspectives, in large part based on the differing particular goals of the various organizations (for example, the police and the judiciary).

While no perfect resolution of these differing interests and perspectives is feasible in any society, the societal manner of resolution of conflicts between organizations in a community will set the tone for the entire criminal process. Because of the complexity of the organizational relationships and the apparent irreconcilability of their demands, characterization of various criminal processes as either police systems or judicial systems is regrettably unrefined.

All criminal law enforcement communities can be positioned on a continuum representing differing degrees of concern with the twin goals of legality and efficient enforcement of order. In practice, simultaneous pursuit of these goals by the community may often imply conflicting organizational strategies in concrete cases. The most efficient enforcement of order, for example, often will not be compatible in the concrete case with legality. Still, at another level at least a minimum degree of legality seems to be required in a criminal process for the efficient enforcement of order.

Professor Lon L. Fuller of the Harvard Law School, it seems to me, would agree with this last point. In his discussion of the "inner morality of law" Fuller argues that certain conditions are essential for the *efficacy* of a system of legal rules.[10] Fulfilling these conditions is a matter of degree, but they must be at least minimally realized as a precondition for creating and maintaining a legal system. The minimal realization of these conditions is equivalent to the minimal degree of legality required to have a legal system at all. Beyond that minimal realization, a system achieves higher levels of legality. In short, while all legal systems (and criminal processes) presuppose at least minimal levels of legality, the degree of legality realized may differ from system to system.

Fuller describes these indispensable conditions in a negative manner by writing of eight ways in which a society may fail in "the attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules. . . ." His description also may be taken to indicate eight ways in which a society may fail to

[10] *The Morality of Law* (New Haven 1964). Fuller's approach, which I here adopt in part, like much of social science may overrationalize reality by trying to treat it as "system." I recognize the problem and admit my own complicity in the use of such an approach.

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create and maintain bureaucratic organization, ways in which each of the component organizations of the criminal law enforcement community may break down to produce disorganization:

> The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided on an *ad hoc* basis. The other routes [to disaster] are (2) a failure to publicize, or at least to make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe; (3) the abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them under the threat of retrospective change; (4) a failure to make rules understandable; (5) the enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; (7) introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them; and, finally (8) a failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual administration.[11]

In organizational terms, Fuller's emphasis on rules may be understood in light of the need for organizations to make ultimate organizational goals more specific and concrete and to stimulate and control performance through regularized procedures. The purpose of modern organization, like the purpose Fuller attributes to the institution of law, is "that of subjecting human conduct to the guidance and control of general rules."

It is hard to conceive of a complex organization in which most issues were decided on an *ad hoc* basis, in which the members were not apprised of the organization's specific purposes and of the rules they were expected to observe, in which rules were constantly being changed, and in which rules were intolerably in conflict. Yet, since all organizations, like all criminal processes, exist in a state of imperfection and not one of utopia, there always will be a substantial degree of failure to achieve rational-legal ideals. But, a "total failure in any one of these eight directions [that is, a failure to achieve at least the indispensable minimum] does not simply result in a bad system of law [or a bad organization]; it results in something that is not properly called a legal system [or organization] at all."[12]

Large-scale organizations like the Ministry of Public Security in Communist China, then, cannot operate effectively without evolving

[11] *Ibid.*, 39.
[12] *Ibid.*

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and enforcing rules and standards. In addition, in order to implement its goals, an organization must combine selective recruitment of its members with varying degrees of intraorganizational socialization to inculcate its values in its members. Without such procedures members will be unable to interpret rules in the light of broader organizational purposes. They will be forced to choose randomly or on the basis of extraorganizational (for example, personal) reasons. Every organization—like the broader legal system itself, of which organizations may be a part—involves a process of shaping men's actions to fit organizational roles. Without such a process there can be no organization. In this sense, at least, there is an inherent tendency toward purposive rule-following, toward legality, in large-scale bureaucratic organizations.

Let me illustrate what the organizational approach to a criminal process implies. It has frequently been pointed out that the Chinese Communists have "not been reluctant to apply proscriptions both analogically and retroactively."[13] This undoubtedly is true, but the degree of its significance largely depends upon the degree to which the Chinese are changing the substantive criminal law. The greater the degree of change, the more latitude for retroactive and analogical applications.[14] However, there is a limit beyond which these practices would cause such disorganization that neither the criminal law enforcement community nor the objects of its attention—the citizens of China—could function.

To apply all new criminal laws retroactively in a context in which laws are changing rapidly obviously would make for such insecurity and frustration of reasonable expectations as to stultify normal societal processes. Not only is it absurd, as Fuller points out, to command "a man today to do something yesterday"[15] and then to punish him for not having done it, but it is also organizationally impossible to do this often or on a large scale. Even if the Chinese criminal law enforcement community had the appallingly great physical resources required to enforce effectively a rapidly changing set of laws retroactively, the

[13] Jerome A. Cohen, "The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China: An Introduction," *Harvard Law Review*, LXXIX (January 1966), 528.

[14] It should be noted that the issue of analogical application of the criminal law often is treated separately from the more general issue of statutory interpretation. But statutory interpretation, ideally involving construction of the purpose or spirit of the law, frequently involves analogical reasoning. The problem of adequate warning is at the core in both issues. Our rules of statutory interpretation requiring strict construction of ambiguous provisions in favor of the defendant reflect an awareness of the close relation between statutory interpretation in general and analogy.

[15] Fuller, 59.

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members of the community would not understand how to do so. For effective, systematic law enforcement is a process that takes time to understand and that requires at the outset an understanding of reasonable purposive orientations.

This is not to say that one can understand the practice of any organization or community of organizations purely through its formal rules. But this point is as true of organizations in the United States as in China. Formal rules tend to spawn informal practices, which in turn to some degree subvert the regularity of formal procedures, ideally in order to achieve organizational goals more efficiently. Thus, even when members of organizations are wholly committed to the organizational "ideology,"[16] they will tend, for example, to violate procedural requirements in order to achieve substantive ones upon which, they accurately judge, the organization places a higher priority. The exercise of police initiative in rooting out criminality in the United States (see below) is a good illustration of this phenomenon. Such deviations from formal procedures, given the fact that the police organization does indeed place a higher priority on the achievement of substantive goals, constitute "positive deviance" from organizational rules. In the case of such positive deviance, the society cannot rely upon the organization itself to restrict such deviance but must depend for that upon other organizations within the community—for example, the judiciary.

Fully successful indoctrination in the organizational ideology, however, is an organizational ideal. Frequently, if not generally, deviance will not be positive, and when it is not, the organization itself must seek to control deviance. It often tries to exercise this control through incentives, the use of which normally requires standards for measuring the performance of organization members. But once these standards are set up, to the extent that organizational "indoctrination" has failed, members will attempt to satisfy these standards only nominally, with as little expenditure of effort as possible. There is, then, in all organizations a continuing dialectic between formal rules and standards, on the one hand, and informal practices, on the other.

There is no doubt that some organizations are more effective than others in controlling internal deviance and in approximating the realization of organizational goals. Nevertheless, every organization, if it is to maintain itself, must be at least minimally effective in this respect. No organization can tolerate arbitrary or random action by its members beyond a certain point. There is, then, an inherent need for a substan-

[16] Schurmann argues that all organizations have their own ideologies (p. 18).

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tial degree of regularity in all organizations. At least, an organization must not be characterized by disorganization.

In suggesting the organizational approach to understanding a society's criminal process, I attempt to eliminate distortions common to comparative approaches that are less than rigorous in their investigation of the operational reality of both the familiar component of the comparison (the American criminal process) and the "strange" component (the Chinese criminal process). In the first sort of distortion, the tendency has been to assume the familiar is a known quantity and, since little empirical work had been done on the American criminal process until recently, to treat an ideal image of the familiar, which emphasizes its adversary and due process character, as reality. In the second sort of distortion, both because of the difficulty of obtaining systematic information necessary to fill out the organizational approach and because of the obtrusiveness of spectacular irregularities, such as mass public trials in Communist China, the tendency, particularly in the mass media, has been to characterize the Communist Chinese criminal process as a series of irregularities or barbarities. The comparison of an idealized image with a one-sidedly unfavorable one is obviously not conducive to understanding reality.

In using the organizational approach, I have tried to suggest that our earlier images of the criminal process in Communist China seem to be grossly inadequate as a description of a functioning legal system. Support for this position can be found in Professor Jerome A. Cohen's recent book on the Chinese criminal process, in which the outlines of patterned processes have begun to emerge.

II

Professor Cohen's *The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1963: An Introduction* is a tightly organized (just look at the table of contents), meticulously researched, and highly intelligent discussion and analysis of the Chinese criminal process. The category of criminal process, quite properly, is treated in its broadest sense: "Because this system neatly meshes 'administrative' and 'criminal' sanctions, and because many of the 'administrative' sanctions and the acts that they punish would be deemed 'criminal' in many other countries, it is necessary to treat the sanctioning system as a whole" (p. 18).[17]

[17] Specifically, Professor Cohen includes offenses the Chinese would style administrative offenses under their Security Administration Punishment Act (SAPA). SAPA, virtually unmentioned in previous literature in the field, "is the nearest thing to a criminal code [for minor crimes] that China has produced" (p. 24).

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The book focuses, as it should, on the patterns of action and interaction among the individual, the police, the procuracy, the courts, and the Communist party. It goes beyond the sterile listing of relevant institutions and the statement of their official hierarchical positions and their roles in formal organizational charts—so common to earlier studies in this field—and deals instead with behavior at the operational level. It succeeds in doing all this, despite the very real difficulties in this field of gathering information, analyzing it, and treating it objectively. Aside from a handful of topics, such as the inner workings of the Chinese military or high-level decision-making in China, it is hard to imagine a field of research upon which there are greater research constraints than there are upon the study of the criminal process in China. The fact, then, that Professor Cohen has produced a first-rate piece of scholarship is a tribute to his hard work, insights, care, and administrative talents.

The book is organized in three parts. The introductory essay "provides an overview of the evolution and operation of the criminal process from 1949 through 1963." The essay is substantially a reprint of Professor Cohen's article that appeared earlier in the *Harvard Law Review*.[18]

The second part, "which constitutes the bulk of the book, systematically presents primary source materials," including "relevant excerpts from legal documents; . . . from official policy statements; from a treatise on criminal law . . . prepared to assist Chinese judicial officials; . . . from articles in Chinese law reviews, academic and popular journals, and national and local newspapers"; from the over eight hundred hours of personal interviews with Chinese refugees that Professor Cohen conducted in Hong Kong in 1963-1964; and, finally, from "written and oral accounts of [other] persons who have lived in or visited the People's Republic" (p. vii). This mass of primary data is organized expertly into eleven topical chapters and numerous subsections, the sequence and contents of which flow rather naturally from the analysis of Part I. The broad topics covered range from the ideology of the criminal law in China, to informal adjustment and sanctioning, to formal administrative sanctioning, to the formal criminal process.

With great profit to his students and to the book itself, Professor Cohen used the materials in this part as teaching materials for several years at the Harvard Law School. These materials can now be used

[18] See n. 13.

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fruitfully by other students of comparative law, comparative organizations, and Chinese government and society.

Part III includes an accurate, extensive, and sophisticated "English-Chinese glossary of the major legal and institutional terms translated in Part II," as well as a bibliography of sources used, including a number of English-language works providing useful comparative perspectives.

My major criticism of the book stems precisely from the fact that it will be, and should be, used by many people who are not familiar with the practice of criminal law in the United States or with the literature on the sociology of law. For those people, the book—especially the introductory essay—does not explicitly set forth the comparative perspectives necessary to understand the Chinese criminal process relative to the criminal process in other countries. Notwithstanding a few scattered, muted comments, such as "Other standard tactics [of the Chinese Communists] also have a familiar ring to a student of criminal law" (p. 30), the bare-bones nature of the argument of the essay may well lead nonspecialists to compare the Chinese process with the idealized and misleading images of the American process that they formed in high-school civics classes. Specialists, such as Professor Cohen himself, who has had experience as a prosecutor, will immediately draw many parallels to their own experience in the United States and will see the inferences to be drawn from the essay's many subtle descriptions.[19] The nonspecialist, I fear, will tend as before to understand the American and Chinese systems as a dichotomy only slightly more refined than that of good and evil. In the following sections, using the organizational approach sketched out above, I shall examine the American criminal process in action and shall make a few tentative comparisons with the Chinese process described by Professor Cohen.

[19] Perhaps it should be made clear here how narrowly the category of "specialists" must be defined. For example, many graduates of this country's foremost law schools probably would be excluded from the category. On the basis of personal experience, I can attest that at least as late as 1961 it was possible, because of the extreme emphasis on the case method on judicial elements and judicial perspectives, to graduate from the Harvard Law School without a realistic conception of how the criminal process operates in the United States.

It might seem that my criticism of Professor Cohen for not accomplishing what he did not attempt to do is gratuitous. However, because of the prevalence of myths and biases about our own and the Chinese processes, I feel that my comments are justifiable. In this context comparative perspectives must be explicitly stated if communication is to be successful.

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III

Although the idealized due process image or model of the American criminal process is the one frequently used in comparative analysis, it seems clear that in practice due process considerations, while important, are hardly dominant in the United States. The American criminal process can be characterized for analytic purposes as an interaction between two competing normative models, the Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model.[20]

The Crime Control Model stresses efficiency in repressing criminal conduct, as well as related values of speed, finality, and informality. It is primarily concerned with the issue of *factual* guilt, and since it has a high degree of "confidence in the reliability of informal administrative fact-finding activities that take place in the early stages of the criminal process" (by the police, for example), those suspects not screened out in the early stages are presumed on this model to be factually guilty.[21] The Crime Control Model sees the formal judicial stage of the criminal process as largely superfluous at best, or, at worst, as a major hindrance to that model's primary task of efficiently repressing criminal conduct. Reduced to its barest essentials the Crime Control Model consists of two elements: "(a) an administrative factfinding process leading to exoneration of the suspect, or to (b) the entry of a plea of guilty."[22]

The Due Process Model, on the other hand, incorporating Western

[20] Herbert L. Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, CXIII (1964), 1-68. The discussion below of these two models is based upon this fine article.

One problem with Professor Packer's treatment of the American criminal process is his slighting of the function of the Due Process Model in crime control itself. Since notions and symbols of due process in our culture are imbedded in the very legitimacy of government, a crucial degree of compliance with the law is induced by the ideal and assumed operation of the Due Process Model. I am indebted to Professor Edmund W. Kitch of the University of Chicago Law School for this point. Presumably, the increasing awareness today of the limited impact of this model in practice is not unrelated to rising doubts concerning the legitimacy of some of our institutions and to rising crime rates.

In focusing on Packer's two analytic models, I do not mean to imply that various organizations, such as the police, are free of political and other pressures affecting behavior of members. If in this broader perspective some positions taken in this article suggest a lack of sympathy for complex problems faced by police, to some degree this is attributable to my primary concern with the quality of effective justice, whatever circumstances may be pled in extenuation. For a very recent and partial survey of the quality of effective justice in Chicago from the point of view of the Director of the Illinois American Civil Liberties Union, see Jay Miller, "Verdict: Guilty—Racism Masks Chicago Police," *Focus Midwest*, VI (1968), 10-15.

[21] Packer, 12.

[22] *Ibid.*, 13.

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liberal values of equality, individualism, and limited governmental power, is primarily concerned with *legal* rather than factual guilt.[23] It is not concerned simply with the reliability of administrative determinations of factual guilt. Thus, "the factually guilty may nonetheless be legally innocent," and one can assert defenses "that have nothing to do with factual guilt. . . ."[24]

Rather than trying to maximize efficiency in repressing criminal conduct, the Due Process Model subjects the criminal process to controls—in the United States, especially judicial controls—that prevent it from operating at maximum efficiency. In this antiauthoritarian manner, the Due Process Model employs the judicial sanction of nullity to invalidate determinations of guilt when the procedures employed in reaching those determinations, such as unreasonable searches or coerced confessions, violate the model's values.

While the trend of the last decade or so has favored an increasing role for the Due Process Model in the United States, today our criminal process still tends by and large to resemble the Crime Control Model.[25] Insofar as this is true, this model focuses attention on similarities rather than on differences between the criminal processes in America and in Communist China, for China's criminal process may be characterized almost exclusively in terms of the Crime Control Model.

In the United States the criminal process typically is a system of justice without trial, in which "conviction is by the accused's plea of guilty, with no trial required. In the federal courts, the guilty plea receives the heaviest use, 86 percent [of the cases] in the fiscal years 1960 through 1963, while in the state courts, the use of the plea trails by [only] 5 to 10 percent. . . . [Thus,] routine decision-making in the administration of criminal justice is hidden from public view. . . . The case is often 'tried' in an informal setting."[26]

The implications of this fact are endless, and from the perspective of the Due Process Model they are negative. Under that model, "the arraignment [at which the accused enters his plea] is the fulcrum of the entire criminal process. It is at this point that one of two things happens: either the possible errors and abuses at the earlier, largely

[23] Due process in this sense is not synonymous with legality, understood as rule-following. Due process, as used here, involves rule-following plus a commitment to substantive positions that epitomize the entire development of Anglo-American liberal culture.

[24] Packer, 17.

[25] *Ibid.*, 23.

[26] Skolnick, 13.

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unscrutinized stages of the process are exposed to judicial scrutiny, or they are forever submerged in a plea of guilty."[27] Since appeals from a guilty plea are highly improbable, the determination of the issue of guilt by plea is likely to be final. This is significant, because the "fewer appeals . . . the likelier it is that Crime Control norms will prevail."[28] This likelihood is enhanced by the fact that guilty pleas frequently have been made without effective aid of counsel, or, if the accused is indigent, wholly without aid of counsel, since at least until recently the state has been under no obligation to provide counsel at this stage of the criminal process. Without even the form of an adversary proceeding in the determination of the issue of guilt, assertion of the infringement of the accused's rights and vindication of those rights have not been common.

The system of justice without trial in the United States severely violates principles of legality and due process. While the influence of the judiciary in favor of both reaches to some extent into all organizations within the criminal law enforcement community, it is certainly strongest in the formal adjudicatory process itself. To the extent that cases do not go to trial, the concern with legality and due process tends to be replaced by an acceptance of "bargain justice," which essentially reflects the criminal law community's dominant concern with efficient law enforcement. All organizations within the community acquiesce to varying degrees in this system of bargain justice that undermines legality. Under the system the defendant, his attorney, the prosecution, and frequently the judge engage in a process of negotiation that, within a broad range, determine the specifics of the disposition of the case under a bargained-for plea of guilty.

Recognizing this community of interests, Fuller writes that one reason why sole reliance on courts to control "the lawless administration of the law" has proved "relatively ineffective" is that the lower courts tend "to identify their mission with that of maintaining the morale of the police force."[29] The consequence of this system of justice in the United States is that "although the ideals of the law emphasize individual rights and protections, the everyday mass-processing of offenders takes place under conditions which increasingly invite systematic violations, denials, and evasions of these rights and protections."[30]

As I have indicated above, the impact of the Crime Control Model

[27] Packer, 49.
[28] *Ibid.*, 56.
[29] Pp. 81-82.
[30] Jerome H. Skolnick, "The Sociology of Law in America: Overview and Trends," *Law and Society*, a supplement to *Social Problems* (Summer 1965), 4-39, at 17.

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is clearest in the early stages of the criminal process. The process begins with discretionary acts of the police.[31] The police in all criminal law enforcement communities have the enormous power to halt the legal process at the outset. In addition, police discretion involves the systematic manner in which police deal with suspects: "In contrast to the criminal law presumption that a man is innocent until proved guilty, the policeman tends to maintain an administrative presumption of regularity, in effect a presumption of [factual] guilt. When he makes an arrest and decides to book a suspect, the officer feels that the suspect has committed the crime as charged. He believes that as a specialist in crime, he has the *ability to distinguish between [factual] guilt and innocence.*"[32] Moreover, "the policeman is offended by judicial assumptions running contrary to probabilistic fact—the notion of due process of law staunchly maintains a rebuttable presumption of innocence in the face of the policeman's everyday experience. . . ."[33]

The extent of police initiative and ingenuity in pursuit of efficient repression of criminal conduct in the United States is reflected in the organizational demand within police departments for "a type of 'professional' police practice in which the concern for legality is minimal."[34]

For example, responding to an intraorganizational control mechanism aimed at measuring the efficiency of the police, policemen follow a policy of selective enforcement of the law in order to appear efficient according to the controlling standard. That standard is the clearance rate, which is the percentage of crimes *known* to the police that the police organization *treats as* having been solved. By this standard, solving a crime does not require a conviction; knowledge of who the offender is appears to be sufficient if the offender already is in the hands of the police. Inducing detained suspects to confess to prior offenses thus raises the clearance rate. In order to induce such confessions, policemen offer three basic commodities in a bargained-for exchange: "reduction of charges and counts [in the instant case], concealment of actual criminality, and freedom from further investigation of [confessed] prior offenses." As a consequence of this practice, "criminality becomes [the suspect's] commodity for exchange . . . [and] under certain con-

[31] In this regard, see Joseph Goldstein, "Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice," *Yale Law Journal*, LXIX (March 1960), 543-94. For a revealing case study of the problem of judicial control of police, see Herman Schwartz, "Stop and Frisk," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, LVIII (1967), 433-64.

[32] Skolnick, *Justice Without Trial*, 197.

[33] *Ibid.*, 233.

[34] *Ibid.*, 110.

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ditions the attention paid by working detectives to clearance rates may *reverse the hierarchy of penalties* associated with the substantive criminal law. . . . In some cases defendants who confess to large numbers of crimes will tend to be shown more leniency in prosecution than those who are in fact less culpable."[35]

Another example of the weakness of the ideal of legality in American police practice is the exercise of initiative by police in crimes, such as prostitution and narcotics violations, that typically are without citizen complaints, "crimes without victims." For the solution of such crimes the need for police initiative is very great,[36] and that initiative is reflected in police-sustained informer systems. In the case of prostitutes, police often try to transform the prostitute, who is not considered a "good pinch" since prostitution is only a misdemeanor, into an informant. To accomplish this feat police treat as discretionary the mandatory quarantine requirements for girls arrested on prostitution charges, thereby creating "commodities of exchange" that can be used to bargain with prostitutes for information.[37]

Police ingenuity in undermining legality and due process is also reflected in their efforts to substantially neutralize such judicial controls as the exclusionary rule. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to discourage illegal searches and seizures, which are especially prevalent in the investigation of crimes without victims. In practice, to evade the bite of the rule while achieving literal compliance with it, police may rely on thinly related events (such as a suspect's prior parole violation) that constitute grounds for legal arrest, which in turn validates any search made "incident" to such an arrest.

Even more subtly, the police develop evasive strategies to make their behavior appear legal. They fabricate probable cause for arrest, reconstructing "a set of complex happenings in such a way that, subsequent to the arrest, probable cause can be found according to appellate court standards."[38]

At best, the exclusionary rule has had an uneven effect on police practice. Its maximal impact is purely a function of police concern with a loss of possible conviction. And even where the police are concerned

[35] *Ibid.*, 174-76.

[36] The broader applicability of the concept of "crimes without victims" to China—involving, for example, black-market transactions or, generally, crimes against the state—is one way of accounting for China's high levels of police initiative and all the practices associated therewith.

[37] Skolnick, *Justice Without Trial*, 112-38.

[38] *Ibid.*, 215.

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with getting a conviction, the likelihood that the conviction may be attained by a guilty plea, in which the element of the illegal search is only one factor in a complex bargain, further undermines the effectiveness of the rule. Moreover, in the early stages of a case or in general patrolling activities, the risk of losing a conviction is too remote to serve as an effective deterrent in any event. Similarly, where prosecution is not even contemplated, as in the "small pinch" where the police are primarily interested in creating an informant, the exclusionary rule has little or no effect on police behavior.

The picture that emerges, then, of this functioning community of organizations is in startling contrast to idealized images of the American criminal process. The judiciary is in fact substantially less autonomous, particularly in the courts of first instance, than the ideal suggests. And if one can speak of the American criminal process as a judicial one, it is only with an awareness of the severe limitations and unevenness of the influence of the judiciary on the entire process. While organizational perspectives within the community vary, as evidenced by the increasing concern for legality and due process as one proceeds sequentially from organization to organization in the criminal process, these differing perspectives tend to be resolved in concrete instances through informal bargaining, which often involves elements of expediency, rather than through the application of formal rules. The concern for efficient enforcement of the law, epitomized in the police organization, appears to dominate the concern for individuated treatment of offenders according to notions of legality or due process.

IV

In this light, a number of features of the Chinese Communist criminal process may be reexamined, again not to deny the differences between that process and its counterpart in the United States, but to put these differences in the perspective presented. I select four features from Professor Cohen's book.

First, the police, procuracy, and judiciary in China really "serve as constituent units of a single administrative structure" (p. 48). Second, the suspect in China lacks a meaningful chance to defend himself, and most of the criminal law process is carried on *ex parte* (p. 49). Third, the "inherently coercive environment" in China inhibits the defendant "from utilizing even the limited opportunities to defend himself that do exist" (p. 50). And, fourth, the criminal process in China tends to judge the man at least as much as the act.

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In perspective: first, although in the United States the police, the prosecution, and the courts preserve their organizational identities sufficiently to make it inappropriate to treat them as "constituent units of a single administrative structure," it is nonetheless true, as I have argued above, that these organizations tend to cooperate as a community in emphasizing the efficient repression of criminal conduct. On the other hand, as Cohen points out, in China the hierarchical structure of the "units" and the separation of functions among police, procuratorial, and judicial "units" provide an institutionalized basis for reviewing and limiting the exercise of arbitrary discretion by law enforcement officials. So to some degree, despite the existence of "a police-dominated, highly integrated system of judicial and extrajudicial sanctions" (p. 47), there is even in China a measure of organizational integrity.

These organizations in China form a tighter community precisely because of the relative absence of the competing Due Process Model. In the United States that model is institutionalized in the judiciary, particularly in the appellate courts, and there provides the tension within the community that sharpens the definition of organizational boundaries. In China the organizations are bound together by a nearly exclusive preoccupation with efficient enforcement. While, as I have stated above, this preoccuaption necessarily implies at least a minimal concern with rule-following, it does not imply a like concern with substantive due process.

Second, with regard to the defendant's lack of opportunity to defend himself, two points should be made. The inquisitorial system—which is not unique to Communist nations—generally offers the defendant less opportunity to defend himself than does the adversary system. The inquisitorial system ideally relies primarily upon official initiative to protect a defendant's interests. Moreover, in many phases of the legal system in the United States—and especially in the dominant criminal procedure of justice without trial—the adversary nature of the process is substantially diluted.[39] Frequently the defendant's formal right to defend himself appears in practice to be compromised and transformed into a "right" to bargain about the charges and the prospective sentence.

Third, the United States is not without its own coercive environment that inhibits the assertion of formally existing rights. To a substantial

[39] For a relevant discussion of the public defender office, see David Sudnow, "Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office," *Social Problems*, XII (Winter 1965), 255-76. Qualifying some of Sudnow's points, Jerome H. Skolnick deals with the problem more generally in "Social Control in the Adversary System," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XI (March 1967), 52-70.

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degree, suspects who anticipate repeated future encounters with the police, such as prostitutes and addicts, are inhibited from asserting their legal rights by the fear of having "the book thrown at them" the next time.[40] Indigent defendants, furthermore, appear to be inhibited by their entire life situation from asserting their rights.[41] In addition, "a large proportion of poor defendants (particularly in misdemeanor cases) are not represented [by counsel] at all. Moreover, when counsel is provided he frequently has neither the resources, the skill nor the incentive to defend his client effectively; and he usually enters the case too late to make any real difference in the outcome. Indeed, the generally higher rate of guilty pleas and prison sentences among defendants represented by assigned counsel or the public defender suggests that these attorneys may actually undermine their clients' position."[42]

Fourth, all criminal law systems try to reconcile two standards for judging crime, the man and the act. While it appears true that the Chinese at least explicitly place comparatively more weight on the man, the American criminal law process seems to focus on the man at the beginning and end of the process. At the beginning, the police as part of their working personality develop "a perceptual shorthand to identify certain kinds of people as symbolic assailants," men who the police presume are inclined as a class or a group to criminality.[43] Police are trained to observe "departures from the 'normal' [and] . . . this disposition to stereotype is an integral part of the policeman's world."[44] The result of stereotyping often may be that an act committed by a man who does not fit the stereotype (for example, a white man, middle-class in appearance, running out of a house in a "nice neighborhood") is likely to be presumed to be normal, while the same act committed by a man who conforms to the stereotype (such as an apparently lower-

[40] Skolnick, *Justice Without Trial*, 146. Again, if only because in China the category of persons who anticipate repeated future encounters with the police may be broader than in the United States, inhibitions among suspects and defendants there may tend to be more generalized than in the United States.

[41] Ironically, the counterpart in China to indigents in the United States probably is the bourgeoisie, who are inhibited increasingly from asserting their rights by their entire life situation since 1949.

[42] Jerome E. Carlin and others, "Civil Justice and the Poor," *Law and Society Review*, 1 (November 1966), 9-89, at 56. This article provides a devastating critique of the *de facto* and *de jure* class bias of the entire American legal system. In fact, it is not altogether clear to me that the class or status (or race) of a suspect or defendant is less relevant to the probable disposition of his case in the United States than in China. Only the good guys and bad guys are changed to protect the respective systems. In this regard, see also Sudnow.

[43] Skolnick, *Justice Without Trial*, 45, 105.

[44] *Ibid.*, 83.

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class black) may be taken as an attempted theft or burglary and will initiate the criminal process.

Similar stereotypes appear to operate during a trial when the trier of fact tries to ascertain whether intent requisite for guilt was present: "The required intent is so little susceptible of definite proof or disproof that the trier of fact is almost inevitably driven to asking, 'Does he look like the kind who would stick by the rules or one who would cheat on them when he saw the chance?' This question, unfortunately, leads easily into another, 'Does he look like my kind?' "[45]

Finally, the whole man is explicitly taken into account in the judge's determination of sentence and in subsequent parole proceedings.

V

A focus on organizational imperatives in this review article has led to an emphasis on similarities between Chinese and American criminal processes. This emphasis has been intensified by an effort to distinguish sharply between stated ideals of the American system and its operational reality. But the operational reality of a criminal process itself is influenced by stated ideals, particularly to the degree that such ideals are institutionalized or embodied in concrete organizational form.

The stated ideal of due process in the United States has a tremendous normative impact. Policemen, for example, in the light of widely held societal values generally are not willing to flout due process ideals openly. Precisely for this reason, evasions and violations of due process restraints normally occur in areas of low public visibility. Moreover, due process ideals are afforded an organizational protector, the appellate courts. In so far as these courts can make their influence felt throughout the system, concerns with individual rights, fair trial, and so on shape the criminal process.

In China the situation is different. The dominant concern, as one would expect of a still revolutionary government, is with substantive justice rather than with due process. China's stated ideals have reflected a high degree of confidence in the party's certain knowledge of good and evil, of who should be punished and for what. Such confidence implies less concern for due process, less agnosticism regarding the positive value of governmental exercise of power against suspected deviants. Even to the degree that China may be said to be concerned about problems of due process, the ideal of due process, as suggested above, has not been embodied in any organization. Thus, in the competition within

[45] Fuller, 72-73.

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the community of organizations constituting the criminal process, due process ideals regularly lose out.

Ongoing processes are inextricably complex, involving shared and competing stated ideals, communities of competing organizations and individuals, and interaction between ideals and concrete "reality." Comparisons of criminal processes require a sophisticated awareness of the problematic nature of our understanding of the familiar component of the comparison as well as a healthy skepticism of previous descriptions of the strange component. Professor Cohen, I am sure, would be the first to agree that the criminal process in China is neither as unlike its American counterpart as a comparison of our stated ideals with China's operational reality would indicate, nor as similar as a comparison of the regularized abuses of our process with the Chinese process would suggest. Truth, as usual, elusively lies somewhere between these poles.

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